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Tom :l. MOEis

On No"\·t)~nber 26, 1945, the Al:l~;assar10r to Ch: 7.tla. PatTie"!::: 3. :'fur.ley,

.annour.ced his resignat i.en tc the Arc.erican press.

In dci.ng S'.J, he lev

elcd charges-against the: State Department and a l1Ul'lber of its Foreign.
SenTlce offil,:ers--chlirges which ques tioned the integrity of Dany, in
their relati8::J.s with "That Hurle.y termed the "imperialist" and communist

nations 'in China.

. Those charges r,ce::e the beginning of

t~vo

and one-half

dec.ades 'Of ide.ological crusading in America by many who developed the
theory that t::hoee men charged by Hurley had been responsible for Ar.'lI?rica T s

H!lrley

,7<>'S s~nt

repT(~se-::1taciw~

t·)

to China in 1944

Chiang

Kai-she~.

2S

President Roose'felt r s personal

His directive was to promote efficient

and harmonious relstions b~tHei.!n Chiang Kai-l5hek ani General Stih-ell,

COllmumder. of A'.!!erican Forces, Cltina Theatre.

Hurley was, further, to

- facU; t.3t:e Stilwell's exercise of command over the Chinese armies ,v;'!1ich,

it was

i:oped~

'Would soon be placed under him.

Failing in this mission, Hurley was ultimately

of Ar.:bassad(Jr after the

I

esii:,nat:i.oiJ vf

Clc.l.re~~ce

r.

appoir~ted

Gaus:::.

to the r.:;,uk

Bu r:_cy had

this ti.me, taken on the responsi.bHHy of pr.omoting negotiations

bet~~Tcep

the Kuomintang Government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist
Pa:::-ty, headc:uartered in Yenan.
~.f.ather t:hansiIP,:pl.Y offering his "good offices

ll

in the o.egotiatio:ls J

Hurley became personally involved, interjecting hi.s personal, ideological
beliefs into the proposals of each side.

Through th:l.s involvement, Hur

ley became personally committed t;.J unification on his terms, and event'.l8.1.1y
gave the Kuo'1lintang Party and Chiang Kai·-sack the impression that the
United State::; WaS perman..: mtlf

~cl1llaitted

to suppcrt of the Central GV',;cr'n-

ment.
Hurley soon came into conflict with a. number of Foreign Service of
ficers and the D.:!partment of State, below thl! level of the Secretary of
State, OVE:r oPfosing interpretations of American policy in China.

Hudey

becaI!"!e intransigent in his overwhelming support of t.he National Government,
while lL!embers of the State Department believed that the United States
shol'ld remain flexible in its approach to the problems in China to avoid
sllpporting the losing side in what was seem as an inevitable civil war.
Hurlay cam..;; to see criticism of Chiang Kai-shek' s government and
suggestions for alterations in policy, as personal criticism directed
him.

a~

In the face of this perceived threat to himself, he had a number of

Foreign Service officers re-called or transferred, only to discover that
they had been reassigned to positions which he thought were superior to

his.

In the face of these ("vents and rising crit:ici.sITl, in adclHion to
eventual failure to bring

thl~

t~?O

Ch:ine::.;e fa.-:.:ti.onr. together al'ld impend

ing civil war, Hurley submitted his resignation to

of

tn", Se~n?tary

State, after first announcing his reasons La tile press.

Experiencing

on:;! of the fm.. failures of his life, ths man T.Jho had risen from the
coal mines of Oklahoma to become a millionaire twice over, Secretary
of Defense under President Hoover, and Ambassador to China under Roose
velt, turned the blaIne for his failure to those wHh whom he hRd

COlUe

in conflict, the Department of State being the principal culprit.
This study of Hurley's experiences in China is based

Up011

sever-

al secondary accounts of the period, recently published Department of
State papers (.!'oreign

Rel~!:J.:.ons~ t~e

United States:

Diplomati.c Papers),

Hurley's several testimonials before Congres!:>ional COllUllittees, and
views wi til Hr. John Stewart Service, upon whom attentiop.

~a8

lntcr~'

focl:secl in

numeroas loyalty investigations subsequent to Hurley's resig!!ation.
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.CHAPTER I

THE "GREAT DEBATE"

On November 26, 1945, Patrick J. Hurley, Ambassador to China
since November 30, 1941+, 1 tendered his resignation to Pres iden t Harry
S Truman.

On the following day, Mr. Hurley released the contents of

hi.s letter of resignation to the press

2

and launched what his biograph

er later termed the "great debate,,,3 one which, while not immediately
fruitful, had profound impl:i.cations for a number of Americans in later
years, and lIne from ,,-rhich echoes continue to be heard in the 1970's.4

lease, Hu.rley offered milch mo,e than a simple

resignatio~i.

In a

If • • •

scathing de.nunciation of State Department sa.botage of American foreign
policy • • . virtually unprecedented :i.n American diplor.mtj c history,"
1

Department of State, Foreign Relatior.s of thE: United States:
Diplomatic Papers (Washington: United States Government Printing
Office), 1944, VI, 200, footnote 29, (hereafter cited as ForeiJQ~.lt.":.
lations). Hurley was confirmed as Ambassador to China by tr,e United
States Senate on this date.
2

New Yor~im~~, November 28, 1945: Hur1ey ' s resignation was
reported in a front page story. The text of his letter to the Presi
dent was printed on page 3 of the same issue. For official text of
his letter of resignation see, Foreign Relations, 1945, VII, 72'2..

3
Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago, 1956), 474.

4

See The Arnerasi.-9JapE:r_§..: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China,
prepared by the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security La\'7S of the Committee
on the Judiciary (Hashington: Untted States Government Printing Office.,
January 26) J. 970), (hereafter cHed as AJ'!lp.I::l.f.'ia Pe.per.1U. S~e :i.n par
ticular, the "introduction" by Anthony Kubek, parts I, II, III, pp. 1-113.

Hurley laid the groundwork upon which he intended to build a case that
would awaken " . . • the indignation of the American people at the mis
conduct of foreign relations to the-point where a thorough investiga
tion and cleansing of the Department of State would be unavoidable." 5
Hurley stated initially that he had had, during

h~s

tenure in

China, the full support of both Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, as well
as their Secreta.ries of State, Cordell Hull, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.,
and James F. Byrnes.

But while American wartime objectives had always

been clearly defined in the "higher echelons of our policy-making of
ficials,"

6

there had existed according to Hurley, a wide discrepancy

between announced policies anc the actual conduct of international re
lations.

The United States had begun the Second World War with the

p.rJ.nQ.J.pJ.es.....of.. the, Atlantj.c Chart.er and. democracy as its...-so.als." ex::..
p1ained Hurley, but had finished the war in the Far East furnishing
Lend-lease supplies and using its reputation to undermine democracy
and bolster imperialism and Conoounism.
Hurley went on to state that he had been directed by President
Roosevelt, first, as the Presidentts personal representative to Chiang
Kai-shek and then as ambassador to China, to prevent the collapse of the
Chinese Government and to keep the Chinese Army in the war against the
Japanese.

While that had been his primary objective, Hurley continued,

it had also been his assigned function to harmonize the relations be
tween the American Embassy in Chungking and the Chinese Government.
ex-ambassador noted, however, that while all of these objectives had
5Lohbeck, 437.
6Foreign Relations, 1945, VII, 722.

The

3
been accomplished, and although they had the support of the President
and the Secretary of State, the American policy did not have the support
of all the career men in the State Department.

The professional foreign

service men, he charged, sided with the Chinese

Co~~unist

armed party

and imperialistic bloc of nations whose policy had been. to keep China
divided against herself.

They had openly advised the Communist armed

party to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the
National Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control.

Fur

thermore, these career men, after having been transferred to Washington
at Hurley's request, had been placed in the Chinese and Far Eastern Div
isions of the State Department as his supervisors.
In surom.arizing, Hurley argued that the United. States I World War II
policy as represented in thE. principles of the Atla11tic

Chart(;~r

and the

Iran Declaration, had been an elaboration of its First World War policy
of making the world free for democracy.
•

But while the United States had

won both wars, it had failed to establish the principles for which i t
had allegedly been fighting.

The war which was then in the making

not even intended to d.efend or establish detnocratic ideals.

vTaS

Instead of

putting its weight behind the Charter of the United Nations, the United
States had definitely been supporting the imperialistic bloc.

At the

same time, according to Hurley, a considerable section of the State De
partment was endeavoring to support Communism generally as well as
specifically in China.
Hurley's intent in releasing this denunciation of America's im
plementation of policy in the Far East

\11aS

not simply to inform the

President of the Ambassador's reasons for resigning.

It was his hope,

rather, to instigate an investigation by America's Congressional bodies:

4

• • • with his idealized concept of the American people and the
American government, Pat Hurley relied upon the Congress--now
that he had pointed out that path to follow--to launch a "great
debate" on the entire foreign policy situation. 7
It appeared at first, that Hurley would get his great debate.

Al

though the response to his publicized resignation was slight in the House
of Representatives, a debate was not long in beginning on the floor of
the United States Senate.

On November 28, Senator Kenneth Wherry of Neb

raska, addressing himself at first to impending legislation for implemen
tation of the United Nations Charter, shifted his attention to the Hurley
statement of resignation on the grounds that perhaps the State Department
was an area to be examined to determine its ability to function under a
United Nations-oriented system. 8
Hurley had not merely charged that some people were incompetent or
inept in conducting American foreign relations in the Orient, Wherry ar
gued, he " • • • has made charges against.at least one section of the
State Department personnel which seems to • • • involve accusations which
fall very little short of treason." 9

Offering lengthy remarks which read

like a defense of Hurley's charges Wherry concluded:
Mr. President, is it possible that we have fought this most
tragic of all wars in history only to discover that the gravest
danger and threat to America was not and is not derived from
any foreign power or combinations of power but from an indigi
nous conspiratorial minority of foreign agents and their dupes
who have used the glorious freedoms of this land to work de
struction from within?lO
7
Lohbeck, 474.
8
U. S. Congress, ~ongressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st
1945, Volume 91, Part 8, 11109.

--_.

9 Ibid . , 11110.
10Ibid., 11111.

Se~sion,

5
Responding to Senator vfuerry's remarks, Senator Tom Connally of
Texas expressed his surprise that Hherry had so hurriedly accepted the
entire statement of the former Ambassador.

11

For nearly an hour Connally

addressed the Senate in te~ms highly critical of Hurley's behavior in
making his resignation public.
Mr. President, it looks to me as if it is a little ungracious
for an Ambassador to a great country, having enjoyed these per
iods of service allover the world by appointment of the Presi
dent of the United States, now, because of this disagreement with
some subordinate somewhere--what it was about I do not know, it
never having been made clear as to what he says they did-- to re
sign his great station in a moment of anger, or pique and under
take to cover the foreign policy of the United States allover
with obloquy and diplomatic slime and say that the Foreign Polic.y
of the United States is almost approaching treason, as suggested
by· the Senator from Nebraska. 12
Admonished by Senator Styles Bridges for "making jest of a very ser
iaus· matrer,"·Connally respondE;;(]: that,
trying to make jest.

\l

no ; the Senator from Texas is not

He is trying to show the ridiculous attitude of the

former ambassador {sic] to China."l3
Follo\ving this rather heated exchange, Senator l\lh.er;ry called for
mally for a Senate investigation of the Hurley charges

14

and, on December

5, 1945, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator Tom
Connally proceeded to hear the testimony of:
General Hurley and such other witnesses as the Committee might
deem proper with respect to the situation :i.n the Far East, par

llIbid. , 11112.
12 Ibid • , 11113.
l3 Ibid . , 11114.
14 Ibid • , 11111.

•

6

ticularly China, in the light of General Hurley's resignation
as Ambassador to China."lS
"Mr. Chairman," Hurley began.
I would like to state in the beginning that I did not ask
for this hearing. I would also like to make it clear that I
have had no meetings of any kind with the members of Congress
on the facts that I will endeavor to present. The reason for
this statement is that I am convinced that this Committee is
beginning a hearing on the foreign policY of the United States.
Such a hearing should not be partisan. I will decline to ally
myself with any partisan group or with any minority.16
Hurley had thus begun his attempt to point out the path for Congress
to follow.

Unfortunately, the path would be a muddy one.

Hurley was not

at all clear in his testimony about what his charges actually were.

A

close examination of the claims made in his initial statement and in re
sponse to questions about the Committee reveal, when considered cumulative-

\.' 1
statement b y 111g1

0

ff"
. 1 atlng
'
Am erlca
"1
'lCla.1s, artlcu
s po 'lCY towar d Cl'
~lna. 17

Claiming that certain people in the Foreign Service were advocating a
different policv and telling the Communists and the A.lJlerican public that
the policy being follm\1ed by Hurlpy in China was his ow11 and not the
United States Government's, Hurley had wanted a public statement to

lSU.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Investigation of Far
Eas.!.ern Policy, Decembpr, 5. 6, 7. 10,1945 [unpublishedl, (Washington:
National Archives), 120.1/11.3045, (hereafter cited as Investigation. Far
East Policy), 3.
l6 Ibi <!., 2.
17 Ibid .. 7. Referring to Secretary of State Byrnes' public state
, ment of the previous day on United States-China policy, Hurley stated,
"
. if that public announcement of American policy had been issued by
the State Department before I returned from China, I would not have re
turned. If that public statement had been made by the State Department
before I rendered my resj.gnation, I would not have resigned." See, Ibid.,

5.

7
support his action and to lend credence to his attempts at unification of
the Nationalist and Communi.st Chinese.
Hurley pointed out to the Committee that while there had been state
ments of policy made directly to him, no public statement had been made
fI

. since Cordell Hull made it on the 26th day of November, 1941, he-

fore we got into war."lB
some

time~Hur1ey

He had asked for a public statement for quite

said, but had never received instructions from the State

Department, only from President Rooseve1t.

19

He stated later, however,

that after having outlined in a letter of December 24, 1944, his concep
tion of American policy, to the Secretary of State (Stettinius), the
latter had sent Hurley a telegram in which he commended the Ambassador
highly for the work he had done.

This was not, however, a public state

ment, Hurley said, and the lIlen whom he had referred to

':';'8

worlei"fl-g-·aga4.~.st

him, had taken the position that the Secretary's commendation was not an
endorsement of the policy the Ambassador had out1ined. 20

On or about

January 21, 1945, Hurley said, he had called all the heads of American
agencies in China together in his office and stated to them the policy
of the United States.

Hurley later reported to the Committee that those

men whom he claimed to be working against him were at that meeting, but
had expressed no hostility to the policy as announced to them at that
time.

IB 1bid . , B.
19 Ibid . , 40A.

20Ibi~. , 40H.

8
Following his announcement of policy to his agency heads,
Hurley ·returned to l-lashington, according to his testimony, and was
there confronted by a report to the Secretary of State from Mr. George
Atcheson (who had been left in charge of the Embassy), in which he a1
legedly recommended that Hurley's policy of not armin.g the Communists-
belligerents who would fight against the government that the United
States was upholding--be discarded and replaced with a policy of pro
viding Lend-lease aid to the Chinese Communists.

Atcheson had also

said in his report, Hurley added, that he (Atcheson) " • • . had the
support, the acquiescence of every official member of the American
Embassy in Chungking. 1I2l

In Hurley's opinion, Mr. Atcheson had been

guilty of insubordination in sending this report without his prior

Asked if he had !:esolved the issue over the Atcheson report,
Hurley answered in the affirmative.

He claimed to have contended at

the time that if the Atcheson report constituted the policy of the
United States it was a departure from the purpose for which he had
been sent to China.

If that were the case then Atcheson should be

left in charge and he, Hurley, kept at home.

The result, after many

days of argument, was, Hurley asserted, " • . • that Mr. Atcheson was
recalled, because he had shown that in my absence he had advocated a
policy that I felt destructive t.o unification.,,22

2lIbid ., 41. Hurley had stated earlier in his testimony that it
had been-his opinion while in China that aroing or providing Lend-lease
to, the Chinese Communists faction would constitute the recognition of
a belligerent. See, IhiE._' 40D.

22Ibid.~ 49.

9

Atcheson's recall, however, did not satisfy the Ambassador, for as
he stated in response to Senator LaFollette's request for a statement of
facts,

.

You have it, that I made this report to Secretary Stettinius;
he sent me a telegram whi"ch approved my conduct but did not
make a public statement upholding the policy, and as soon as I
left China the whole crowd got together and reversed or tried
to reverse that telegram, The result was that Atcheson was re
called and placed in a supervisory capacity with all the others
over me in Washington, and that made untenable my position, I
wanted a public statement from the State Department of our po1
icy."23
Asked once more, what the issue was, Hurley replied:
What I wanted was a public statement of the American policy
so that they could not continue in high official positions to
say that what I upheld was not the American policy. " I think
that is the issue, Senator. 24
In addition to George Atcheson and the "whole crowd" at the Chung
king Embassy, Hurley named

spe~ifica1ly,

one John Stewart Scrvjce, a po

litical advisor assigned to General Joseph Stilwell's command in China
as one of the principal saboteurs.

In response to the Committee Chair-

man's question as to when these men defeated Hurley's poiicy in China,
Hurley testified that on October 30, 1944, Mr. John S. Service submitted
in his report number 40, "

a general statement of how to let the

government that I was sent over there to sustain fall; and that report
was

circu~ated

among the communists whose support I was seeking for our

,
1125
po I ~cy . . • •

Later in his testimony, Hurley reiterated that ".

the report of Hr. John Service dated October 10, 1944, and numbered 40.
23 Ibid • , 50.
24
o

~

Ibid. , 58.

~51bid_, , 16.

10
was the first outward evidence I had of a plan not to uphold but to
cause. the collapse of the Government of the Republic of China.,,26
Although Hurley's testimony was extremely vague and rambling, it
appears that he was finally motivated to resign by a number of occur
rences which led him to believe that his work was being undermined.
Having succeeded in getting Atcheson, Service and several other Foreign
Service offi.cers recalled, Hurley then discovered that three of these
men, Atcheson, Service and John K. Emmerson, had been appoi.nted as Ad
visors to the Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Asia.

Although

the appointments irritated Hurley, he was far more concerned with the
fact that
the papers in China, especially in Yenan [the Chinese Communist
stronghold], and the radio, said that Atcheson and Service and
sa.c.for.th had. won out over. me, and. that I had.. ,not haem. rep.r.esen.t:i.ng.
the United States' policy, and the papers said they were coming
back to China and therefore the Communists should not unite.
Hurley fu:;;:ther stated on this point that it had been Mao Tse-tung who had
told him that the United States was not going to follow through on its
unification program that he was trying to present.

28

In addition to this challenge to Hurley's authority in China, the
ex-Ambassador testified that while he was in Washington in November,
1945, someone had addressed a letter to President Truman in which lIurley
was charged with making his own policy in China.

Everett

D~umright,

Chief of the Department of State's China Division, prepared an answer
to this letter, Hurley told the Committee, in which it was stated that
26.!.bid., 89.
27 IbJ5!.

,

57.

28.~bid. , 60.

11

the policy being followed in China was the United States Government's
policy and not one formulated by Hurley.

But when the letter reached

John Carter Vincent, Hurley went on to report, the Director of the Far
Eastern Division struck out all but an acknowledgement of its receipt.
Drumright's defense of Hurley, in other words, never reached the ac
cuser.

On that same day Hurley charged, "

the same career man's

attack on me came out not only in papers in New York and in Chicago,
but on the floor of Congress."

29

He had come home in November to re

sign, Hurley explained, but Secretary Byrnes and President Truman had
talked him into going back after a brief rest.

He was sincere when

he told the President and Byrnes that he would go back, said Hurley,
"but when I was confronted by the fact that again I was left naked to
my".eo.cmiDA.and.. the.. en.emies, of
ing, and I dl.d.

Ame,ric~l,

. I de.o.ided.. I would

COm1!1Cllce.

fi·r-·

So that is the' reason 'vhy I am here this morning. ,,30

It is apparent from Hurley's testimony, when viewed as a whole,
that he had felt strongly about avoiding military and mater.ial support
of the Chinese Communists for fear chat this \-]Quld constitute recogni
tion by the United States Government of the belligerent status of the
Communists i.n a Chinese civil war.

The recognition of an armed force

which.was fighting to overthrow a government allied with the United
States was.out of the question, as far as he was concerned.

Foreign

Service personnel, however, were advocating the arming of the Communists,
and in Hurley's opinion, doing it behind his back.

29 Ibi <!.., 63.
30 Ibid .) 63.

This apparent

Hurley never identified this man in his testimony.

12
insubordination threatened the Ambassador and was compounded by reports,
both in China and at home, which questioned publicly his authority to
carry out what he perceived to be his assigned duty--the unifi.cation of
the Chinese Communist and Nationalist governments.
Unfortunately, for Hurley, and perhaps for the American people,
the ex-Ambassador's charges could not be substantiated.

The man who,

through Congress, was taking his case to the American public, could not
take the evidence to them as well.

Hurley had based his charges on a

number of documents, stated 'at first to be written by himself, but ex
panded in number as the hearings progressed, to include several written
by John Stewart Service, George Atcheson and John Patton Davies, Jr.
Although Hurley had testified in the beginning stages of the hearings
that he pos:::es'sed none of the coded copies· of the-J'e ' documents j he-did
admit to having had in his possessiun, notes of the preparation of his
original copies.

But Hurley would not reveal the contents of these doc

uments, without the Committee being supplied paraphrases by the Depart
ment of State.

As Hurley stated,

I know what they contain, but I will have to ask the State De
partment to furnish me with paraphrases of these documents for
the reason that if we should submit from the State Department
the original documents they would have a tendency to give away
the American secret code; and I do not want to do any irrepar
able damage to the foreign policy of my country.3l
After four days of hearings, in which Hurley's charges were reit
erated, but not substantiated, the Committee moved to continue its in
vestigation in Executive Session, where the contents of the documents
requested by Hurley could be examined without publicity.

3lU~id., 3.

But Hurley

13

refused.

"He would testify only in public, where the press could trans

. t h e 1n
. f ormat10n
.
.
.
..
,,32
m1t
0 f- corrupt10n
to t h e ent1re
CJ_t1zenry.

The ideal

ism of Patrick J. Hurley which would not allow him to disclose the con
tents of documents vital to his case, destroyed his attempt to take "tbe
truth" to the American people.

On December 10, 1945, the Senate Foreign

Relations Cowmittee's Investigation of Far Eastern Policy came to an end.
For lack of a principal, the case was dropped.

While Hurley had pointed

out the path for Congress to follow, he had, at the same time, blocked
that path with obstacles insurmountable at that time.

About Senator

Wherry's resolution to set up a five-man Committee for a "top to bottom
investigation of the State Department," Senator Connally reported:
is lying calmly on my desk.

.

It

have not put a pulmotor on it."

shows no signs of life, although

"It

\ole

33

Having instigated, but by his own action ended, an investigation
of the State Department, Hurley, in 1946~ decided to take his case di
rectly to the people.

But to do so, he needed a" • • . nationwide forum

from which to proclaim his charges against the pro-Communist and pro-im
perialist elements within the government."

34

That forum, as Hurley saw

it, would be the United States' Senate for which he campaigned as the
Republican nominee from Ne'l1 Nexico in 1946.

In a letter to an Ok13.homa

newspaper editor who had charged that Hurley changed his residence froffi
32

Lohbeck, 446.

33

Anthony Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and
the Creation of Conununist China, .1941-1949 (Chicago, 1963), 313.

34

Lchbeck, 453.
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Oklahoma to New Mexico to pick up an easy Senate seat, Hurley wrote:
I ran for the Senate from New Mexico after I had resigned as
Ambassador to China. • . • I decided to go to the Senate to
obtain for myself a forum through which to speak to the American
people and by which I believed I could prevent the loss of our
great ally, China. 35
Losing to the incumbent, Senator Dennis Chavez, who according to
Hurley's biographer, Don Lohbeck,
speaking vote in New Mexico • • .

It • • •

,n

controlled the large Spanish-

Hurley again attempted election in

1948, running this time against the former Secretary of Agriculture,
Clinton P. Anderson.

In the 1948 campaign which Lohbeck describes as

similar to the one in 1946:
·Hur1ey spoke of the betrayal of America's honor and integrIty
through the secret betrayal of our ally in the Far East, and of
the dangers of corrupting America's traditional support of po
litical independence and territorial integrity through the policy
of'upholding imperialist greed and a.ggression . • • 36
Where Hurley had lost by' only 4000 votes in 1946, he lost by
26,000 in the 1948 election.

In both cases, Lohbeck reported Hurley's

losses in such a way that Hurley appeared once again, the victim of
machinations against him.

Where it was reported that Hurley had been

accused of moving to New Hexico to pick up an easy seat in the 1946
election, Hr. Lohbeck wrote that in 1948 Hurley's opponents were again
campaigning on a personal level.
The'smear commentators were brought to New Mexico to accuse
Pat Hurley of cowardice in the first World War, brutality dur
ing the bonus march, and of having recommended during the de
pression years that 'the poor be fed the scrapings from the
rich men's plates. ,37
35 Ibid:...., 504.

36Ib2-~"

454.

37 IbJd., 38.
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In 1949, the "China white-paper" was released by the State De
partment.

Entitled, Unite? St!ltes Relations HUh China,38 this publi

cation was released following the

Corr~unist

takeover in China and was

intended to be an explanation of American policy toward China since
1941, but with emphasis on the five yea'rs vreceding the Communist vic
tory over the Nationalist government.

In Hurley's eyes, however, it was

• a smooth alibi for the pro-Communists in the State Department who
have engineered the overthrow of our ally, the National Government of
the Republic of China, and aided in the Communist conquest of China.,,39
Critical of the "white paper" for numerol.!S reasons, Hurley's pri
mary complaints centered around the reporting of the Yalta agreement)
and the failure of the State Department to reveal to the American people,
tIm dO'cunrents which he could not present in 1945, wh:l:ch, Hurley claimed ,
had obviously been quoted from in the "white paper.,,40
It was Hurley's opinion, that contrary to the justifica.tion pre
sented in the "white paper," the secret Yalta agreement which brought
Russia into the Pacific War approximately three months after the defeat
of Germany, was not necessary.
The import of the "white paper" to the effect that we were com
pelled to meet these demands of Russia because we were afraid of
what Russia would do about our war with Japan, is not a satisfactory
reason for our entering into the secret agreements of Yalta. At

38Department of State, United States Relations With Ch::'na: With
Special_Reference~t~ ~~eperiod.194~9 (Washington~ 1949), (Hereafter
cited as United States Relations with China).
39Quoted in Lohbeck, 457.
40 Ibid ., 458.
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that time the United States had on land, on the seas, and in
the air, the greatest military power ever assembled on this
earth. America's military power at the time of Yalta was in
vincible. The United States did not need Russia. Russia
dared not oppose the United States. Japan was already defeated
before Russia reached the Japanese front. td
Once again, in 1950, as reported by Hurley's biographer, the exAmbassador to China made a martyred appeal to the American people.

In

a radio forum of that year, moderated by Eleanor Roosevelt, Hurley,
" • •• expresslllg the weariness of years of shouting a warning from the
housetops while few paused to listen," stated in answer to Mrs. Roose
velt's question if everything had been published on the China incident,
"Well, no, Mrs. Roosevelt.
to

stop_~."

42

.Everytime I try to tell it, somebody tries

(Emphasis is Lohbeck' s).

But ironically, in that same year, 1950, Patrick Hurley denied
himself an opportunity to tell again what he saw as the cause of America's
failure in China.

Invited to testify' before the Senate Foreign Relations

Committeets hearings on State Department employee loyalty investigations,
better known as the Tydings sub-committee, Hurley refused because the
documents requested by him in 1945 would not yet be made available to
him.
He IMi11ard E. Tydings) advised me that they would not be,
that they were secret documents. I said then that it would
be futile for me to appear because I could not use the docu
ments, even those which are my own which have been encoded,
until they are decoded and made available to me through the
State Department. 43
4;tlbid. , 458.
42 Ibid . , 458.
43 Ibid • , 460.
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In 1951, however, Patrick Hurley found himself with another chance
to tell his story fully, when he was invited to testify before the joint
hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Armed Services Com
mittees, on the military situation in the Far East.

44

In his testimony,

to which there is no reference in his biography, Hurley made many of the
same points that he had in 1945, but added many more, since the longasked-for documents were available to him, and the secret Yalta agree
ments had become public knowledge.
American diplomats, Hurley began, had surrendered the territorial
llltegrity and the political independence of China in the secret agreement
at Yalta.

That secret agreement, he said, marked the beginning of a

change in America's foreign policy toward China, from support of the prin
ciples of the

Atlanti~

Charter to a policy basec on concessions to Com

munism, imperialisre and fear of Russia.
£hart~

The provision in the

At!~

agreeing to no territorial or other form of aggrandizement by

the signatories during the war, was intended, said Hurler, " . • • to hold
Russia and Communism within the national boundaries of Russia.,,45

The

Yalta agreement, Hurley testified, released Russia from this bind.
thermore, the

A~lantic Cha~

Fur

provision guaranteeing respect for the

right of all peoples to choose their own form of government had to be
repealed, claimed Hurley, " • • • in order to give the colonial imperial
ists the right to resubjugate their colonial and mandated people •• .46

44 U. S• Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign
Relations, Hearin s on the Militar- Situation in the Far East (Washington,
1951), (hereafter cited as Mi itarZ Situation Far East).
45 Ibid ., 2832.
46 Ibid •
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The Atlantic Charter had been a consistent reference for Hurley
beginning with his letter of resignation in 1945, and now, finally, six
years later, his attachment to that document was revealed.

He had

•
47
been instrumental in drafting the Iran Declaration
at the Teheran Con
ference in 1943, Hurley pointed out in his testimony.

Although this

declaration had been presented by Secretary of State, Cordell

Hul~

to

the Russians earlier in Moscow, and rejected, it was accepted by the
powers at Teheran, according to Hurley, after he had included the fol
lowing additional phrase:
They {the signatories] count upon the participation of Iran
together with all peace-loving nations, in the establishment of
international peace, security, and prosperity after the war in
accordance with the principles of t::le Atlantic Charter to which
all four nations have s 11bscribed.48
Hurley identified himself with the Irar, Declaration, therefore,
and this identification was carried over to the principles of the
Atlantic Charter which, in his mind, had been reaffirmed by the three
principal powers when they signed the Iran Declaration.

Having charged

in his 1951 testimony that after the United States had entered the war,

the Communists and Imperialists had tried to discount the Atlantic
Ch

~te:r

49 -c l"
. was not a b'1nd'l.ng agreement--l.t
. was H
a1m1ng t h at 1t
ur I
eyt s

contention that because the Iran Declaration had included a reference

47 See : Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran,
1943 (Washington, 1961), 377. See also: Military Situation Far East,
2834; and Lohbeck, Chapter 4, 202.
48Military Sityation F,!lr East, 2834.
49 Ibid ., 50.
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to the Atlantic Charter, and because the former had been signed by the
Unl.ted States, Great Britaj.n and the Soviet Union, it
an international agreement as any treaty •

\oTaS

as binding

50

.

Having thus testified to the binding legality of the Atlantic
'~harter,

Hurley proceeded to show how the United States had surrendered

the principles of that agreement at Yalta.

The National Government of

the Republic of China was our ally, Hurley repeated, and the secret
agreement at Yalta gave away her property without her being represented.
This was, in effect, a violation of the Atlantic Charter guarantees of
the territorial integrity of sovereign nations.
Marsha11

S1

Furthermore, General

who had been sent to China as Hurley's replacement, had been

ordered, according to Hurley, to force the Nationalists into a coalition
with the Chinese Communists.

This was not in keeping with the UoHed

States· policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign
states, he pointed out.

52

President Roosevelt was a sick man at Yalta,
did not know what was happening.

53

Hurl~y

claimed, and

Hurley had learned that an agreement

had been made at Yalta in reference to China while he was still in
China, and when he came home in March, 1945, he confronted the President,

50 Ibid_., 2842.
51General of the Army, George C. Marshall, was appointed by Truman
as the President's special envoy to China with the personal rank of
Ambassador, on November 27, 1945. See ,Foreign Relations, 1945, VII, 276.
52M1'l'1t~ry- Si ~uat1o~
.
F'ar East, 2838 .
53 1, . d

~.,

2888.
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first with a demand to see the ag:reements made at Yalta, and then, after
having seen them, with the. contention that the secret portion was a
violation of the territorial integrity of China.

Hurley did not reveal

his actual conversations with Roosevelt in his testimony, only that
Roosevelt, subsequently, and as a result of Hurley's urgings, felt that
there was some possible dangers of infringements on China's territory
if the Yalta provisions were carried out.
Agreeing that there was some justification for Hurley's fears,
Roosevelt, according to Hurley's testimony, sent the ambassador immedi
ately to London and Moscow to ameliorate the agreements related to
China.

Once again, Hurley failed to reveal the substance of his conver

sations with Churchill and Stalin, stating only that he 'vas able to an
nounce to the press upon his return tv China, that the three governments
concerned had agreed that they would respect the territorial integrity
and the political independence of China and that they would support the
efforts of the Chinese people to establish self-government.

On

the day

following his announcement to the press, Hurley testified, the British
Prime Minister under question in Parliaruent

54

affirmed the correctness

of Hurley's announcement.
Hurley concluded his testimony, however, stating that:
. . . the next thing I had was a cable from the State Depart
ment in which they say that they are irrevocably committed to
the agreement signed at Yalta; in other words, I was making a
little dE'.nt on Britain and Russia, but I could not move the
American State Department; and that, my friends, I think,
brings you to what I consider the saddest defeat that I suf
fered . . . . 55

55 Ibid .
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Once again, Hurley had been given an opportunity to tell his
story but, as in 1945, he was extremely vague in reference to a number
of points, the most vital being the actual substance of his conversations
with Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin.

He did reveal, however, his very

close attachment to the Atlantic Charter and to its reaffirmation in the
Iran Declaration of 1943.

This personal attachment suggests a tendency

to become personally committed to the diplomatic work assigned to him, a
characteristic which deprived him of needed flexibility.
Roosevelt, who was in Hurley's opinion, a sick man at Yalta, was
a victim of the same machinations that had been working to defeat the
ambassador in his attempts to stabilize and sustain the Natjona1ist
Chinese government in the war effort.

Hurley revealed in his testimony,

fight a.gainst Japan, and that this was known prior to Yalta.

Referring

to the allegation in the "China white-paper," that American policy
mskers feared there would be upwards of 1,000,000 casualties in an in
vasion of Japan, Hurley stated:
If we believe this • • • we must also believe that the final
conquest of a broken and beaten Japan would cost more in
American casualties than all the battles of the Pacific, all
the battles of the islands, all the battles of Burma and
China, all the battles of the Atlantic, all the battles of
Africa, all tIle battles of the Mediterranean, all the battles
of England, all the battles of France, all the battles of
Bolland, all the battles of Belgium, and all the battles of
Germany. America had less than 1,000,000 casuslties in all
of those battles. 56
It was easy, therefore, for Hurley to view the unnecessary Yalta
agreeffient to bring Russia into the Pacific war, as another of the State
~epartment~s

attempts to let China go to the Communists.

56 Ibid ., 2839.

lbe United
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States did not need Russia's help in fighting the Japanese.

This was

known at Yalta, according to Hurley, by all perhaps but Roosevelt.
conclusion was obvious:

The

The only reason Russia was brought into the

Pacific war was to aid the Communists in gaining a foothold in North
China and Manchuria, the resulting effect being aid to the Chinese
Communists in their fight to control all of China.

And it was all done

by a key group of career State Department personnel.
In 1952, Patrick Hurley again ran for the Senate from New Mexico.
Once again, he lost, victimized this time, his supporters alleged, by
bi-partisan alignments, the " • • • communist-dominated Mine, Mill and
Smelter Worker's Union" and, " • • • the long arm of Zionist political
pressure. 11

57

Betrayed by the leaders of his own party, smeared by pro
Communist labor groups, opposed by those who sought to revenge
themselves against his anti-imperialism, Pat Hurley--when the
ballots were counted--appeared to h~ve been defeated by 5,071
votes out of a total of 239,971 ballots cast,58
But not only was Hurley the victim of a smear campaign in this)
his final bid for a Senate seat, the election, he complained, was rigged.
Two years after the election a sub-committee of the Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration, which had investigated the New Mexico election
in response to Hurley's petition, recommended, based on its findings,
II

that no member of the Senate was elected from the State of New

Nexico in the 1952 general election,II
57

Lohbeck, 462.

58}bid., 463.
59 Ibid ., 467.

59

In response to Senator William

23
Jenner's resolution of March 16, 1954, calling for Senate concurrence
in the committee's

recon~endation

(S. Res. 220) the Senate voted, 53

to 36 against setting aside the election of Dennis Chavez in 1952.
Hurley faced another defeat.

In his biographer's words:

Once again he was denied the national forum from which to
carryon his fight against the perversion of America's world
mission into an appeasement of Communist aggression and a de
fense of imperialist exploitation. 60
But the Hurley story did not end with his defeat in 1952, nor has
it ended yet today.

In 1956 his biography, authored by Don Lohbeck and

referred to previously in this account, presented the Hurley story in
glittering terms.

Lohbeck pictured Hurley as a great American martyr,

who
• • • had left the coal towns before the turn of the century-
since -had trtrveltd· li1C"'\o;'or-ld com!ltt'lting
with Presidents, admonishing Prime Ministers, consoling Gen
erali.sSimos debating with'Dictators l and giving advice to
'
• • 6i
K~ngs.
and'in-thfr'ma~'yeal's

but who "
titled:

• himself suggested that the story of his life should be
'The Story of a Failure.

111

62

Bu't in spite of Hurley's view of himself as a failure, Lohbeck
wrote, ". • • it is now becoming increasingly evident that he has not
e il e.
d ,,63
.La

Quoting John Foster Dulles' 1955 statement that:

62 Ibid ., 480,

63 Ibid .
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What we need to do is to recapture to some extent the kind
of crusading spirit of the nation's early days when we were
darn sure that what we had was a lot better than what anybody
else had. lie kney' the rest of t:he world wanted it, and needed
it, and that we were going to carry it around the world • • • 64
Lohbeck concludes his biography of Hurley with, "That is precisely the
kind of

f~ericanism

that Patrick J. Hurley has lived and taught through

out his long and active life.,,65
As the public reaction to the post-l-1orld l-1ar II events, partic
ularly to the so-called "loss of China" and the Korean lVar, diE'd down
in the late 1950's and 1960's, little was heard of Patrick J. Hurley
and the charged he leveled at the State Department.

Most assuredly,

academicians studied and wrote about the China incident, and none could
ignore Patrick J. Hurley's role in the episode.

But publicly, Hurley

disappeared from view, though the charges he made, such as 'lIthe sick
man at Yalta" and Communist infiltration of the State Department, re
mained as highly controversial themes through the two decades following
the Second World War, though without acknowledgment of their source.
Then, in 19.70, twenty-five years after Hurley tried to show
Congress the path, the issues were raised again by a
the United States Senate.

Subcon~ittee

of

On January 26, 1970, this subcommittee re

leased, in two volumes, The Amerasia Papers:

A Clue to the Catastrophe

of China,66 an edited collection of documents which had been seized in
a raid on the office of Amerasia Hagazine in 1945.

64 Ibid ., 481.
65 Ibid .

66 See fn.
4.

Among these documents,
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most of which were stolen from the United States Governme.nt, were the
papers which Hurley had so adamantly requested be revealed to the American
people to substantiate his case sincE 1945.
The Amerasia collection was edited and introduced by Anthony Kubek,
Professor of History at the University of Dallas and author of !low the
Far East Was Lost:

American Policy and the Creation of Communist China,

1941-1949 (Chicago, 1963).

In his introduction, entitled "Historical

Survey of Kuomintang...-<::ommunist Relations," the thesis presented is that
which was developed by Hurley so many years earlier:

America's China

policy was sabotaged by the "old China. hands," John Stewart Service
being the principle culprit.
The main thrust of Kubek's introduction of which there are three

them, WEre found among those confiscated from the offices of Amerasia
lI.¥gaz:i.:.ne in 1945.

Implicating Service in the scandal that was the

"Amerasia Case," Kubek all but convicts the me.n of treason on the grounds
that his papers were with those found in the Amerasia office.

Although

Kubek eventually reveals that the Service papers found at Amerasia were
stolen from the State Department and not provided by Service, he persists
in making the following observations:
(11 During the years of \<lorld War II an aggressively pro
Communist magazine office in New York, populated by individuals
whose connection with international Communism was old and deep,
furtively obtained and copied many highly classified documents
of the United States Government; and (2) the official policy of
the United States Government in support of Chiang Kai-shek's
Nationalist regime in China was actively opposed and subverted
during World War II by a few junior American career diplomats
on station in China, John Stewart Service conspicuous among
them. 67

67

.
AmeraSl.a

112.
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In concluding from the above that "connected inextricably, these
twin facts contain a special relevance today for the people of the United
States • • . ,,68
had imagined.

Mr. Kubek is, perhaps, more to the point than even he
At a time when the People's Republic of China is gaining

prestige and recognition throughout the world and when the United States
government is being drawn closer to recognition of the Chinese COIlullunis '.:
government, it becomes ever more necessary to re-examine a story of con
spiracy and duplicity that has stood in the face of many challenges for
far too many years.

This is all the more important lyhen the present

conflict in Indo-China rages, and a Subcommittee of the United States
Senate publishes material which holds that:
the terrible wars in Korea and Vietnanl have resulted directly
from the Com.lllunist selzure of the Asiatic heartland, and all
tha-"bre.,y.ing di.{ficu1tier:l c,].s-ewhl;H;e in the"Far"EaM" over-the'
past two decades have had the cancer of China at their root. 69
The task remains, therefore, to examine from the beginning, Patrick

J. Hurley's role in China and a story which has been perpetuated over a
period of two and a half decades.

CHAPTER II
CHINA AND THE ROOTS OF THE HURLEY MISSION 1943-44
The story of Patrick J. Hurley in China is, to a great degree, the
story of wartime Ch:i.na itself.

Sent to the China Theatre in 1944 as

President Roosevelt's personal representative to Chiang Kai-shek, Major
Generel Hurley's principal mission was to reconcile the differences be
tween Lt. General Joseph Stilwell and Chi.ang Kai-shek.

Stilwell had been

assigned to China as Chief of Staff and commander of American forces in
1942.

But when Hurley arrived in China it was immediately obvious, if it

haclnot been so prior to his dL!lJarture from' the Un±tcd·· St"ates, that there
were more deeply rooted problems in China than those between Stih-,el1 and
Chiang--problems which had their origins in America's traditional view of
its role, vis-l-vis the Chinese, and in President Roosevelt's view of
China's place in the post-war world.
Nilitarily, China's role in the world war was to be a minor one.
In terms of grand strategy, the Pacific Theatre was third in line behind
England and Russia for military aid, and China placed a poor fourth.

The

Chinese were vie\'led as capable of resisting the Japanese advance on the
Asian continent until the Germans could be defeated and until the United
States could rebuild he,r fleet, after which China would ultimately
become the la,nnching pad for the final air and sea assault against
the Japanese home-islands.
a holding action.

In other words, the Chinese were to fight

Their primary function in thE: 'War would be to somehow

28

stay in the war and on the slde of the Allies.

l

Politically, however, China loomed large in the minds of American
policy formulators, particularly Roosevelt's, as a future Great Power.
Always present in the President's mind, from the earliest days of the
war, was the belief that the world would never be free

~rom

war as long

as imperialism, particularly British imperialism, was allowed to con

tinue.

In his conception of the future post-war world stood a free and

independent Asia, with a strong and unified China as its pillar of
strength against future imperialist incursions.

Such a China would,

Roosevelt envisioned, take its place in a future world system which
would be policed by the four Great Powers:
Britain, the Sovi.et Union, and China.

the United States, Great

2

In' sp.:iw-o{ the fact thAt· China '.s irmnediate. miJ HaJ;¥ and....fut.ur.e._.
world political roles 'vere not compatible, the United States intended
to give the Chinese its full moral support during the war, plus all the
supplies and equipment i t could possibly spare.

The assumption was

that this moral and, albeit minor, military support, when combined with
what were believed to be strong traditional ties between the United
States and China since the days of the open-door, would result not only
in a great power role for China, but a China which would lean politically
and diplomatically toward the United States as well. 3
lGaddis Smith, AmericCli:1 Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941
1945 (Ne~v York, 1967), 7; Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: the American
Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (New York, 1965),
14; Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China
(Washington, D.C., 1953) 64; James MacGregor Burns, -Roosevelt: The Soldier
of Fr~j_om, 19l,0-1945 (Nev1 York, 1970), 242.
')

~Smith, A~erican Diplc~acy,

3Ibi~., 7.

81-98.
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Though illusory, this view prevailed. and Roosevelt made policy
from the beginning with the idea in mind that when the war was over,
colonialism would be over as well.

4

Even prior to the United States'

formal entry into the war," Roosevelt had begun to put his post-war plans
into effect.

At Argentia, Newfoundland, in August, 1941, Roosevelt

committed himself and the United States to the principles of self-de
termination and non-aggrandizement when he signed, with the British
Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, the Atlantic Charter.
ciples, the first of

~l1hich

S

These prin

was new, in \-lord at least, to American dip

lomacy were applied to China by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, on
November 26,

191~1.

In what was to be the final formai policy statement

on China made by the United States until 1945, Hull informed the Jap
anoes&' tha-t the- United Sta,tas,· \-,IB&,·,co:rrlUi tted to "the....,principle ,.of inviol
ability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations"
and to "the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of
other countries."

6

At the ARCADIA conference in Washington, D.C., called shortly af
ter the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt and Churchill, meeting to
plan their grand strategy, agreed to establish a separate China Theatre,
under the command of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Operating under the

belief that Chiang would never consent to being placed under foreign
command, he was made responsible to none other than himself, rather than
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the unified command structure which was

4

Ibid., 81.

SWilli[lm L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared Hat:.,
.!,9 l }Q-194!. (NCvl York, 1953), 687.
6Foreign Relations L 1941, II, 766.
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also created at ARCADIA.

7

This separate command reflected a sensitivity

on the part of Churchill and Roosevelt, to the century of foreign inter
ference in China's internal affairs by the West.

Keeping in mind past

European intervention in China and the American policy statement of Nov
ember 26, 1944, to say nothing of the fact that the Allies were now in
vo1ved in the Far East in opposition to Japanese imperialism in Asia,
the two Western leaders were very cautious not to appear to be inter
fering in China.

It would, furthermore, be extremely difficult to sub

ordinate Chiang Kai-shek to the Combined Chiefs.

While he was, in fact,

Generalissimo of the Chinese Army, he was, as well, 'head of state.

Unlike

the American wartime command structure, the Chinese structure did not
provide for a military Chief of Staff, subordinate to the Political Chief.
Chi~vMt

one.

heed of' state, COInl.'1e!tntiler-i.n-Gbie£·

and~·Cbi·ef

o£uStat'f, a11in

It would not have been politic to make him subordinate to the Com

bined Chiefs in one role and equal to Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in
the other.
Involved as well, in these early planning stages, were Roosevelt's
hopes for an Asia free, in the future, of imperialism.

Chiang Kai-shek

had become an ally of Roosevelt's in the latter's anti-imperialism cam
paign, the two uniting early in the war, against Churchill, on that ques
tion.

Chiang believed, as did Roosevelt, that the existence of colonial

ism in Asia provided Japan with considerable propaganda material to be
used in influencing the Chinese people.

Chiang had spoken out strongly

against the British position in India and in support of Gandhi, and
Roosevelt had offered his encouragement.

Roosevelt had realized the

7Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Nission, 61-62.
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futility of his own advancements toward Churchill on the subject.

As

early as the Argentia meeting, ChurchjJ.l had announced that he had not
taken office to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.

8

Roosevelt, therefore, had turned to China, hoping to make that nation
strong enough to resist the colonial pressures of Great Britaj.n and
others, throughout Asia.

To avoid being associated with the imperial

powers, whose presence Roosevelt so opposed, it was necessary to avoid
direct American involvement in China.

9

Chiang Kai-shekts nearly autonomous role in the China Theatre
'Was not., as the war developed, to his liking, as was evidenced by de
velopments in August, 1943, when Roosevelt and Churchill were meeting
at Quebec.

Just as that conference was beginning, T. V. Soong, the

Clrli.~Fot:'eign

}iini'seer,' uPPToached· Cordell Hull ui:than· ur.gent plea

to make the unity of the four pmvers a reality by j.nc1uding China jn
the major planning conferences.

The letter handed to Hull

• • • remarked that the Chinese government had not even
been asked to present opinions and plans in regard to mat
ters of utmost concern to China; and that even when given
a hearing by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Chinese spokesman
had net been allowed to share in the arguments and the mak-
ing of decisions. The Chinese government • • • wanted to be
included on a footing of equality in all existing joint and
\. d agencl.es.
.
. COlmane
• • • 10
Although the Chinese were not granted their request at Quebec,
they were soon diverted from that ccurse, when, on September 2, 1943,

8Smith,

Am~rifan,Diplo}T1acy,

9Ibic'~.,

91.

82.
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Hull revealed to Soong a declaration of principles for a United Nations
organization prepared by the State Department and agreed to in prin
ciple by Roosevelt and Churchill at-Quebec.
before the delegates of the Foreign

The Declaration was placed

~finister's

Conference at Moscow and

formalized as the Moscow Declaration of October 30,

194~.

Confirmed

at Cairo the same year, it became thE' foundation for the principles
outlined in the United Nations Charter.

As soon as the Declaration had

been agreed upon by the three Foreign Secretaries at

HOSCo\l1,

it was

sent directly to Chiang, who signed it immediately.

With the signing of

that document, China became, formally, one of the big-four that were to
police the world at war's end.

ll

Of particular interest to the Chinese was the sixth and final
pai.'\B~~ of th&·11oscovl De.-cla:.:a t-ion.

Throllghou t th~"\o1a~ par"ii:ot!·, the,

Chinese Nationalists had been more concerned with the activities of the
Communist faction, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, than with the
Japanese.

Although Chiang felt that his forces could easily handle the

Communist threat after the war, one of his greatest fears was that the
Soviet Union was secretly cooperating with Mao and would aid the Chinese
Communists onc,,! peace had been made tvith Japan.

If this should be the

case, -thought Chiang, there would be little hope of bringing the Commu
nist-controlled areas back under control of the Central Government.

12

But the sixth paragraph of the Moscow Declaration seemed to offer some
hope that Russia would not become involved in what by 1943 was clearly
seen by outside observers as a civil war in the making.
llIbid., 91, 99.
12 Ibi<!.

J

95.

In that
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paragraph, the Soviet Union, along with the United States, Great Britain
and China, had pledged:
That after the termination of hostilities they will not
employ their military forces within the territories of other
states except for the purposes invisaged in this declara
tion and after joint consultation. l3
There occurred one other important event at Moscow, however, one
which carried profound implications relative to China.

At the closing

banquet, which formally ended the }!oscow Conference, Hull found himself
sitting next to Joseph Stalin, who, half-way through the dinner, leaned
to Hull and announced matter-of-factly that Russia would enter the
Pacific war shortly after the defeat of Germany.

14 Although the United

States had been anxiously awaiting such a development and welcomed it
for the promises Soviet entry held for a speedier defeat of Japan, the
prospect of such an event meant that a settlement of Sino-Soviet relations
was all the more important.

When Russia entered the Pacific war) she

would

e than likely do so through Manchuria.

enter

th China and come in contact with the Communist forces of

Mao Tse-tung in that area.

This meant she might

With Russian entry quite probable, it was

more ur ent than ever for the United"States to impress Chiang with the
importance of establishing more cooperative relations with the forces
of Mao Tse-tung.

15

Aware of repeated statements from both the Nati.onalist and Commu
nist leaders to the effect that both sides were united, at least in

l3 Ibid • , 99.
l4 Ibid . , 100.
l5 Ibid . , 102.
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their desire to remove the Japanese from Chinese soil, Americans at
the higher diplomatic levels probably believed that the two would be
just as opposed to future incursions into Chinese territory by the
Russians.

If, however, the two competing factions were still close

to civil war when the Soviets made their appearance in the north, there
were good chances that the Chinese

Co~~unists

would take a more prag

matic course and enlist the aid of their "ideological" brethren to
further their own ends.

16

In November, 1943, President Roosevelt traveled to Cairo and
Teheran to meet, for the first time, all three of the other powers,
though his meeting with Chiang Kai-shek would be a separate one.

Aware

of Chiang's fears of Soviet 8£sistance to the Chinese Communists,
Rcoseve'!t hope-d to gain a reassertiO!t· of the- HoscOW' Declarat'ion"and' to'

come t.o an agreement with Churchill and Stalin about some major conces
,
17
sions he hoped could be made to the Chinese.

Roosevelt was also aware

of a number of rumors of recent origin which held that Chiang might
possibly arrive at a separate peace with the Japanese.

Although the

rumors were groundless. Roosevelt saw it necessary once more to give
the Chinese a morale boost, particularly in view of the fact that the
Pacific strategy was in the process of change.

18

Allied military

l6 Ibid •
l7Roosevelt succeeded at Teheran in arriving at an agreement with
Stalin and Churchill which provided for the return to China of Manchuria,
Formosa and the Pescadores, and for a temporary trusteeship for Korea
following the defeat of Japan. See, Ibid., 106-107.
l8 Ibid ., 105; Romanus ~nd Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems
(Washington, D.C., 1955), 53.

35
planners were fast moving to the conclusion that the best route to Japan
would be across the Central Pacific and up from the Southeast Pacific, in
what came to be known as the island-hopping strategy.

19

China was moving

out of the military vision as the final launching-·pad for the assault on
Japan.

The fact remained, however, that China \lould still be a necessary,

if not vital factor in that final assault.

It was believed that the main

land Japanese forces might attempt to pull back to the home-islands for
defensive

pur~oses,

making itnecessary for the Chinese to keep those

forces tied down on the continent.

There was the other possibility as

well, that those Japanese forces might entrench themselves in China,
prolonging the war and making it necessary to launch an allied invasion
there, a prospect which was undesirable for the military difficulties

•
Roosevelt gained his desired reassertion of the Hoscou Declaration,
and he arrived at an acceptable agreement which made far-reaching ter
ritorial concessions to the Chinese,2l concessions, it was believed, which
would convince Chiang that the Soviets were not interested in reestablish
ing their influence over areas which were historically Chinese.

But the

President's efforts were for naught, for by late spring-eB:rly summer, 1944,
the situation in China showed little, if any, improvement.
Wllile Roosevelt had been adhering to the principle of a strong
China, the reality of the situation was being expressed in other circles,

19 1bid •
2°F e1S,
.
China
21 1,
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a reality grasped by China-based observers, military, political and
diplomatic.

The most vehement of these observers, and one who ex

pressed himself in no uncertain terms, was General "Vinegar" Joe Sti1
well.

Despatched to China in 1942 " • • . to increase the effective

ness of the United States aid to the Chinese government for the prosecu
tion of the war and to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese
Army, ,,22 Stilwell had, by 1943-44, met with little success.

A1

though caused in part by Stilwell's own lack of tact in dealing with
Chiang, his failures were attributable to a far greater degree, to
other priorities for American aid, the refusal of Chiang and the
Kuoumintang to make economic, social and military reforms conducive
to the creation of an effective fighting force, and the conflict be
tween the Nationalist government and the Communist faction in thp.
North.

Stilwell had consistently relayed his objections to these condi

tions to the War and State Departments, and many members of the latter
had just as consistently supported his asse5sments.

His criticism

was heard in the Wnite House as well, but with reserve.

The Pres i-

dent felt it more essential at the time to preserve a basically
friendly attitude toward the Chinese government, rather than pressure
them into making the changes necessary for active Chinese prosecution
of the war.

23

22Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission, 74. Stilwell was
assigned to the China Theatre with a'number of specific tasks: "To su
pervise and control all United States defense-aid affairs for China;
under the Generalissimo to command all United States forces in China and
such Chinese forces as may be assigned to him; to represent the United
States on any international war council in China and act as the Chief of
Staff for the Generalissimo; to improve, maintain, and control the Burma
Road in China. 1I Ibid., 73. It was the long-term objective of Stilwell's
mission, to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army. Ibid., 75.
23 Feis , China Tangle, 37.
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By early 1944, as reports from both the State Department and mil
itary personnel clearly indicate, the political and military situation
was becoming critical.

The Nationalist forces under Chiang were not

fighting, the Japan.ese were gaining considerable ground, the economy was
in a chaotic state, increased friction was developing

b~tween

Chiang's

government and the Soviet Union, and the personality gap was ever widen
ing between Stily,Tel1 and Chiang. 24
Although concessions had been made at Cairo and Teheran with
Soviet acquiescence, Chiang's worries about the Soviet Union were not
satisfactorily dispelled.

By early summer, 1944, he was still ex

tremely dubious about the possibilities of the Soviet Union maintaining
a hands-off policy t01:.,rard China.
m~~i-nt!"

In the face of extreme problems in

populap. support of" the5.r own people and,wcoMinue.g·,detR@$aJ.i-·

zation of their armies, the Chinese leaders were increasingly fearful
that the Soviets yrere maintaining close out secret ties with the
Chinese Communists.

Furthermore, Soviet aircraft had, in

~~rch,

fired

upon and killed Chinese troops who were reportedly pursuing Chinese
rebels near the border of Outer Mongolia.

The Soviets had claimed that

the troops crossed the border, a claim the Nationalist government
denied.

~~atever

the facts may have been, the Chinese reported that

the Soviet attitude had been hostile and that this hostility was evi
dence of a more general attitude

011

the part of the Russlans tmvard

the Nationalists, and not isolated to the immediate episode.

This in

cident, combined with the signing of the Russo-Japanese Sakhalin
fishing agreement of the same month, and a feeling on the part of the

24Foreisn

Relat~,

1944, VI, 41, 54-56) 58, 59, 69,' 77.
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Chinese that their inability to arrive at an acceptable agreement with
the Chinese Communists was a result of Soviet support of the Communists,
led to apprehensions about the reality and sincerity of the Soviet
policy.

25

President Roosevelt and the State Department put little stock
in Chiang's contentions of Soviet hostility.

They agreed with the

knbassador in China, Clarence Gauss, that Chiang was merelv

attem~ting

to elicit greater help and more active support for his central govern
ment from the United States.

But they had. nevertheless, exerted a

great amount of energv attempting to pacify the Generalissimo, drilling
into him the need for getting along with both the Communist Chinese
and the Soviets for the sake of the whole war effort.

But in spite

of theircff'vt'"t"S', Chiang' remained ill fcar of future So'\ri:et"

8UPP'Ol:t

of the Chinese Communists, and 'the former's extension of influence over
the frontier regions--Inner

Mongolia. Sinkiang and Manchuria.

26

Roosevelt maintained that there \'las little fundamental opposi
tion between China and the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, he \\Tas suffi

ciently worried about Chiang's appeals, to send another mission to
China·--an attempt once again to calm the Chinese leader and to urge
an agreement between the Nationalists and Communists. and thus. a re
duction of' Chinese fears of Soviet incursions.

Roosevelt's choice for

the mission was his Vice-president, Henry Wallace.

25 Ibid •

26

Feis. China

27 Ibid , 140.

Tang~~,

•
139.
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WRllace arrived in Chungking, the wartime Nationalist capitol,
with instructions from Roosevelt to
• • • explain to the Generalissimo that China had been
recognized as one of the four Great Powers primarily because
of the insistence of Secretary Hull at the Moscow Conference
and to elaborate on this by expressing the hope that the Gen
eralissimo must realize this and could not let America down
after America had pinned such faith and hope on China as a
World Power. 28
In a cabinet meeting around the middle of May, Roosevelt had explained
that 'he was greatly concerned about the situation in China, and that

"

• he was apprehensive for the first time as to China holding to

gether for the duration of the war."

29

In his testimony before the Sen

ate Internal Security Committee in 1951, Wallace pointed out that Roose
velt had told him to do what he could to get the Chinese Nationalists
ane-Co:m.tm!lli:sts to stop-fighting.

30

:Roosevelt' s

cy.plan~-·an&·"

Wallace's testimony indicate that the President was at that time less
worried about the possibility of Soviet incursions into the Northern
regions after the war than he was about Chinese internal problems
which might frustrate the whole war effort against Japan.
China was becoming a problem of prestige as well, particularly
for Roosevelt and Hull, who had fought long and hard to gain great
power status for China.

While the idea of "loss of face" has tradi

tionally been applied to the Oriental races, these two American leaders
stood to lose their full share if the Chinese proved unworthy of the
status which had been won for them.

28

Edward Stettinius, Under Secretary of State, to Joseph C. Grew,
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 230.

29 Ibid .
30

Feis,

Ch~Ta~~le,

145.
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In the four days spent with Chiang, Wallace discussed topics cov
ering the full range of Sino-American relations.

The Vice-president had

not been instructed to arrive at any specific agreements with Chiang, but
rather, had been referred to by Roosevelt as a "messenger," well suited
to bring back a valuable first-hand report on the situa,tion in China. 31
And messenger he was, for at one point in his conversations,
Mr. Wallace told Pres. Chiang of Pres. Roosevelt's comment
that the British did not consider China a great power; that
Pres. Roosevelt wanted China to be a great power in fact as
well as in theory; that at Cairo the British were opposed
to giving any reality to China's position as one of the "Big
Four," and that at Teheran the Russians were cool regarding
China. Mr. Wallace then quoted to Pres. Chiang the follmving
statement made by Pres. Roosevelt: "Churchill is old. A new
Britisll 'Government will give Hong Kong to China and the next
day China will make i t a free port."32
This was the message Roosevelt most wanted to be stated explicitly.
The United States was intent upon making China a great power in the post
war world.

But: implied in the message was that Chiang need not \vorry

about the Soviets.

Instead, he should be working to prove the Chinese

were worthy of the role Roosevelt had envisioned for them.
mission was,for the most part, one of goodwill.
lieved, needed yet another morale boost.

Wallace's

The Chinese it was be

It was with that goal in mind

that the not"so-subtle promise of a return of Hong Kong after a century
of British control, was intended.
There appear to have been no concrete commitments made, at least
on the part of the United States.

One of Wallace's more specific tasks

31president Roosevelt's public annOl1ncement of the Wallace mission
to Chtna. Foreign Re~tions, 1944, VI, 228.
32summary of notes of conversati.on between Wallace and Chiang.
Ibid., 232.

41
had been that of discussing ,vi th the Chinese

the possibilities of send

ing an American observer group to Yenan, the Communist stronghold in North
China, to gather information on Communist Chinp-se activities there.

Such

a mission had often been recommended by a number of Foreign ServicE' offi
cers in China since 1943.
mendations, until a

Little had been done to implement their recom

strong1y~worded memorandu~written

in January, 1944

by John Patton Davies, reached the hands of the President.

Evidently

impressed by Davies' plea for such a mission, Roosevelt brought it to
the attention of General Marshall and directed that appropriate action
be taken .on the proposal • 33
. Wallace had obviously been instructed to discuss stich a mission
with Chiang ·whi1e in Chungking, for, on June 22nd, the subject was

following day and agreed in principle to the despatch of an observer
group to the North.

34

It was this observer group, soon to be called

the Dixie MiGsion,35 that would carry John Stewart Service and others
to the Communist capital.

As fate would have it they would come into

conflict with the President's personal representative to Chiang and
later Ambassador in China, Patrick J. Hurley.
It was, in fact, one result of the Wallace
went to China in 1944.

m~ssion

that Hurley

At the last meeting of Wallace and Chiang, the

GeneraU.ssi.rllo had suggested to the Vice-president that Roosevelt send

33David D. Barrett, D::I.xie Mission: The United States Army Obser
ver Group in Yenan, 1944 (Berkeley, 1970),23.

-

.

"

35 Ibid ., 13.

.
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to China, a personal representative.

with the President.

Chiang desired closer cooperation

There being too many channels through the State De

partment which made communication difficult, would it be possible,
Chiang inquired of Wallace, to have a personal representative such as
Carton de Wiart, Churchill's representative ", , , who handles polit
ical and military matters?,,36
Wallace, in his report to the President of June 28, 1944, relayed
this request for a personal representative, while at the same time pre
senting to Roosevelt an extremely pessimistic account of conditions in
China.

Claiming that "the fact in China at present is the strong prob

ability that East China will be lost to the Japanese in the near future," 37
Wallace went on to suggest that the situation was far from hopeless and
could possibly t.e turned to bOt!l political and military advantage.
With the right man to do the job, i t should be possihle to
induce the Generalissimo to reform his regime and to establish
at least the semblance of a united front, which are necessary
to the restoration of Chinese morale; and to proceed there
after to organizing the new offensive effort for which re
stored morale will provide a foundation. 38
But Wallace did not have in mind a new representative.
rather, a replacement for Stilwell.

He urged,

Such a replacement, Wallace ar

gued, should be placed in closer contact with Chiang and be given author
ity over both military and political matters.

Stilwell would not do, in

part because of his involvement in Burma, but even more because Chiang

.

36United States Relations With China, 559.
37

Wallace to Roosevelt,

38
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Relations, 1944, VI, 235.
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had expressed dissatisfaction \vith and a lack of c.onfidence in the
sharp-tongued General.

39

But neither the President nor the War Department was of the
same mind, and ultimately, in the face of strong Japanese advances
which threatened the American air-bases in East China,

~oosevelt

sug

gested not that Stilwell be recalled but that Chiang place him in
command of all Chinese forces.

40

Responding to the President's sug

gestion, Chiang agreed that in principle, it was

a good

idea, but

that this would take some time to accomplish, given the present po
1itica1 situation in China and the length of time it took Chinese
troops to adapt to new leadership.

In the meantime, Chiang added,

it would be well that a personal representative be sent to China
" . • . to>-constant1y co 11 ahOJ:lil to· with me and • . • ad.jus.t. the,.. re.la
tions between me and General Stilwell ••
In the face of Chiang's tactful denial to place Stilwell in
such a position of power, Roosevelt, agreeing with Chiang's asser
tions that some form of political and military liaison should be es
tablished,42 informed the Chinese leader on August 19, 1944, that he
was sending to China, Major General Patrick J. Hurley.

General Hurley,

Roosevelt informed Chiang,
• is to be my personal representative on military mat
ters.
His principle mission is to coordinate the
whole military picture under you as Military Commander-in
Chief-··your being, of course, the Commander-in-Chief of the
39T.'
.
.r elS, Chinfl Tangle, 156 •

40 Ibid ., 170.
41Chiang to Roosevelt.
42Feis ,

Chin~ Ta~&~~.,
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whole area--to help to iron out any problems between you and
General·Stilwell who, of course, has problems of his own re
garding the Burma campaign and is necessarily in close touch
\-7ith Admiral }-Iountbatten. 43
The climate in China on the eve of Hurley's departure was there
fore stormy.

The United States was, as it had been since the beginning

of the war, committed to the support of the Nationalist government in
word and in deed.

Roosevelt had gone to great lengLhs to force China

upon Britain and the U.S.S.R. as·a Great Power.

But militarily, as well

as politically, Chiang's government was not living up to the role being
handed her.

Rosevelt's post-war dream depended on China's strength

for fulfillment, and he was not anxious to see that dream shattered--for
reasons of prestige as well as utility.

Militarily, China was not as

important as she had once. been, but she was still important nevertheless.
Victory in Europe was just over the horizon.
soon shift to Asia.

If,

The main theatre would

when it shifted, there existed no stable gov

ernment in China, the vacuum might in fact be filled, not by the Chinese
Communists but by Russia, a prospect Roosevelt finally realized but did
not desire for reasons related not only to his dream of an Asia free of
outside interference, but to fears of a world power structure imbalanced
:i.n favor of the Soviet Union as well.
The Japanese had attacked the American fleet at Pearl Harbor to
protect thell1selves from a threat to their further encroachments in Asia.
The United States had attempted to block the Japanese movements diplo
matically, but by the time war began it was clear that America was
involved in Asia in opposition to Japanese aggression in China which
began with the incident at the Mukden in 1931.

43Roosevelt to Chiang.

Fo~~i~Re~at5~~_,

The United

1944, VI, 249.
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States had clearly stated its opposition to Japanese incursions at that
time and once vlar began in 1941 it was understood that it was a war to
remove the Japanese from the Asian continent.

With that view of the

wa~Rooseve1t surely had misgivings about the possibilities of another

power or powers, gaining control once again inside China.

If, at war's

end, there was not a strong Chinese government clearly in control of
all China, foreign intervention was highly probable.
Americans had been slow to go to war in the first place, and
did so finally, when the reasons appeared clear and unquestionable.
If that war should end with China weak and o'lerpowered once more,
albeit by other than the Japanese, the American public would not take
kindly to having fought a worthless war.

There can be no doubt that

this was a paramount consideration for Frankl,in D. R<1ostW'elt.
Chinese internal problems must be solved, but in a manner that was
in keeping with the statement issued by Cordell Hull in 1941--that
the United States was committed to "the principles of non-interference
in the internal affairs of other countries."

Although not the inten

tion of the President initially, Patrick J. Hurley would be the man to
attempt the resolution of those internal problems while trying to keep
within the bounds of the principles set down by Hull in 1941 •

•

CHAPTER III
THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
General Hurley was not lacking in experience nor was he unfamiliar
to Roosevelt when in 1944 the President decided to send a personal rep
resentative to China.

A self-made man, a millionaire two times over,

secretary of War under President Herbert Hoover, successful attorney
and investor,l Hurley had volunteered his services to the nation
1

Hurley was born in Lehigh, Choctaw Indian Territory (now Oklahoma),
on January 8, 1883. The son of Irish Immigrants, Hurley was forced to go
to work at the age of 11 after his father vIas injured in a fall from a
horse and his mother died. He tended trap-door in a shaft or the Atoka
Coal and Mining Company near Lehigh for 25¢ per hour. Hurley received
some schooling when he was 14 years of age, attending night classes taught
by an itinerant school teacher by the name of Golightly. When his school
ing was cut off by a strike in the mines, the young man turned to "cow
punching." Following an abortive attempt to join Theodore Roosevelt's
Roughriders in 1898, Hurley entered the Baptist Indian University, now
Bacone College near Muskogee, Oklahoma. He received his "Bachelor of
Arts degree in 1905 and in 1908 received his Bachelor of Law degree from
the National University in Washington, D.C. He opened a law office in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, where he was an immediate success and where he began to
accumulate his fortune. One of his early fees was a large tract of land
on the outskirts of Tulsa, land which very soon was engulfed by the rapidly
expanding city. Elected President of the Tulsa Bar Association in 1910,
Hurley was admitted to the bar of the United States Supreme Court in 1912.
Shortly t~ereafter he was appointed attorney for the Choctaw Nation, a
position whic~while not lucrative, provided him with considerable pres
tige and the foundation upon which to build his fortune. Following his
World War I experience, Hurley became involved through his law practice,
in banking and oil operations. As receiver from the Gilliland Oil Company,
he managed the company's affairs so well he 'vas able to sell it to
Standard Oil for a profit of over three million dollars, for which he
received a handsome fee. Campaigning for Herbert Hoover in the election
of 1928, Hurley was rewarded with an appointment to the position of
Assistant Secretary of War. When Secretary Good died nine months later,
Hurley became Hoover's Secretary of War, and the first Oklahoman ever to
sit on a Presidential Cabinet. Losing most of his fortune in the
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immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Although he had

been quite outspoken against the New Deal administration of Franklin
Roosevelt since 1932, Hurley was a strong supporter of the President's for

.

eign policies in the years immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.

He had

urged repeal of the Neutrality Act and America's active participation
in the European struggle, despite the centralization of government which
would result, and which he so despised.

"The Ne.utrality Act," Hurley had

stated in 1941, "is a covlardly surrender of the freedom of the seas. •
The United States is in no position to maintain its traditional policy on
freedom of the seas until the Neutrality Act has been repealed."

2

·With great faith in his nation's ability to win and a strong be
lief in action

ov~r

words, Hurley wired President Roosevelt shortly after

the Pearl Harbor attack, requesting a command aasignmen-t)

He'hatt"pre

viously been informed by the War Department that he was "on the Eligible

IDepression years, Hurley returned to his law practice after Hoover's de
feat, rebuilding his assets quickly, again ~hrough some very successful
oil dealings, inves~ments, and real estate transactions. In 1940, he be
came involved in the Mexican-American oil expropriation dispute as counsel
for the Sinclair oil interests. Through individual action and negotiations
with the Mexican government, Hurley arrived at an acceptable agreement where
others had failed. For his services, Hurley received from the Sinclair com
panies a reported one million dollars, and from the Mexican government,
that nation's highest honor, the Order of the Aztec Eagle. He was on a bus",:,
i.ness trip to Venezuela when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941. See: Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago, 1956); George Milburn,
"Mr. Hoover's Stalking-Horse," The American Merc~ XXVI, No. 103 (July,
1932),257; Who Was Who in America, (Chicago, 1968), IV [1961-1968], 477;
Anna Roth, ed., "P-atrick J. Hurley," Current Biography: Who's Ne"tvs and Why:
1944 (New York, 1945), 319; Parker La Moore, Pat Hurley: The Story of an
American (New York, 1932).
2

Lohbeck, 156.

3Ibid ., 158.
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List for appointment in case of emergency as Brigadier General of the
Line, Reserve." 4

TIle emergency had obviously arisen, and now Hurley

wanted to serve, more it might be ventured, for his own glorification
than for what he could offer to his country in military expertise.
Not lacking in vanity, Hurley held himself in

hig~

regard, and

consistently resisted, throughout the wartime period, assignments which
kept him awa.y from the theatres of action.
war in which he sought military glories.

But this was not the first
When he enlisted in the Army

j.n 1916, he was assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Office in Wash
ington D.C.

An experienced attorney, his skills had been utilized where

they were mos·t needed.

But he was highly dissatisfied, and following

numerous requests for transfer to the battle zones, Hurley was sent with

belt behind the lines, in the battles of Aisne-Marne, Heuse-Argonne and
St. Mihiel.

But even this did not satisfy Lt. Colonel Hurley.

Although assigned to a staff position far behind the lines,
Hurley was determined to be decorated for valor. He arranged
to carry a message from one artillery command post to another,
and, as a result, the Army awarded Hurley the Silver Star. S
When President Roosevelt received Hurley's request for assignment,
he turned i t over to General Marshall, who informed Hurley that the Army
was looking for younger men to take command posts and that his servic.es
would not be needed. 6

A few days later, however, Hurley was summoned to

4 Ibid ., 156.

5Robert Thomas Smith, "Alone in China: Patrick J. Hurley's Attempt
to Unify China," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oklahoma
1966), 9.
6

Lohbeck, 158.
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the White House where the President offered him the post of Minister to
New Zealand, a post which had not previously existed.

The President was,

without doubt, aware that Hurley was an influential Republican who had
supported his foreign but not his domestic policies.

It would have been

impolitic to refuse to allow such a man the opportunity. to serve his country_
But Hurley insisted upon a more militarily-oriented role, and was
sent finally to General Marshallts office, where he noticed a message
from General Douglas MacArthur, appealing for assistance at Corregidor.

7

Hurley and MacArthur had been long-standing friends, Hurley having been
responsible for MacArthur's appointment as Army Chief of Staff over the
strong objections of General John J. Pershing, in 1930.
immediate desire to " • . . just help Doug,fI

9

8

Expressing an

Marshall responded just as

quickly to Hurley I s desires uy offering him the job of acquiring- ships
and crews in Australia to run the Japanese blockade of Corregidor and get
supplies through to MacArthur.

Once this mission was accomplished, Hur

ley was to take up his post in New Zealand.

10

Accepting this assignment, Hurley was sent directly to the War
Plans Division, and Marshall, fll est the ebullient Hurley talk too much,"
telephoned to tell them Hurley was coming and to keep him there and take
him to the plane and not let him out of the Department.

11

On

this note,

Hurley's World War II service to his country began.
7Forrest C. Pogue, Ge?rge C. Marshall:
(New York, 1966), 243.

8
9

Lohbeck, 101.

Pogue, 244.

lOIbid.
llIbid.

Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942

50
Failing to make a significant break in the Japanese blockade,
Hurley went on to New Zealand and was sworn in as American Minister on
April 1, 1942.

In July of the same year, dissatisfied with his

non'~

military role, he requested and was granted permission to travel with
Peter Frazer, Prime Minis ter of New Zealand, to ~lashington to discuss
Pacific military strategy.

12

Although Hurley was supposed to return, eventually, to New Zealand,
he did not.

Following his discussions wi.th Roosevelt, he was sent in

the opposite directi.on--to the Middle Eas t, Iraq and Iran--and then on to
Russia.

The President had sent him on this side-mission, allegedly to

discuss the Europe First strategy with Stalin, after which he was to
return to New Zealand and Australia and explain to the governments there
tire'-neeessi-ty' for major oFerntiotls' in Europe as OPP&se-d:-to--th~Paci:fi'c. 13
But by all appearances, Hurley f'S journey t.:> Russia was intended to reas
sure the Soviet government of America's desire for a second European
Front as well.
In Hurley's letter of introduction, Roosevelt informed Stalin that
he was sending the General to Mosco'i; so that
• • • as a result of his personal experience [he would]
• • • be able to assure the Government of Australia that the
most effective manner in which the United States can join in
defeating Hitler was through the rendering of all possible
assistance to the gallant Russian armies, who have so bril
liantly withstood the attacks of Hitler's armies.
The President went on to state:
12

Lohbeck, 171.

l3 1bid •
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As you know, the Governments of Australia and New Zealand have
been inclined to believe that it was imperative than an immed
iate and all-out attack should be made by the United Nations
against Japan. What I wish General Hurley to be able to say to
these two Governments after his' visit to the Soviet Union is
that the best strategy for the United Nations to pursue is for
them first to join in making possible the defeat of Hitler and
that this is the best and surest way of insuring the defeat of
Japa.n. 14
•
It is unlikely that Stalin could have given Hurley any better rea

sons than Roosevelt for a Europe First strategy, or that anything the
Soviet leader had to say would have had any more influence on the gov
ernments of Australia and New Zealand than would the words of Roosevelt.1 5
That Hurley's mission to Russia was intended to pacify Stalin is
further evidenced by the fact that the General never did return to New
Zealand or Australia.

Following two months of "barnstorm:ing" through

Russia, he moved on to Teheran, 1raO"", arri.v-ing there·on-Naw..Y.e.ar·' s .Day,
1943.

He very quickly uncovered

~larrante

R.

situation

ent. 16
d averb a 1 report to t h e Pres~'d'

~ihich,

as he wired Roosevelt,

Apparently Roosevelt was

not greatly concerned about relaying Stalin's attitudes to the New
Zealanders and Australians, for he called Hurley home to Washington to
hear his report, and on Harch 3, 1943, designated the General as his
personal representative to act as an observer and to report under condi
l4 Ibid ., 173.
15Ibid • It appears to be the case that Hurley's mission to Moscow
in the fall of 1942 was more related to problems the United States and
Great Britain were having trying to convince Stalin that they were doing
all they could, both to supply the Russians and to arrange for a second
front in Europe, than to laying the groundwork for pacifying the govern
ments of New Zealand and Australia. See Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roose
vel~a~Utal}n: . The '~r Th~aged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton,
Ne\v Jersey, 1967), 67--68.
l6Smith, "Alone in China," 23.
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tions in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, the Arab States,
including Saudi Arabia, and Karachi.

l7

Hurley never returned to his

post as Minister to New Zealand •

.

Despite the fact that Hurley was instructed by Roosevelt to assume
no responsibility for conduct of foreign policy or military and naval
operations,18 he did, by his mere presence, interfere with the normal
diplomatic and military activities in the areas he visited.

Taking what

has been described as little more than " • . • a V.I.P. tour of each
country through which he passed," Hurley's activities caused a great
deal of resentment on the part of the regular State Department and mil
itarypersonnel in the area.

19

Untrained as a diplomat, and with very little actual military
experience, Hurley believed he could accomplish much by- virtue of 'his
personality alone.

A handsome, striking individual, and one who was

not lacking in confidence, Hurley believed in the straight-forward ap
proach and disdained subtleties.

Such behavior did not appeal to the

foreign service men who observed his activities in the Middle East, and
who looked upon the General as little more than a "bumptious amateur."

20

17

Roosevelt to Hurley, March 3, 1943 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
Hyde Park, New York), Presi.dent's Personal File 6533.
l8 Ibid .
19Smith, "Alone in China," 23.
20Ibid ., 24. Follo't.;ing Hurley's visit to the Soviet Union, he wrote
voluminous reports on vlhat he ·saw there. Referring to those reports,
George F. Kennan, a noted diplomat and Russian specialist, stated: "I
don't think • . • [Hurley] knew what he was talking about when he reported
on the vievls of the Soviet leaders. On the other hand, there was ample
advice available to him which he shewed no desire to tap on these subjects.
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Quite aware of such attitudes tmvard him, Hurley reacted to them
by way of his reports to the President.
Hurley's reports from the Middle East had charged that ele
ments in the State Department were either pro-British or pro
Communist in their sentiments. He said'that some members of
the State Department were intent upon using the war against
Germany and Japan as a means for strengthening the British
Empire's hold over weaker nations of Europe, the Middle East,
and Asia. Others, he continued, were determined to assist the
2l
Communist conspiracy for world domination by the Soviet Union.
The seeds of Hurley's discontent with the State Department were
planted, therefore, early in his relatively short diplomatic career.
This early conflict would not be forgotten by them or by Hurley, when the
time came for the General to move on to China.
Although Hurley had visited China during his tenure as Secretary
of War under Hoover,

22

his first visit there under Roosevelt was in 1943.

201 mean, it was not surpr1s1ng to me that Hurley didn't know that he was
being given the usual run-around and the usual patter by Stalin and Molo
tov, but I think that if he had been a wiser and more thoughtful man, he
would have asked some people who would be familiar with those conditions
for some years to comment on those." Ibid., 22. Although Kennan's remarks
did not relate directly to Hurley's activities in the Middle East, they are
representative of the attitudes held by regular career Foreign Service men
toward him and his movements in circles for which they felt he was not
trained. See also: William D. Leahy, I Was There: the Personal Story of
the Chief of Staff to President's Roosevelt and Truman (New York, 1950), 123.
2lSmith, IIAlone in China," 24.
22

Lohbeck, 94. Hurley happened to be in Shanghai enroute to the
United States from an inspection trip to the Philippines on September 18,
1931, the day of the Mukden incident which preceded the Japanese takeover
of that year in Manchuria. Hurley, upon his return to the United States,
hotly opposed the subsequent "Stimpson non-recognition doctrine," whereby
the United States addressed "notes'1 to the Government of Japan," • • • an
nouncing the United States policy of refusing to recognize territorial
changes brought about by force of arms. 1I Ibid., 95. It was Hurley's opinion that II • • • 'the Japanese was going to seize Manchuria anyhow' unless
stopped by force." Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study in State
craft (New Brunswick, 1954), 81, " . . • opposing further notes and protestsand
deprecating nonrecognition, [Hurley] argued that we should put up or
'shut up, should either use our fleet (along with the British) t.o restrain
Japan or else say and do nothing." Ibid., 94. Hurley used this experi
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The President was making preparations for his conference with Stalin,
Churchill and Chiang Ka.i-shek at Caire and Teheran, and wanted Hurley
to sound out the Generalissimo on the arrangements and vario1ls problems
which might arise at the upcom:f.ng Cairo meeting.

In addition, Hurley

was to review with Chiang the developing plans for the Pacific Island
.
23
hopp1ng strategy.
After meeting with Chiang for three days (November 7-10, 1943),
Hurley flew on to Cairo and Teheran where his presence had been requested
b y t h e P reS1'd ent. 24

On November 5, 1943, Acting Secretary of State

Stettinius had written Hurley instructing him to go to Teheran on a
special missfon as the President's "personal Representative with the
Rank of Ambassador."
Dip1.0111lrth:

Hi8~ion

25

He was not to assume actual charge of the

in Iran, bue was, rather, to

co~rd4.t:wH~e

the v <'vr.ious

agencies of the American government there and the activities of those
agencies with the British and Soviet Russians, while the regular Min
ister to Iran, Louis Dreyfus, was on leave of absence.

Although at

first glance, such a mission might appear to have been one of high
regard, Hurley was actually being sent to Teheran to make arrangements
22ience in later years as evidence that he was not unfamiliar with China
when he went there in 1944 as Roosevelt's Personal Representative.
Military Situation ~East, 2852.
23

Roosevelt to Hurley, October 12, 1943 (Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library). Presidentts Personal File 6533. See also: Smith, "Alone
in China,1I 25.
24 Ibid ., 26.
26

Lohbeck, 208.
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for the President's accommodations there.

26

Although he was not to play a major role in the diplomatic negotia
tions at Teheran, Hurley did perform at least one vital function.

He

was instrumental in urging upon the President the need for a tri-partite
declaration on the status of Iran, and drafted the document (The Iran
Declaration) which was subsequently signed by the three major powers,
the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain.
In early May, 1943, Hurley had written to to the President about
thQ situation in Iran, urging Roosevelt to
• • • assume at least that degree of leadership that t<lill
justify the confidence of the officials and the people of Iran
in America's capacity to uphold the princi.ples of the Atlantic
Charter~ and to assure the continued existence of Iran as a iree
nation. 7
It"a:T\'had: bt:!eu c:xperi'encing difficulties as an

o~eup-i~.j.'Cr)\mtTY,

not yet declared war against any nation or block of nations.

havin!;

Serving

essentially as a military base, the country had been occupied by the
Soviets in the north and Great Britain in the south.

American forces

were present there as well, but only to operate the rail transport
system that ran from the Persian Gulf to the Soviet frontier, an es
sentlal route of supply for the Red Army.

28

It was assumed that the

Iranian Government was pro-Axis and, according to Hurley, "the Government
of Iran had been rendered impotent by the occupying forces."
26 Ibid ., 210.
27Military Situation Far East, 2843.
28Feis , Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, 266.
29

Military Situation Far East, 2844.

29

The

56
Shah of Iran was becoming increasingly distressed by the situation,
claiming

11 • • •

that he and his people were not in fact pro-Axis; they

were pro-United Nations."

30

Urging the Shah to prove his alignments by declaring war on the
~~is

powers, Hurley proceeded to convince President Roosevelt that there

was need to assure the Iranian government that the United States at
least, insisted upon the principles of the

AtlaD:~!c_S~~..!,

and that

those principles be applied to Iran; that Iran should be admitted to the
United Nations by virtue of her declaration of war against the Axis pow
ers; that the American and British legations should be raised

irr~ediately

to the status of Embassies, and that American and British Ambassadors
compatible to one another and capable of understanding and promoting
Brlrlsh-Amcric'an-Rnssiarr-coopera-t:±onshould be appoint'cd to ITan; 31,
The British had been aware of the problema, in Iran and had taken
the initiative to assure the Iranians that wartime occupation ,wuld not
lead to any permanent impairment of her independence.

At the Moscow

Conference, Great Britain had raised the subject in an agenda item en
titled the "Common Policy in Iran."

She had urged that " • . • the

three countries whose forces were in Iran should join in a public dec
laration stating that when the war was over these would be withdrawn."

32

But both the United States and the Soviet Union had expressed res
ervations at Moscow, the United States because American troops were in
30 Ibid .
3l Ibid •

32F el.s.
.
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, 267.
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Iran in a different capacity than the Russian and British forces, and
because Hull had hesitated to become involved in Iranian domestic pol itics.

The Soviet Union h8sitated because the Soviet-Anglo-Iranian Treaty

of 1942 provided for the presence of an Iranian representative whenever
questions relating to that country were discussed.

The. subject was

avoided, therefore, to be dealt with when the three heads of state met

.

at Teneran.

33

In his discussion with Roosevelt at Cairo in November, Hurley re
vealed to the President his belief that the Soviet Union and Great
Britain were disregarding the pledges made in the Atlantic
that the United States was fully committed to the wa.r.

34

Charte~

now

Roosevelt,

susceptible to such ideas as a result of his own experiences with
Br-i'tishc tnt'f"al1l&i-gence on quest·l.'ons of Asian ColonialisTl'l'r agt'eed with
Hurley's feelings and suggested that Hurley find a place and a proce
dure at Teheran appropriate for insisting that Churchill and Stalin
reaffirm their Atlant'ic' Charter commitments. 35
Secretary of State Hull had suggested at Moscow that each of the
Big Three make separate statements of intention to Iran and had pre
sented on behalf of the United States, a Declaration Regarding Iran as
an example of the kind of statement he thought each should make.

Roose

velt and Hurley agreed that Hull's Declaration should be the appropriate
vehicle through which to gain a reaffirmation by Stalin and Churchill

33 Ibid •

34

Lohbeck, 214.

35 Ibid.• , 215.
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of the

~ntic

Charter.

36

While Roosevelt was meeting with Churchill and Stalin at Teheran,
Hurley and J. D. Jernegan of the State Department drew up the proposed
Declaration, and, following discussions with 11olotov and Eden who
approved the proposal, a final draft was made.

37

Presented at the last

Teheran meeting, the draft was accepted with but a few minor changes
being made by Winston Churchill.

38

The document was essentially that

which had been prepared and presented by Hull at Hoscow.

It was merely

rewritten to include a reference to all three major powers and to the
Atlantic Charter.

The final paragraph read as follows:

The Government of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the
United Kingdom are at one with the Governments of Iran in their
desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and
territorial i~tegrity of Iran. They count upon the participa·
tion-of Iran, together with- all other peace-l(n~in8nations, in
the establishment of international peace, security and prosper
ity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the
39
Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

On December 1, 1943, the Declaration on Iran was initialled for the
Iranian government by Foreign Minister, Mohammad Saed,40 and with that
Patrick Hurley became personally committed to the document, believing it
to have constituted a reaffirmation of the Atlantic Charter.

Unfortun

ately, the 'tvards ". . • in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic
36 Ibid .
3J Ibid.

38 Ibid ., 216.

39M1'l'ltary ..S'1t~~-.t.lon
.
F~r East, 2834 •
40

.Lohbeck, 217.

59
Charter . • . ," left a great deal of leeway for interpretation by the
powers.

According to Hurley's mm charges, the Russians and the British

had already chosen to interpret the.

Char~

to fit their own purposes.

Yet he failed to recogn'ize that i f what he said was true, Churchill and
Stalin would no doubt see the Declaration on Iran in terms of their own
individual interpretations of the Atlantic Charter.
~~en

Hurley claimed in later years that the Delcaration on Iran was

a reaffirmation of the Atlantic Charter, he was quite correct, for it
was.

Unfortunately, he equated reaffirmation with clarification.

There

was no clarification of the Atlantic Charter at Teheran.
Follm-1ing the Teheran Conference, Hurley remained in Iran, having
been requested by Roosevelt, who had by this time established consider
~conliden.ce

5.n the General, to coordinate the acitivities of the

various agencies in that country.

41

The career Foreign Service officers,

however, had even less faith by this time in the President's assignee and
Hurley succeeded in alienating them even further by his overly-gregarious
nature and u.npredictable behavior.

42

Nor was Hurley particularly fond of the officials stationed in Iran.
He soon came to believe that State Department personnel were attemptl.ng
'"
to sabotage h 15
mlSS10n. 43

On December 21, 1943, Hurley had submitted

to the President a full report with recommendations for an American
policy in Iran.

44

On January 12, 1944, Roosevelt

4lSmith, "Alone in China," 27.
42 Ibid •
43 Ibid .
44~
.
Far East, 2846 •
M'l'ltary S'ltuatlon

for~arded this
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report to the Secretary of State indicating his strong agreement with the
recommendations made by Hurley.

45

In March, Roosevelt corresponded with

Hurley directly, and again indicated his favorable response to the pro
d to Was h ington in
· Decemb er. 46, But wh
posa1s made ~n
en Bur I
ey returne
March for consultation with the President, he happened upon a memorandum
in the State Department which had been written by Eugene Rostow and ini
tialled by the Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.

The memoran

dum referred to Hurley's proposals on Iran as "hysterical, messianic
globalony."

47

Attributing this statement to himself, Acheson, reporting

the incident years later, explained that the phrase referred to the
charges Hurley had made in his report to the President--that the British
were misusing Lend-lease goods in Iran, and that Russia and Great Britain
hsQ..imfJer--iaiHsti:c designs fOT the Miadle

Ea.st~-not to

tl-re-- report per_ se. 48

But Hurley apparently took this' as confirming evidence of his prior sus
picions that his whole mission in Iran was being sabotaged by the State
Department.

In a September, 1944, letter to the President, Hurley re

viewed the incident and added:
My report which you sent to the State Department was circula
ted in other departments of the Government. It carried with it
the "messianic global boloney" memorandum and was also verbally
attacked by men in the State Department to such an extent that
the report was discredited. I t finally reaC:hed the press through
a keyhole columnist in discreditable form. So, the basic work

46 Ibid •
47
48

Ibid., 2847.

Dean Acheson, Present at the
Department (New York, 1969)~ 134.

Creation~!lY

Years in the State
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of destroying your Iranian plan 'vas accomplished in Washington. 49
Furthermore, Hurley added, those who opposed the Iranian plan in
Washington, also opposed the Atlantic Charter, particularly those arti
cles dealing with free trade and self-determination.
These are men in the State Department who are upholding im
perialism, monopoly and exploitation as opposed to the prin
ciples stated in the Atlantic Charter. That is one of the deep
seated reasons for the failure of the Iranian plan. 50
Hurley did not return to Iran following his Narch meeting with the
President, for he refused to. serve any longer in positions which would
place him in the State Department chain of command.

5l

For the remainder

of the spring and summer of 1944, he stayed in Washington, where, in
. July, he began to hear rumors of the developing crisis which in August
would take him, again as the President's personal representative, to
China.
During the summer of 194!f, the Japanese had been making considerable
advances in China proper, threatening the American air bases at Liuchow
and Kweilin.

If those bases were to fall, the next Japanese move would

most likely be toward Kunming and Chungking.

•

w~r

Kunming was vital to the

effort in China as the terminus of the air supply route from India

and the nerve center of American air attacks on the Japanese in China.
As Herbert Feis pointed out in The China T.mgle"

"if that was lost, the

whole tremendous Allied effort to move supplies into China and maintain
effective air bases and equipment would be canceled."
49Military Situation Far East, 2847.
50 Ibid .
51Smith, IlAlone in China," 28.
52 Feis , China Tangle, 166.

52
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Although in July Roosevelt had accepted HacArthur's plan for
moving into the Philippines instead of Formosa and the China mainland,
thus putting campaigns in China in the background, it was still felt
essential to enable the Chinese to fight more effectively.53
Kai-shek~s

Chiang

forces had been meeting with little success on the battle

field, and American observers were fast becoming convinced that the
Chinese were waiting for the United States and Great Britain to win
the war, after which the Chinese would reap the benefits of American
benevolence in particular.

54

In addition, there was still the Communist

threat which Chiang believed must be met after the war, and for which he
was preserving his best troops.

According to a r.eport from the Military

Intelligence Division of the War Department, submitted in July, 1945,
but -refC!'rril1g to the If,iHtury situation in summer, 19M!, the-Chungking
government was adhering to a policy of conserving its military strength
by keeping its best armies away from the fronts in East China.

Many of

the troops which were on the front lines were military units comprised
of troops loyal to local war-lords who had formerly opposed Chiang Kai
shek, and were not eager to do the Generalissimo's bidding except as it
might benefit their own political and milHary position.

55

In short,

the Chinese Nationalists were, as usual, fighting only among themselves.
By midsummer, 1944, the United States began, in spite of changes
in strategic planning, a concerted effort to get the Chinese into the
53 Ibid • , 168.

54I~id. , 167.
55 IEid . , 166.
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war on an active footing.

Vice-president Hallace had conferred with

Chiang in June and had recommended to the President, upon returning to
the United States, that General Stilt,ell be replaced with a personal
representatble to Chiang Kai-shele, who could handle both military and
political affairs.

Men in the War Department, however,. felt Stilwell

had been judged unfairly.56

But the British were suggesting Stilwell's

recall as well, and in the face of strong pressures, thoughts in Wash
ington turned to the possibility of transferring Stilwell from Burma to
China where he might salvage the situation if given a command assign
ment.

57

Stilwell had been queried on his attitude toward such an as

signment and ·reportedly answered that the Generalissimo might give him
a command job if the President pressed the issue, but for such a com
matnl to be effective he would have tu- be t;iven cOlil.p·leteauthority- over
'
t.e
h Ch ~nese

.

arm~es.

58

Pressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Roosevelt

informed Chiang on July 6, 1944, that Stilwell had been made a full gen-·
era1, and urged the Generalissimo to recall
confer

u~on

Stih~e1l

from Burma and

him " • • . the power to coordinate all Allied military re

sources in China, including the Communist forces.,,59

Chiang had hedged,

agreeing in principle, but had placed obstacles in the path of an im
mediate takeover by Stilwell.
In the meantime, Roosevelt had traveled to Hawaii where he met
with the Pacific Theatre Commanders and made the finc.l decision to move
56 lbid . > 169.
5] Ibid.
58 Ibid ,
59 Ibid• , 170.

64
against the Japanese in the Philippines rather than on Formosa and the
China Mainland.

60

As these decisions were being made, the President was

also searching for the appropriateiuan to :represent him in Chungking.
Patrick J. Hurley, meanwhile, was still in Washington searching for a
new assignment.

On August 3, 1944, Secretary of War Stimson had remarked to Gen
era1 Marshall that he was still trying to find an adequate job for
Hurley.

It had been suggested that Hurley be sent back to the Middle

East, but the Foreign Economic Admini.stration had objected, and Hurley
was still seeking a military assignment.

61

Marshall, who had originally

held reservat·ions about sending a personal representative, found himself
faced with the need to send someone friendly to Stilwell, before others
with presid"en'tia1 influence had an vpportunity tc suggest a candidate
friendly to General Clair Chennault with whom Stilvlell had been having
.
62
a long-standing dispute over China strategy.

Hurley, having estab

1ished very cordial relations with Stilwell on their meeting just prior
to the Cairo Conference in 1943, was suggested to l-u.rsha11 by Stimson
b 63 a d eC1S10n
..
' to b e accepta b1 e f or t h
he
d h 1m
and Marshaoun
11 f
e 'JO,

made more from a sense of urgency perhaps, than of a careful weighing
of Hurley's ability to do the job.

62Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China,
1911-45 (New York, 1970), 47'8',
63 Ibid ., 479.

6S
Hurley \Jas soundecd out about the mission on the same day that
Stimson raised his name.

64

Following his discussion with Marshall,

Hurley immediately contacted Stettillius, inquiring about the possibility
of his being made Ambassador.

Informed by the Undersecretary that there

was little chance of any changes being made in China at. any time in the
llear future, Hurley pressed Stettinius to discuss the matter with Hull,
\Jhich Stettinius did on that same day.

Hurley, it appears was not as much

against serving within the State Department chain of command as he had
,

led some to

believe~as

long as his link was somewhere tmvard the top of

· 65
t h.at c h a1n.
By August 9, 1944, the President and General Marshall had agreed up
on Hurley as the man to go to Chungking,66 and on August 18th the Pres'
ident, after receiving word frumChiangthat Hurl-eywol,:ll.d

be"acce~able,

talked briefly with his new appointee and issued him a brief letter of
67
.
i nstruct10ns.

In t\JO short paragraphs"Roosevelt designated Hurley as

64 Ibid •
65Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 247. Hurley's biographer claimed
that the General initially turned down the President's request that he
go to China because 11e did not want another diplomatic post. But when
Roosevelt told him that he could go in the capacity of an Army officer,
Hurley readily agreed: Hurley's inquiries about the possibility of his
being sent as Ambassacor, seem to contradict such findings. See Lohbeck,
279.
66

.
Fe1S, China

Tan~le,

178.

67According to Forei&n.~~13t~ons, 1944, VI, 250, Hurley's letter
of instructions was never located in State Department files. Hurley
merely reported the contents of that letter to the Department on August
22. 1944. Ibid. According to Robert Smith "Alone in China," 48, there
was such a letter in Hurley's Personal Papers from which Smith did the
proportionate amount of his research. No such letter has been located,
however, in the Roosevelt collection at Ryde Park.

66

his personal representative to Chiang Kai-shek and outlined his principle
mission as that of promoting efficient and harmonious relations between
the Generalissimo and General Stilwell.

Hurley was, further, to

facilitate Stilwell's exercise of command over the Chinese armies,which,
it was hoped, itJe:te soon to be placed under him.

Although Hurley was

instructed to report directly to the President, he was also directed to
coordinate all his activities with the Ambassador in China, Clarence
Gauss.
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Following seven days of briefings with military, diplomatic and

Presidential advisors on the China situation, Hurley met again with the
.
69
President on August 24.

It was during this meeting that Hurley

gained the impression that one of his primary functions in China ,;ould
be to uphold and sustain the Government of Chiang-

K::li~ . .;J1Ck·,

Meeting for less than an hour in the late afternoon the two
men discussed corruption in the Chinese government and the po
litical alternatives to Chiang Kai-sllek. The Presider:.t char
acterized Mao Tse-tung as "probably a competent man, but un
tried in the larger responsibility of governing China." Roose
velt felt that the lack of Chinese leaders forced the United
States to depend on Chiang; therefore, the policy of the Am
erican government was to support the Generalissimo. 70
The existing American policy to'.ard China, the P"i·esident further
explained, made recognition of any other political factions in China im
possible.

Secretary of State Hull had clearly explained this in his note

to the Japanese knbassador before the outbreak of war in 1941.

68Smith, "Alone in China," 48.
69 Ibid ., 49.

70 Ihid •

Suggestions
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which were being made to the effect that there were other leaders in China
more capable than Chiang, were, therefore, rejected by Roosevelt.

71

In the same meeting, Roosevelt and Hurley discussed proposals which
had been made to arm the Communist forces in China.

Although such pro

posals had been intended not to threaten Chiang's position, but rather, to
put into the war

military forces which had evidenced a sincere desire and

the ability to successfully fight the Japanese in China, Hurley and the
President agreed that because of Chiang's
the idea," it should be rejected.

II

. well known apathy tm"ard
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On August 25, 1970, General Hurley, in the company of Donald Nelson

73

and two aides', departed for Chungking, China, flying first to Moscow to
converse with the Soviet leaders to " • •. acquaint them with the purposes
and objc'C1:"ivc-s of his trip to China.,,74

But Hurley's purposes and objec

tives would change soon after his arrival in Chungking, and in spite of
his seven days of briefing on the situation in China, he was unprepared
for the task which awaited him there.

Without any real military or dip

lomatic experience, Hurley relied upon confidence in his own personality,
believing as did Roosevelt in himself, that

'I . ..

his power to make

73Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 252. Donald Nelson, Chairman of the
War Production Board'was sent to China with Hurley "specifically • • • to
look into the problem of civilian supply to China 'over the hump' and in
to the related problems of production and distribution in China." Ibid.,
Hull to Gauss, August 23, 1944, 251.
-
74 Ibid ., Deputy Director of Office of European Affairs, H. Freeman
Matthews--U;--the Secretary of State, August 24, 19 l14, 252.
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friends was so irresistible that all opposition could be charmed out of
existence. ,,75
When the President sent Hurley to China. • • he knew full well
the kind of man he had selected. Roosevelt realized that Hurley
had no special diplomatic training. Furthermore, Hurley's past
history had demonstrated him to be a poor team worker and a flam
boyant dandy.76
Hurley"

•• delighted in wearing his General's uniform,,,77 but

had relatively little training as a soldier.

His past experiences, in

many parts of the world, had provided him with little in the

~lay

of dip

lomatic expertise as far as the Department of State and the Foreign Ser
vice personnel were concerned.

In later years he would level charges at

members of the latter, which related to the situation that developed
in China.

But the contempt he held for the Department of State did not

sprout:- in--China.

He took it with- hini and it hindered himirr the role

he was to play.

Hurley went to China with little in his favor, aside

perhaps, from the fact that he was a prominent Republican who supported
a Democratic President's foreign policy, and had gained the President's
confidence.

There was a great deal working against him, not the least

of which was his own personality.

"Nevertheless, Hurley held the con

fidence of President Roosevelt and that qualification overrode any of
Hurley's deficiencies.,,78

75

Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy, 9.

76 Ibid ., 252.
77 Smith, "Alone in China," 28.
78 Ibid .

CHAPTER IV
nIXIE MISSION
While the President and his advisors were attempting to arrive at
feasible soluttons to the problems in China during the summer months of

1944, at least one operation was moving forward with success.

In June,

Vice-president Wallace had managed to convince Chiang Kai-shek of the
utility of an observer mission to the Chinese Communist stronghold in
the north.

Such a mission had been proposed to General Stilwell early

in 1943 by John Patton Davies, a Foreign Service officer attached to
Sti1:wel'1' she-adq1:mrters as, apolitical advisOl:.

Stilwa.ll, pre-oeeupied,

by other troubles, not the least of which were his relatioILs with Chiang,
paid little attention to his early proposal.

Then, on June 24, 1943,

Davies again put his arguments in 't'lrit:tng and addn,ssed them to both
Stilwell and the Department of State.

Davies pointed out that,only one

official United States observer had ever visited Yenan, and that had
been in 1938.

The largest concentration of Japanese troops and the

second largest Japanese industrial base were in North China, he noted,
and the Chinese Communists constituted the most cohesive, disciplined
and aggressive anti-Japanese group in the country.

This was the area

which Russia would probably enter when she attacked Japan, Davies pointed
out, and the Chinese Communists there were in a position to become the
foundation of a new rapprochement with the U.S.S.R.

IBarret t, D"l.Xl.e
" M""
l.8Sl.0n J 23 •
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Once again in January, 1944, Davies memorialized Stilwell and the
State Department,

2

and this time his urgings were brought to the atten

ti.on of the President, who in February, pressed upon Chiang the need for
information on the strength of the Japanese forces in North China.
Information at present regarding the enemy in North China and
Manchuria is exceedingly meagre. To increase the flow of such
information and to survey the possibilities of future opera
tions, both ground and air, it appears to be of very great ad
visability that an American observers' mission be immediately
dispatched to North Shensi and Shansi Provinces and such other
parts of North China as may be necessary.3
In answer to the President's suggestion, Chiang wrote on February

22 that he would be glad to send an American observer mission " . . • to
gain more accurate information regarding the troop concentration of our
common enemy in North China and Manchuria. ,A

He had already issued in

struetions"to the Hini"stry of War, Chiang reported, to' contact

Ccn:(~I!.'al

Stilwell's headquarters for the purpose of mapping out a prospective itin
erary for a mission to " • • • all areas where the political authority of
the National Government extends Cind wherever our Army is stationed."S
But the political authority of the National Government did not ex
tend into the area to which the President wished the mission to go, nor
was the Kuomintang Army stationed there.

By June, however, . ."..hen Vice-

president Wallace discussed the proposal with Chiang, that condition was
no longer evident.

Chiang only required that the mission come under the

auspices of the National Military Council, a condition ,,,hich was clarified

3Roosevelt to Chiang, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 329.
4Chiang to Roosevelt, Ibid., 349.
SIb:i.d.
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on June 23, to mean that the mission would be "sponsored" by the National
Military Council.

As far as the Communist areas were concerned, Chiang

simply denied responsibility for the mission if it desired to travel there.
The Generalissimo returned to the subject of his attitude to
ward the project by emphasizing again that he desired it to have
the completest freedom, and being merely under the, nominal spon
sorship of the National Military Council. He went on to say,
however, that while he could promise full freedom in Kuomintang
territory he could make no promises for the treatment and free
dom given by the Communists, and that we would have to arrange
that with the Communists ourselves. 6
On

July 22, 1944, the first group of L\merican military observers

left for Yenan, a second group departing about August 5.

Commanded by

Colonel David D. Barrett of the General Staff Corps, the observer group,
known by its code name "Dixie", included sixteen military observers and
two Foreign Service men who were assigned as polj.tical observers. 7
These two, John Stewart Service and Raymond P. Ludden, had been
assigned to the Army mission because, as one Department of State official
put it, " • • • for sometime to come the only way the Department can get
its political observers into the growing1y important Communist area is
by detailing them to the Army."S

Ambassador Gauss also wrote to the

Secretary of State on July 8, that
as understanding reached with Chinese Government was
that this group should be a military group for purpose of ob
taining military intelligence, care must be exercised in at
taching Foreign Service officers to it. So far as Chinese
Government is concerned they should appear as lan§uage offi
cers and not as diplomatic or political officers.
6Ibid ., report of conversation between Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek,

462.
7Barrett, Dixie Mission, 13.
8John Pattoll Davies, as sent to Hull by Officer ir. Charge, New
Delhi (Nerrill), Foreisn Relations, 1944, VI, 113.
9

Gauss to Hull, Ibid., 119.
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Commander of the Dixie Mission, Colonel Barrett, had been ordered
to Chungking in March, 1944, where he had been informed by Service that
he was to be in command.

10

But final approval for the mission had not

come in }1arch, and Barrett was sent back to Kweilin to resume his duties
there.

Ordered once more to Chungking in July, he was finally informed

officially that he would command the mission. 11
But oddly enough, Barrett was never issued official orders relating
to his specific duties in the north.
It is amusing now to look back on the busy days just before
our departure, and recall that with all the talk there had been
about the necessity for sending the mission and the valuable
work we hoped to accomplish, up to the last minute no one seems
to have thought about giving us any definite orders. On the
21st day of July, with everything set for us to take off the
next day, it suddenly occurred to me I had received no instructions
in black and white. 12
With this realization, Barrett contacted a Headquarters IIC-2", who
gave him a typed sheet listing the topics on which the mission was to
obtain information.

"These orders were unsigned, and without authenti

cation of any kind," and in the form of a "Memorandum to Colonel David
G. Barrett, GSC,,,13 which told the Colonel that "in connection with the
despatch of an

Ob~ervation

Section to area

under control of the Chinese

Communists, information is particularly deSired on the following subjects:

10

Barrett, Dixie Mission, 24.

11 Ibid ., 25.

12Ibi~., 27.
13 Ibid .
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Enemy Order of Battle
Enemy Air Order of Battle
Puppet Order of Battle
Strength, composition, disposition, equipment, training, and combat
efficiency of the Communist Forces.
Utilization and expansion of Communist intelligence agencies in
enemy and occupied territory.
Complete list of Communist officials (Who's Who)
Enemy air fields and air defense in North China.
Target intelligence
Bomb damage
. Weather
Economic intelligence
Operat'.ions of Communist forces.
Enemy operations
Evaluation of present contribution of Communists to the v!ar effort
Present extent of areas under Communist control (with maps)
Most effective means of ass.isting Communists to increase the value
of their war effort
Naval intelligence
Order of Battle of Communist forces
Evaluation of potential contribution of Communists to the war effort.

"14

"No other instructions of any kind, oral or written, secret or non
secret," Barrett wrote, "were ever given me. "IS

But whether the orders were

officially given or not, it was perfectly clear to the men who traveled to
Yenan, exactly what it was thay were expected to do.

14 Tb ' d

-

~

., 28.

ISIbid.

That expectation had
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been indicated in the last item on Barrett's list of subjects, that is
to evaluate the potential contribution of the Communists to the war ef
fort against the Japanese.
If Service and Ludden were given specific written' instructions,
they have either been lost, or no record of them was ever kept.

More

likely than not, the two Foreign Service officers were well aware of the
intent of the Mission, and functioned without specific instructions in
the same manner as they had previously--as observers reporting on the
political situation where and when they believed such reports would be
of interest to their superiors.

Although they were still Foreign Service

officers, they were directly responsible to General Stilwell prior to
their assignment to the Dixie M:Lssion, after which they came under the
command of Colonel Barrett ~

Tl~i.r'

rep-arts went7'firs't"to Barrett \'lho

approved them for transmission to Headquarters, China-Burma-India the
atre.

16

From there they were transmitted wherever the commander-in-chief

of that Theatre, General Stilwell, chose to send thern.
John Stewart Service was considered by many to be a highly compe
tent political observer in China.

He was born and spent part of his early

life in Szechuan, where he learned the language, and, according to Barrett,
fI

• was accustomed to what I considered the barbarous dialect of that

province and the local accents of other areas.,,17

But Service went to

Yenan with strong Ilegative feelings toward the Government of Chiang Kai
shek and held a critical opinion of the manner by which the United States
had previously dealt with that Government.
16 Ibid ., 45.
17 Ibid., 47.

In a March, 1944 memorandum
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which was transmitted to the Department of State by the Ambassador in
China, Service wrote that China was in a mess.
significant scale is in sight.
and worsen.

"No military action on a

The economic crisis continues to drift

Internal unrest is acti.ve and growing.

her allies are estranged."

Relations with all

18 Admitting that the United States was par

tially to blame for adding to China's economic difficulties, Service as
serted that Chiang and only Chiang was responsible for the sorry situa
tion in China at the time.

The answer to the enigma, Service contended,

would be found in Chiang's background and limitations, and in the United
States' failings in dealing with him.
wrote, carried little

weight'~

The words of the Ambassador, he

. • because the state Department has not

taken a strong policy and because it doer. not, in any event, speak for
the White House. ,,19

Chiang had no fear of Gen",ral Stilwell, Service con

tended, because the General could not demonstrate the unqualified backing
of the War Department or the

w~ite

House.

Chiang will cooperate if the United States, upon which he is
dependent, makes up its mind exactly what it wants fr'om him
and then gets hard-boiled about it. Until the President deter
mines our policy, decides our requirements, and makes these
clearly and unoistakably known to Chiang, Chiang will continue
in his present ways.20
The President could make his policy known, Service urged, by Stil
well and the Ambassador working in close concert.

Although such action

might mean taking an active part in Chinese affairs, Service argued, ".
unless we do it, China will not be much use as an ally. II

In tal·dng an

l8Service to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Foreign Relations,

1944, VI, 38.
19 Ibid ., 39.
20 Ibid .
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active part, he closed, " • • . we may save China."

2l

In March, Service had also written, tn a memorandum relating to
the possible unification of anti-Central Government elements, that civil
war in China was likely to occur following the war.

Out of such a civil

war, he wrote, "there can be expected to emerge either a more progressive
Kuomintang Government or a communist state, probably of the present modi
fied Chinese communist type.,,22

Inasmuch as this memorandum was written

prior to the one in which Service proposed a stronger, clearer diplomatic
position on the part of the United States with the objective of gaining
a greater commitment from Chiang, he

d~d

not advocate Chiang's removal,

nor, to touch here on a subject which later will be dealt with at length,
did he have in mjnd the overthrmv or destruction of the Government that
t1re-Untted-Sta:tes was pledged to uphold.
warning~

He- was simply registering a

prophetic as i.t was, that if the United States did not take a

stronger position with Chiang, the chances of civil war following Japan's
defeat were good, and the possibility existed of a "modified Chinese
communist type," of government coming to power if it did.
On July 28, Service wrote the first of many reports on his obser
vations of the political, social and cultural conditions in Yenan.

Ad

mitting in this report that he had only been in Yenan for six days,
Service explained that he felt it necessary, given the availability of
mail facilities and their future uncertainty, to record a few general
first impressions of the Communist Region.

"My own experiences," Service

reported, "is that one enters an area like this, concerning which one has
21 Ibid .
22As reported by Gauss to Hull, Ibid., 378.
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heard so many entirely good but sec.ond-hand reports, with a conscious
determination not to be swept off one 1 s feet." 23
It is interesting, therefore; that my own first impressions-
and those of the rest of our Observer Group--have been extremely
favorable. The same is true of the foreign correspondents, at
least two of whom • • • could not, by any stretching of the term,
have been called "pro-Communist" before their arriv.al. The spell
of the Chinese Communists still seems to work. 24
Greatly impressed by the openness and cordiality of the Communists,
Service found their leaders to be very competent, political and military
men.

Mao Tse-tung, Service reported, was far more warm and magnetic than

had been anticipated.

And the general feeling of the military men was

one of calm, self-confidence and self-respect, Service wrote.

25

Summing up this rather lengthy initial report, Service added:
I think now. that further study and observation will confirm
that' what is scen- at· Yenan is a \vell integrated fi1crv~ment, with
a political and economic program, which it is successfully
carrying out under competent leaders.
And that while the Kuomintang has iost its early revolution
ary character and with that loss, disintegrated, the Communist
Party, because of the struggle it has had to continue, has kept
its revolutionary character, but has grown to a healthy and
moderate maturity.
One cannot help coming to feel that this movement is strong
and successful, and that it has such drive behind it and has
tied itself so closely to the people that it will not easily
be killed. 26

23

Service, Report No.1, Ibid., 518.

24 Ibid •
25"'b'd
~., 520.
26 Ibid .
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Colonel Barrett, over whose signature all of Service's reports
from Yenan were submitted wrote in 1970, that " . . . I saw at once [that
Service's reports] were strongly in favor of the Communists and
critical of the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang.

~dversely

I spoke to Jack and

told him I was concerned lest the reports get him into trouble with ul
tra-conservatives in United States Government circles.,,27

Service's

response, Barrett claimed, was "Dave, I'm a Foreign Service Officer.
What I have y,'ritten in these reports and the recommendation I have made
are my observations and carefully considered opinions.
like them in Washington, they can throw them out."

If they don't

28

Service was true to his words, for the stream of 'reports which
flowed from Yenan were neither brief, nor were they, for the most part,
critical of the

Communists'~

On' September

II,

t'VJO

da')·s-- before-- HU1::"ley- ar

rived in Chungking, Service submitted his 21st report from Yenan, en
titled "Gener':-ll Impression of the Chinese Conununist Leaders. ,,29

In the

report, Service lauded the Communist leaders, finding them with very few
negative traits--at worst they demonstrated voluntary effacement of in
dividuality, a noticeable uniformity in their thinking and expressions,
and a lack of humor among them.

In conclusion, Service added:

The general impression one gets of the Chinese Communist
leaders is that they are a unified group of vigorous, mature
and practical men, unselfishly devoted to high principles,
and having great ability and strong qualities of leadership.
27

Barrett, Dixie

M~ssion,

45.
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This impression-and, I suggest, their record--places them
above any other contemporary group in China. It is not sur
prising that they have favorably impressed most or all of the
Americans who have met them during the last seven years:
their manners, habits of thought, and direct handUng of prob
lems seem more American than oriental. 30
Earlier on August 3, Servtce had submitted report No.5, entitled
"The Communist Policy Toward the Kuomintang,"

3l

in which he suggested

that " • • . the policies of the Chinese Communist Party will not run
counter to the interests of the United States in China in the foreseeable
future, and that the Party

m~rits,

friendly attitude on our part. 1I

32

so far as possible, a sympathetic and
He arrived at this conclusion through

an extensive analysis of the Cotffillunist's attitude toward Chiang and the
Kuomintang, attitudes which were held by the political though not the
military leaders.

The political leaders, Service noted, appeared to

have complete control of the military

leadc.~rs

the policy of the former continued to be "

in policy matters, and
. adherence to the United

Front; full mobilization to fight Japan; abandonment of any purely Com
munist program; and recognition of the Central Government and the
leadership of the Generalissimo.,,33
It might seem strange, Service suggested, that a party which was
striving for political power, and was theoretically at least, revolutionary
in nature, would not be taking advantage of the deteriorating control of
30 Ibid . , 556.
3l Ibi <!.

,

562.

32 Ibid.• , 567.
33~.,
Ib ·
562.
1
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the Kuomintang throughout China.

v7hy, Service asked rhetorically, would

the Communists still be adhering to the United Front when the political
and military situation in China was to their advantage?

"The question

therefore presents itself: 1I he wrote, "are the Communists sincere in
this pOlicy?,,34
The indications, Service offered, were that the Communists were
sincere.
Except for the months from July to September, 1943 when they
seriously thought they were in danger of attack by the Kuomintang,
they have not talked of violent opposition to the Kuomintang. The
Communists steadfastly stick to the line that civil war would be a
tragedy which must be avoided at any cost--although some observers
believe that it would be difficult if not impossible for the Kuom
intang to defeat them. They will not permit any suggestion that
China should be divided or that they should hold one section of
it, such as North China, more or less independently. Propaganda.
wall slogans in Yenan (long antedating our arrival) call for both
p81!'t-iesto unite to resist Japan. 35
Service went on to offer two explanations of Communist policy, one
based on theoretical grounds as given by the Party leaders, the other a
rising out of practical considerations.

The second, he suggested, may be

too cynical, and it would be rejected by the Party leaders.

Nevertheless,

they both made some sense, he added, "and both would seem to show that
the party is under far-sighted, careful leadership and strong discipline.,,36
As a theoretical explanation, Service pointed out that the Chinese
Communist Party claimed to be Marxist.

"By this the Communists mean that

their ideology, their philosophical approach, and their dialectical methods

34 Ibid . , 563.
35 Ibid .
36 Ibid . , 564.
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and an

a~proach

M~rxi~m

waR, therefore, an

to problems, according to Service.

at~itude

"It is a long-term

vijw of political and economic development to which all short-term con
si erations of temporary advantage or premature power are ruthlessly sub

or~inated.,,38
• • • 'although the Chinese Communist Party aims at eventual
socialism, it hopes to arrive at this, not through a violent rev
olution, but through a long and orderly process of democracy and
controlled economic development. This democracy will be of a
progressive--or what would generally be called radical--type.
The economic development tVill be partly socialistic, partly pri.
vate. The first is essential to the second: the desired eco
nomic development can come about only under democracy.39
The long-term approach, Service commented, determined for the Com
mu ists their policy toward the Kuomintang.

Because they believed in

de ocracy, they advocated multi-party participation in politics.

In

ke ping with this approach, they sought compromises v7ith the Kuomintang
in the hope that the progressive elements in the Kuomintang would rise
to the occasion and make such compromises possible.
re~used

to exploit what appeared to be an excellent opportunity to over-

th

the Nationalist government.

ci

war:

op

Thus the Communists

"And for this reason they seek to avoid

even if they win after a long struggle, the country's devel
be set back by loss of time and destruction of resources.,,40

But at the same time, the Communists would not sacrifice the gains
thus far if that would be the prerequ::l,site to a compromise with the
37 Ibid •
38 Ibid •
39 Ibid ., 565.
40 Ibid .
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Kuomintang.

They would accept provocation and abuse, Service noted, but

they would make no concessions of principle, " • • • because to make such
concessions would be a violation of' their long-·term policy and a turning
· t h e pursu1t
.
b ack 1n

0f

' u lt1mate
'
t he1r

0 b"
Ject1ves.
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By this view the Communist Party becomes a party $eeking order
ly democratic growth toward socialism--as it is being attained,
for instance, in a country like England--rather than a party fo
menting an immediate and violent revolution. It becomes a party
which is not seeking an early monopoly of political power but
pursuing what it considers the long-term interests of China. 42
But Service was not the naive observer that some would claim he was
in later years, for his second explanation held forth the possibility
that the Chinese Communists were simply well-versed in Machiavellian pol
itics.

Their support of the war could be giving them time to mobilize,

organize, and indoctrinate the people and to train and equip an effi.cient
army.

Their operation behind the Japanese lines could be providing them

with relative freedom from Kuomintang harassment.

Land refor.m programs

might be designed merely to gain the support of the people in the areas
of Communist operations, while at the same time their espousal of dem
ocracy acted as an appeal to the majority of the Chinese people and as
a good club for beating the Kuomintang.

Their democratic claims, Service

further noted, along with their engagement in guerilla warfare behind
enemy lines, and their proclamation of liberal economic policies based
as they were on private property, were also useful as an appeal to foreign
sympathies to the point of winning the foreign support necessary for the
rebuilding of China following the war.

41 Ibid •

42 Ibid .
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With the conditions as bad as they appeared to be throughout Chi.na,
the Communists grew stronger, Service revealed, and with this fact in
mind, it was unnecessary for them to take active steps toward the defeat
of the Kuomintang.

"If things continue as they are now going, time will

bring the collapse of the Kuomintang, leaving the Commupists the strongest
force in China.,,43
It was difficult, Service wrote, to make a clear-cut determination
of whether the first or second explanation of the Communist Chinese
policy was appropriate.

It was probable, he speculated, that a portion

of both entered into the actual formulation of Communist strategy.

The

bellicosity of the Communist generals tended to draw him toward the sec
ond explanation.
But' on--the other hand, the apparently genuin'€, atte~s~of the"
Communists to avoid any civil "Nar now or after the present war
are hard to fit into the second E::xplanation. And the impressive
personal qualities of the Coro.D1unist leaders, their seeming sin
cerity, anc the coherence and logical nature of their program
leads me, at least, toward general acceptance of the first ex
planatlon--that the Communists base their policy toward the
Kuomintang on a real desire for growth through a stage of pri
vate enterprise to eventual socialism without the need of vio
lent upheaval and revolution. 44

. Thus did Service arrive at his conclusion that the Chinese Communist
policies did not run counter to the interests of the United States.

AI-

though he was not advocating the arming of the Communists at this early
date, he did press strongly his belief that the United States should ap
proach the Communists with a friendly attitude.
Ambassador Gauss transmitted Service's report No.5 to the Secretary
43 1, . d

~-.,

566.

44 1bid ., 567.
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of State on Septereber 8.
Chinese

Con~unists

45

Admitting in his prefacing remarks that the

had moderated their policies since about 1937, Gauss

took the position that this haa come about, in all probability, for rea
sons of self-preservation and the obvious need for unity in the face of
Japanese aggressions.

"It was only by following such a policy that the

Communists could hope to participate actively in the war in its early
stages and command support from the Chinese public.,,46

In Gauss' opin

ion, the changes in the Chinese Communists' policies were measures of
expediency, and were intended to give the Communists time for the
strengthening of their position vis-a-vis the Kuomintang.
The attitude of the several foreign pmv-ers with interests in China,
the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union in particular,
would, more likely than not, contribute to the eVului.ion of Kuomint.ang-·
Communist relations in Cl1ina, Gauss pointed out, and could, perhaps, be
decisive.
For this reason, the position of the foreign powers is ob
viously one of great responsibility in dealing with this prob
lem. A decision, for example, of one or more of the great
Powers to arm the Communists to assist in the conflict against
Japan might in the end produce far-reaching internal repercus
sions; indeed, it is almost certain to do so. Independent or
unilateral foreign support of the Chinese Communists under
present conditions would in all probability be a serious blow
to the Kuomintang and the National Government and might even
bring about their early collapse. 47
But Service had not yet suggested that the United States arm the
Communists.
45

He soon would, however, and others already had.

Gauss to Hull, Ibid., 559.

46 Ibid .• 561.
47 Ibid .

For that
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it is necessary to turn to the arrival of Patrick J. Hurley, who, on
September 6, 1944, conferred with Chiang Kai-shek for the first time
since their meeting in 1943.

CHAPTER V
STILWELL, CHIANG AND THE

CO~lliUNISTS

Although President Roosevelt and Hurley had agreed in their discus
sions of August 24, 1944 that the idea of arming the Communists should be
rejected, the fact remains that the President, having accepted the propos
a1 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to put General Stilwell in command of all
Chinese forces,

1

radioed Chiang Kai-shek to that effect on July 6, and

added:
The extremely serious sj tuation which results from Japanese a.d
vances in Cent;ral China, which threaten not only your Government
buc~ all that the U. S. Anny- has been· building up'·'in China, leads·
me to the conclusion that drastic measures mu~t be taken immedi
ately i f the situation is to be saved. The critical situation
which now exists, in my opinion calls for the delegation to one
individual of the power to coordinate' all Allied L'1ilitarv resources
in China, inc:..ludin~~he Co.,mmunist forces. [emphasis added] 2
On

August 23, 1944, the day before Hurley I s 1a::>t meeting vlith the

President, General Hearn, Stilwell's chief of staff, preseuted to Chiang
another message from Roosevelt, urging again that positive steps be
immediately taken to place General Stilwell in command of the Chinese
forces.

In that message, Roosevelt also pointed out that,

I do not think the forces to come under General Stilwell's
conmand should be limited except by their availability to de
fend C!1ina and fight the Japanese. When the enemy is pressing
1

Romanus and Sunderland, Stihve11' s Command Problems, 382.
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us toward possible disaster, it appears unsound to refuse the
aid of anyone who will kill Japanese. 3
The President had in mind, when he sent these messages to Chiang,
the unification of all Chinese forces, who would then launch a combin.ed
effort under Stilwellts command to defeat the Japanese forces in China.
There are no indications that he intended the Communists to be armed
independently by the United States.
But when Hurley arrived in Chungking he discovered that the ques
tion of the use of Communist forces was still very much a point of con
tention between Chiang and Stilwell in their attempts to arrive at an ac
ceptable arrangement for Stilwellts cownand takeover.

In his first

meeting with Chiang on September 6, Hurley was informed by the Generalis
simo that if Stilwell wished to use the Communists, those forces would
have to acknowledge the authority of the National Militnry Council.

Fur

thermore, the Generalissimo informed Hurley, any Communiots serving
under Stilwell would have to submit to Chiang t s control. 4
On September 8, Hurley took up his formal role as negotiator,
meeting with Chiang and T.V. Soong to hear the Chinese conditions for
Stilwellts command takeover.

Hurley took emphatic objection to these

conditions whereupon the Generalissimo suggested that agendas be pre
pared by Hurley and Stilwell for the remainder of the negotiations.
Chiang then proposed that the Communist troop issue be met by incorporat
ing the Communists into the Chinese Army i f they would submit to his
command.

S

3 Ibid . , 417.
4 Ibid . , 423.
SIbid. , 425.
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On September 12, Hurley presented his ten-point Agenda to Chiang:
1.

The paramount objective of Chinese-American collaboration
is to bring about the unification of all military forces
in China for the immediate defeat of Japan and the libera
tion of China.

2.

To cooperate with China in bringing about closer relations
and harmony with Russia and Britain for the support of the
Chinese objectives.

3.

The unification of all resources in China for war purposes.

4.

The marshalling of all resources in China for war purposes.

5.

Support efforts of Generalissimo for political unification
of China on a democratic basis.

6.

Submit present and postwar economic plans for China.

7.

Definition of the pmvcrs of General Stilwell as Field Com
mander.

8.

Definition of General Stilwell's powers as Chief of Staff to
the- Generalissimo'.

9.

Prepare for presentation a diagram of command.

10.

Discuss future control of

Lend~·lease in China. 6

Taking objection to the words "on a democratic basis," Soong asked
that this phrase be struck from point 5.

Chiang, agreeing to the "objec

tives" outlined in the first six points, stated, upon reaching the points
relating to Stihvell's assumption of command, that his powers would have
to be defined by an international agreement. 7
Stilwell took this to mean that the Generalissimo had agreed to
give him command so he and Hurley proceeded, following the meeting, to draft

6Ibid .

See also, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 259.

7
Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 426. Soong's
objections to lion a democratic basis," arose, no doubt, out of his idea
of the political philosophy of Sun Yat-sen which called for a period of
one-·party tutelage prior to the creation of a democratic system. China,
he probably believed was still under the one-party system.
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outlines of Stilwell's new powers for the purpose of presenting to Chiang
the type of agreement he desired.

Among the many suggestions made by

Stilwell relating to his command over the Chinese Armies, was that "all
the Chinese Armed Forces, air as well as ground,"
in his command.

8

were to be included

He also pointed out to Hurley that his' conception of

arrangements with the Chinese Communists was that they should be purely
military in nature and limited to the present crisis.
The 18th Group
misunderstanding
where there will
but they must be

Army (Reds) will be used. There must be no
on this point. They can be brought to bear
be no conflict with Central Government troops, 9
accepted as part of the team during the crisis.

Nothing was exnlicitly stated about the use of the Communist
in the two papers presented to Chiang around September 14.

10

force~

But bv this

time Chiang was well aware of the desires of President Roosevel::., the
War Department and Stilwell, that the

Con~unisl

forces be included in

Stilwell's command.
Furthermore, the War Deuartment had, a fe'N weeks earlier, told
Stilwell that it was contemulating giving Lend-lease aid to a Chinese
Army that might include Communist as well as Nationalist troops.

11

At

about the same time that Stilwell received this information, he received
.
12
as well, John Stewart Service's report No. 16 from YenaII.,
in which

9 Ibid ., 429.
10

'.
Hurley presented to Chiang a draft of Stilwell's order of appoint
ment and a proposed directive from the Generalissimo to Stilwell. Ibid.
llIbid., 420.
l2Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 618.
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Service suggested that the United States should begin furnishing desper
ately needed basic military supplies to the Communists.

Not only should

the Communists be supplied, Service' argued, but those supplies
• • • should be supported by training in the effective use
of these supplies. It should be planned to lead, as the war
in China develops into its late stages, to actual tactical 13
cooperation of Communists with air and other ground forces.
Earlier, on July 28, Service had informed Stilwell that in a con
versation with Chou En-lai, the then Communist representative to Chungking
had said that the Communists would welcome an American Allied Supreme
Commander such as that which Chu Teh, the Communist commander_in_chief,
had earlier suggested to an American newsman.

Chou had pointed out also

that the Communists would welcome collaboration with the Nationalists,
but that this would only occur i f there had been a radical change in the
Central Government's earlier opposition.1
On September 13, just prior to

4

Sti~well's

departure for Kweilin and

East China where Japanese movements were causing him some worry, he was
visited by Communist emissaries.

According to Romanus and Sunderland's

Stilwell's Command Problems,

All that is recorded of the meeting in his diary is that
Stilwell told them he would go to Yenan, that he would meet
again with them after he returned from Kweilin, and that
they were much pleased. In the light of events, this sug
gests that after Stilwell's position had been settled to the
mutual satisfaction of the Generalissimo and himself he would
go to Yenan for the bargaining sessions that would precede
any exercise of command over Communist forces. 15

13 Ibid ., 619.
14Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 431.
l5 Ibid ., 432.
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While there is no evidence to indicate that Stilwell had proposed
a political settlement between the Communists and the Kuomintang--that,
after all, was not his responsibility--there is ample evidence that pol
icy makers in Washington were urging just that.

On September 4, Gauss

reported to the Secretary of State on the Communist problem in China, in
forming him that Chiang was
as adamant as, if not more adamant than, before in his
attitude which is one that no compromise is possible and that
the only acceptable solution would be capitulation by the Chi-
nese Communists to the demands and wishes of the Government, 16
i.e. of himself and the present leaders of the national party.
In response, Hull told Gauss in a September 9, telegram that he and
the President had taken note of Chiang's suggestions that the Communists
should be told to settle with the Government, and in view of similar sug
gestions made to Vice-president Wallace, it appeared that there had been
" • • . a discouraging lack of progress in Chiang's thinking, in view of
his own professed desire to reach a settiement with the Communists.,,17
Hull went on to suggest to Gauss that if he considered the step advisable,
he could tell Chiang that if he would arrange a meeting with the Commu
nist representative in Chungking .
• you will point out to the Communist representative that
unity in China in prosecuting the war and in preparing for the
peace is urgently necessary, that a spirit of tolerance and good
will-of give and take--is essential in achieving such unity;
that Chinese of every shade of political thinking should cooper
ate nm" to defeat the Japanese; and that differences can be set
tled i f the maj9r objective of victory is kept in mind. illS
I

16 Gauss to

I

Hu~l,

Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 544.

l7Hull to Gauss, Jbid., 567.
I

l8 Ibid ., 568.
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Furthermore, Hull informed Gauss, he should tell Chiang that he
and the President were concerned about the absence of a settlement with
the Chinese Communists.

Chiang should also be informed, Hull indicated,

that he and the President were not interested in the Chinese Communists
as such, but that they were anxious on behalf of the United States and
the United Nations, as well as on the behalf of China, for the Chinese
people to merge and settle their factional differences by intelligent
conciliation and cooperation.

Their hope, Hull pointed out, was for the

establishment, following the war, of a durable, democratic peace.

19

In concluding, Hull instructed Gauss to inform General Stilwell,
Hurley and Nelson, of the matter, and, if he considered it useful, to
invite one or more of them to accompany him when he called on Chiang.
Gauss. so . informad ba.th Hurley and. Nelson> though the.. tvlo.,did,..not acc.om-::
pany him when he approached Chiang on the matter on September 15.

20

President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State, therefore, were
becoming impatient with Chiang for his recalcitrance on the Communist
question, as well as over the now obvious fact that the Chinese forces
under Chiang "Jere doing a poor job of fighting the Japanese.

This im

patience was not relieved when in September General Stilwell's situation
report of the 15th was relayed to General Marshall who was at Quebec
where Roosevelt and Churchill were meeting with the Combined Chiefs of
Staff in the OCTAGON Conference.

2l

Where in the past, particularly at the Washington Conference in 1943
and the Cairo Conference in December of that year, there had been strong
19 Ibid .
20Gauss to Hull, Ibid., 573.
2lRomanus and Sunderland, Stih.;re11 's Command Problems) 439.
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disagreements

bet~l1een

the Joint Chiefs and the British Chiefs of Staff

over the value of committing British resources to a major offensive in
Burma, now, with evidence of recent defeats over the Japanese along the
Indo-Burmese border and in north Burma, the British were in the process
of altering their thinking.

On September 1, the British Chiefs of Staff

had suggested that an operati.on be launched by air and by sea against the
city of Rangoon.

To the Americans this was immediately acceptable as it

would minimize jungle fi.ghting, would cut the Japanese line of comlIlunica
tions to Burma, and would be a step toward reopening prewar lines of
communications from Rangoon north.

For the British, such an operation,

if successful, would offer them the hope for the much-desired advance
"
22
ment tml1'ard S1ngapore.
It...was, .. ill..this.. at.mQ~he.f\e of relief over a fin"cd compromise on

Burma that Stihlell's report was placed, a report ""hich told of Chiang
Kai-shek's desire to withdraw Chinese troops from Burma to be used in
the defense of Kunroing.

This action would, if carried out, end the cam

paign in Burma and upset completely the Combined Chiefs of Staff's strat
egy for Burma.

23

On September 16, the problem was formally presented to

O
24
t he CCS, t he P reS1Od ent an d t h e Pr1me M1n1ster.
0

0

The outcome of the dis

cussions would be the first step, or perhaps the final step, leading to
Stilwell's recall from China and the end of Hurley's first duty as the
President's personal representative to Chiang Kai-shek.

22Ibido
23 Ibid ., 440.
24 Ibid . , 441.
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After reviewing Stilwell's report,

Y~rshall

600-word telegram which had been drafted by

presented to Roosevelt, a
l"~rshall' s

and upon which Marshall had written his endorseIbent.

staff at Quebec
"I recommend that

you send the proposed attached message to the Generalissimo,,,25 Marshall
had written, and Roosevelt complied.

Because the telegram was perhaps

the most controversial one ever sent by Roosevelt to Chiang, it is
quoted here in its full length.
After reading the last reports on the situation in China my
Chiefs of Staff and I are convinced that you are faced in the
near future with the disaster I have feared. The men of your
"y" forces crossing the Salween have fought with great courage
and rendered i.nvaluable assistance to the ce.mpaign in North
Burma. But we feel that unless they are reinforced and St,p
ported with your every c-3.T'ficlty you cannot expect to reap any
fruits from their sacrifices, which will be valueless unless
they go on to assist in opening the Burma Road. Furthermore,
any pause in your attack across the Sahveen or suggestion of
wlchtlraua'l is exactly '''hat the Jap hC:t::'~ bee11' striving to cause.
you to do by his operations in Eastern China. He knows that
if you continue to attack, cooperating with Mountbatten's com
ing offensive, the land line to China will be opened in early
1945 and the continued resistance of China and maintenance of
your control will be assured. On the other hand, if you do
not provide Uli'lnpOv7er for your divisions in North Burma and,
if you fail to send reinforcements to the Salween forces and
withdraw these armies, we will lose all chance of opening land
communications with China and immediately je.opardize the air
route over the hump. For this you must yourself be prepared
to accept the consequences and assume the personal responsibility.
I have urged time and again in recent months that you take
drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving
closer to China and to you. Now, when you have not yet placed
Genera.! Stilwell in command of all forces in China, we are faced
with the loss of a critical area in east China with possible
catastrophic consequences. The Japanese capture of Kweilin
will place the Kunming air terminal under the menace of constant
air attack, reduce the hump tonnage and possible severing of
the air route.
Even though we are rolling the enemy back in defeat allover
the world this will not. help the situation in China for a con
siderable time. The advance of our forces across the Pacific
is swift. But this advance will be too late for China unless
you act now and vigoro~sly. Only drastic and iwnediate action
25

Tuchman, 492.
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on your part alone can be in time to preserve the fruits of your
long years of struggle and the effortl:l we have been able to make
to support you. Otherwise political and military considerations
alike are going to be swallowed in military disaster.
The Prime Minister and I have just decided at Quebec to press
vigorously the operations to open the land line to China on the
assumption that you would continue an unremitting attack from
the Salween side. I am certain that the only things you can now
do in an attempt to prevent the Jap from achieving his objec
tives in China is to reinforce your Salween armies immediately
and press their offensive, while at once placing General Stilwell
in unrestricted command of all your forces. The action I am ask
ing you to take will fortify us.in our decision and in the con
tinued efforts the United States proposes to ta.ke to maintain and
increase our aid to you. This we are doing when we are fighting
two other great campaigns in Europe and across the Pacific. I
trust that your farsighted vision, which has guided and inspired
your people in this war, will realize the necessity for iwnediate
action. In this message I have expressed my thoughts with com
plete frankness because it appears plainly evident to all of us
here that all your and our efforts to save China are to be lost
by further delays.26
. Although Roosevelt's message to Chiang was very nearly an ultimatum,
it probably would not have been considered as such by the Generalissimo
had i t not been delivered to him by G:;neral Sti.h:ell.

Stilwell had re

ceived the message on the morning of September 19, and realized its pos
sible impact on Chiang.

Because of the strength of Roosevelt's words,

Stilwell had doubts as to whether or not he should deliver the message to
Chiang himself, and sought the council of his chief-of-staff, General
Hearn.

Hearn told Stilwell he did not see how the General could stop a

message from the President.

Stilwell was cognizant of the fact, further

more, that Roosevelt had ordered in 'Hay, that his messages were to be
delivered to Chiang by the General.
orders from the President.
deliver the message.

26

Stilwell was not one to disobey

He decided, therefore, that he himself must

27

Roosevelt to Chiang, Foreign Relatic:)Us, 194£1, VI, 157.

27Romanns and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 444.
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Stihlell went immed:i.ately to Chiang's residence where Hurley was in
conference with the Generalissimo and other Chinese, including T.V. Soong.

On the table around which the group was seated, were a draft of Stilwell's
commission, a draft of his directive, and a draft diagram of command chan
nels.

It was Hurley's opinion that the Generalissimo was about to place

his. chop on each of the documents, an act which would have placed Stilwell
in complete command of the Chinese forces.

28

When Stilwell arrived, he called Hurley out of the room and showed
him Roosevelt's message.
was an ultimatum.

Hurley read it and remarked that in effect H

He suggested to Stilwell that the General let him para

phra.se the message, but Stilwell, after a brief discussion, told Hurley
that he was under orders to deliver the message himself. ·With this the
twg..,-moveQ.··baak into the room vlh(H'e Stilwell announce{l that. he-had a mes
sage for the Generalissitlo from President Roosevelt.

He handed the mes

sage to General Chu Shih-ming to read to Chiang, but Hurley, realizing
the embarrassment Chiang would suffer if others in the room heard the
message at the same time., took the note from General Chu and handed the
Chinese portion to the Generalissimo, saying that it would save time
if Chiang read it himself.

Chiang read the message, stated quietly, "I

d t h e meetlng.
.
29
un d erstan,
d " an dc Iose
Chiang apparently found i t difficult to believe that Roosevelt, whom
he considered to be his close and devoted friend, would have sent such a
harsh message.

He therefore thought, it appears, that Stilwell had drafted

the message himself, and had sent it to Washington, arranging to have it

28 Ibid .
29 Ibid ., 445.
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sent back to Chiang as though it had come from the president.

30

vlliat

ever his thoughts may have been relating to the origins of the telegram,
his response was one of indignation and bitterness.

Shortly after

reading the telegram, he reportedly called in T.V. Soong and told him
that Roosevelt's message forced him to cancel his promise to give Stil
well command.

31

But negotiations continued, though haltingly, for a few more days,
and on September 23, Stilwell handed Hurley a new agenda, designed, he
hoped, to get the talks moving.

"I propose that we go to the GMO," wrote

Stilwell, "and take up the following items for his considerations."
That I be sent to Yenan to make the following proposi-·
tions to the Reds:

1.

a. The Reds to acknm,r1edge the suprem~ authority of the GHO,
and to accept command through'me.
b. The Red Forces to be employed north of the Yellow River,
out of contact with the Central Government Troops.

c. Equipment and ammunition to be furnished five divisions
with supporting artillery.
d.

Keep these Red Divisions at full strength at all times.

e. Both the KllT [Kuomintang] and the Reds to drop discussion
of political matters until the Japanese are beaten. 32
In spite of Hurley's understanding with President Roosevelt on
August 24, he " . • • accepted [Stilwell's agenda] with characteristic
gusto and the remark, tThis will knock the persimmons off the trees!,,33

30 Ibid • , 447.
31 Ibid .
32 Ibid . , 451.
33 Ibid . , 452.
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But when Hurley took Stihvell's agenda to Chiang on September 24,
he learned that Chiang had already arrived at a decision--Stilwell must
go.

Further discussion took place between Hurley and Chiang on this

matter, but the Generalissimo's decision stood, and on September 25,
Hurley transmitted to Washington for Chiang an aide-memoire in which the
Generalissimo informed the Presiden.t that Stilwell would n.o longer be
acceptable as Field Commander of the Chinese Armies.

34

With this, Patrick J. Hurley's first assignment ended, and in
failure.

He had not been able to bring about harmony between Stilwell

end Chiang becaus'e, as he later wrote, the two men were incompatible.
By all indications, however, Hurley's failure was not really his own,
but rather was the result of the mis-handling of a very deljcate situa
tion, by nearly all involved, including the President.

In a first draft

of Chiang's aide-memoire, Chiang had written that his position was being
taken because Stilwell had handed him Roosevelt's September 19 message. 35
The nature of that message, and the fact that Stilwell had delivered it,
made Chiang appear to be Stilwell's subordlnate, the Chinese leader wrote.
With that kind of relationship and "were Stilwell appointed, the Chinese
Army might mutiny,,,36 Chiang informed the President.

Although Hurley con

vinced Chiang that such a response would be inappropriate, and that the
first draft should be rewritten without that charge, Hurley did, in his
own prefacing remarks, make it quite clear that the method of delivery
had been a cause of Chiang's reaction. 37
34 Ibid .
35 Ibid •
36 Ibid •
·
37 Ib 1.0,
1
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Had that September 19, message been delivered to Chiang in a dif
ferent manner and by someone other than Stilwell, it might not have ap
peared quite so harsh and Chiang might not have been quite so taken aback
by it.

In a September 28, draft message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Marshall offered an explanation and an apology for the poor handling of
the Presidentts message:
• • • The delivery of my message by Stilwell personally was
a routine procedure which had been in effect for more than a
year due to difficulties encountered in the past in securing
prompt deliveries and in at least one instance of some evidence
that the phrasing of my messages to you had been tampered with.
You have my apology for the procedure in the present instance
and I much regret that the transmitting agencies in the War De
partment did not think to give instructions for the message to
be presented by General Hurley.38
Although this message was never sent to Chiang, for whom it was
originally intended by Marshall, it does point out Marshall's impression
of what was at least partially, the cause of the final breakdown between
Stilwell and Chiang.

But whatever the reason, President Roosevelt in

formed Chiang Kai-shek on October 18, 1944, that Stilwell was being re
called from the China Theatre.

39

Hurley's role as negotiator had been of little consequence in the
dispute between Chiang and Stilwell, but the episode has been dealt with
here to emphasize the fact that in the early period of Hurley's tenure
in China, he revealed little aversion to using or to arming the Chinese
Communists, in the \\'ar against Japan.

Hurley had stopped in l1oscow on

his way to Chungking in late August, where he and Nelson had talked with

38 Ibid., 454.
39 Roosevelt to Chiang, Foreign }\elations, 1944, VI, 165.
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V.M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, about the Soviet atti
tude toward China.

Molotov had told the two that some of the people in

parts of China who were extremely impoverished, half-starved and miser
able, called themselves Communists.
relation whatever to communism.

But, Molotov stressed, they had no

"They were merely expressing their dis

satisfaction at their economic conditions by calling themselves Communists.
However, once their economic conditions had improved, they would forget
this political inclina.tion. ,AO

Hurley had apparently believed this alle

gation, as he came to refer consistently to the Yenan forces of Mao Tse
tung, as the "so-called Communists,,,4l

As late as January, 1945, three

months after Stilwell's recall, Hurley informed the Secretary of State
that "The Communists are not in fact Communists, they are striving for
democratic principles . •

,,42

But his attitude would change toward the "so-called Communists."
For by mid-February, 1945, less than a month after he had informed the
Secretary of State that the

Cow~unists

view had changed drastically.

were not really Communists, his

All the arguments and all the documents

should indicate, Hurley wrote to the Secretary on February 18, " • . • that
the Chinese Communist Party is not democratic; that its purpose is to
destroy the control of government by the Kuomintang.,,43
40Asreported by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to
Hull, Ibid., 255.
4lHurley to Roosevelt and Marshall, Ibid., 154.
42

Hurley

to Secretary of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, VII,

211.

43 Ibid ., 227.

CHAPTER VI
HURLEY MEETS THE COMMUNISTS

On October 5, 1944, President Roosevelt had wired Chiang Kai-shek,
expressing his surprise that the Generalissimo had reversed himself on
the decision to give Stilwell command of all Chinese forces.

The Pres

ident had not yet decided to recall Stilwell, only, as he informed Chiang,
to relieve him of his duties as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo and
of his responsibilities in connection with Lend-lease matters.

Nor

would the President be willing to suggest another candidate for command
of the"Chi.nese forces, he infOl'.med Chiang.

The g'J':ound situation in

China had so deteriorated, he ¥-'rote, that he was inclined to feel that
the United States Government should not assume the responsibility in
volved in placing an American officer in command of the ground forces
throughout China..

1

But Roosevelt was willing, he had informed Chiang, for Hurley to
continue as his personal representative to the Generalissimo " • • • re
garding military affairs in China,"

2

and to this offer, Chiang had indi

cated his appreciation and his hope that Hurley's assignment would be on
a more permanent and broader basis.

Chiang expressed to Roosevelt, his

desire that Hurley's directive would be broad enough that he could cooper
ate with the Generalissimo on the many vital questions involving China's

lRoosevelt to Chiang, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 165.
2 Ibid •
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relationship with the United States.

3

Stating that it was his purpose to increase the Communist troops
in the regular forces of the National Army, and indicating that this con
stituted one of the vital ~equisites in China's war effort against Japan,
Chiang revealed to Roosevelt that he was relying on Hurley for assistance
in negotiations with the Chinese Communists.
General Hurley has my complete confidence. Because of his rare
knowledge of human nature, and his approach to the problem, he
seems to get on well "rith the Communist leaders. As your person
al representative, possessing my full confidence, his contribution
in solving this hitherto insoluble problem would be of the great
est value to our war effort. 4
Apparently this undated response to Roosevelt's October 5, messa.ge
was despatched sometime shortly after October 17, for in it Chiang in
dicated that Hurley had alrEady begun to confer with the Chinese Communist
representatives, and the ear1ie.st indicator of Hurley's contact with
those representatives was his meeting with them on Octuber 17, 1944.
Chiang had decided in late September that the political situation in
China required not only changes in his own government, but a liberal
agreement: with the Communists as well.

He had not made this decision

known publicly, however, for fear that if his intentions became

kno~1,

the Communists might increase their demands upon the Kuomintang for a
sett 1ement.

5

In an Embassy c!ocum.;nt dated October 17, therefore, it

had been suggested that General Hurley hold confidential talks with

3Chiang to Roosevelt, Ibid., 170.

SAs reported by Gauss to Hull, Ibid., 595.
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Messrs. Lin Tzu-han and Tung Pi-wu, the

t\-lO

Communist members of the

People's Political Council in Chungking, to determine if the Communists
desired the General's good offices for bringing about a settlement with
the government.

If the Communists should favor Hurley's offer, the mem

orandum read, he should then submit a draft proposal fo"!, settlement to
both the Communist and the Central Government representatives.

6

Thus, on October 17, 1944, Patrick J. Hurley, meeting with the
two Communist representatives, took on a new role.

His original in

structions had not directed him to act as a negotiator between the
Kuomintang and the

Cow~unists,

but those instructions were broad enough

to allow such activity, and Roosevelt did not oppose Chiang's suggestion
that Hurley should involve himself in such negotiations.

On October 23,

Hu-tiey,in,fc1"med Roosevelt that "wi.th the i:clvi.ce.and conseaL of the. Gissimo
we are having conferences with the leaders of the Communist Party and the
Communist troops."

7

Because there was again, no response to this announce

ment, from either Roosevelt or the Department of State, it can be assumed
that Hurley's new role \,Tas acceptable to them.
Hurley was quite elated follo\-ling his first meetings with the
Communist representatives on October 17 and 18, learning, as he did,
6

Embassy Memorandum, Ibid., 650.

7Hurley to Roosevelt, Ibid., 177. According to R.T. Smith, there
was evidence in the Hurley papers that the General had written to Roose
velt on October 19, 1944, informing the President that he had entered
into negotiations with the Communists, a feat which, he wrotf:!, many con
sidered impossible. This report was optimistic, Hurley claiming he had
advanced a formula for unification which would put Chiang in unquestionable
command of all forces in China. Perhaps Hurley decided not to send this
message, for there appears to be no record of it in the printed diplomatic
papers. This is all the more apparent in view of Hurley's October 23, mes
sage, which seems to ce informing the President for the first time, of the
conferences which were occurring with the Communists. See Smith, "Alone
in China," 73.
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that the Communists favored unification of China under a government which
would allow what they called democratic principles to evolve.

For the

present, the two representatives told Hurley, they were willing, for pur
poses of fighting the Japanese, to submit to the leadership of Chiang
Kai-shek.

Asking the Communists to put their proposals, in writing, Hurley

then met with Wang Shih-chieh and Chang Chih-chung, the Kuomintang rep
resentatives, on October 19, to make a similar request.

S

But after both sides had submitted their proposals, Hurley found
little about which he could be excited.

The Kuomintang nine-point pro

posal which came to Hurley on October 21, demanded, for military unifica
tion, that the Communist forces be formed into twelve units which would
be placed in the front lines.
th&&lilr,.unitsc w~lld be·

tr~ated·

Under complete control of the Generalissimo,
in the- snme manner

aq

othe.r unl ts of the

Nationalist Army. The Communists would be thrown into the heaviest fight
ing, without the proper equipment, merely to be destroyed by the Japanese.
As far as political concessions were concerned, the Kuomintang merely of
fered the Communists an unspecified role in a government dominated by
·
9
t h e Kuoml.ntang.

The Communist proposals, handed to Hurley on October 23, offered
little more toward a reasonable compromise than had those submitted by
the Kuomintang.

In addition to the four pledges of the Communist Party

made on September 22, 1937 and a listing of the "Main Demands" of the
Communists made during earlier negotiations in June, 1944, the document

8 Ibid,., 74.

lOS
which Hurley received presented the "l'resent Political Notions of the
Chinese Communist Party."
Because there are so many defects in the policy, structure
and personnel of the National Government, the Chinese Commu
nist Party thinks, in order that China may coordinate the
coming counter-offensive of the Allies to defeat the Japanese,
the following steps must be taken:
1. Changes must be quickly made in the policy, structure and
personnel of the Government.

2.

The Kuomintang must immediately end its one-party rule.

3. The national government must iwmediately call a national
Emergency Conference of all the anti-Japanese political par
ties, armies, local governments and public bodies, to reorganize
the Government into a coalition gcvernment.

4. The present military High Command must be reorganized in
to a joint High Command. lU
The Communist demands for immediate changes in governmental struc
ture and philosophy surely must have appeared just. as absurd to the Kuom-
intang as did the Kuomintang military prC!posals appear to the Couu!!unists.
The two factions were not even close to any reasonable compromising posi
tion, a fact which would have appeared impossible to alter to anyone less
optimistic and confident than Hurley.

In spite of the obvious distance

between the two positions, Hurley wired the President that "the Communist
. 11

military forces can be united with the National Army."

Hurley was de

termined to bring that unity about.
Hurley's preconceptions of the "democratic" orientation of both
the Nationalists and Communists in China were deffionstrated when, on
November 7, he journeyed to the Communist headquarters at Yenan to

10Lin Tsu-han and Tung Pi-wu to Hurley, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI,
655.
llIbi'!., 177.
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confer with Mao and the Conununist military leaders.

On October 27, he

had received a telegram from Davies urging him to go to Yenan from
where, Davies wrote, the General could " • . • take significant informa
tion and proposals back to the President vitally affecting the war and
the future balance of power in Asia and the Pacific.,,12
At the same time that Hurley received this message from Davies, he
was in the process of drafting a five-point "Basis for Agreement"

13

to

present to the Kuomintang, and, as was finally decided, to the Cornnunists
at Yenan rather than to their representatives in Chungking.

On November

3, Hurley presented his draft to Wang and Chang, and then proceeded to
make preparations for his trip to Yenan.

But just prior to his departure,

the Kuomintang presented Hurley with a revised draft of his "Basis for
Ag~atM!!len't," in~vh'ich

they propo.soo that the Communists should observe

and carry out the orders of the Central Government and its National Mil
itary Council, rather than, as Hurley's draft had read, " • • . acknowledge
Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Chinese Republic and Generalissimo of
all the military forces of China.,,14
This alteration of Hurley's draft was in keeping with the Kuomintang's
privately announced decision, made through Chiang in September, to make
.
15
important military and civilian changes in the Central Government.
It
was no doubt in view of the possibility of such changes, as well as the
fact that Chiang would surely, someday, step down from his position of
l2Davies to Hurley, Ibid., 659.
l3"Basis for Agreement," Ibid.
l41!Revised Draft by Chinese Government Representatives," Ibid., 666.
15As reported by Gauss to Hull, Jbid., 595.
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rule,

that the Kuomintang draft established the Central Government as

the ultimate source of authority rather than placing that authority in
one individual.
To Hurley neither the reasons for such a change nor the change it
self were of much c.oncern.

More important to him was the fact that with

the exception of this one slight change, the Kuomintang had accepted his
basis for an agreement, providing him with something concrete to present
to the Communists when he journeyed to Yenan.
On November 7, Hurley wired the President, informing Roosevelt that
he was about to depart for Communist tf'.rritory.

His intent, Hurley wrote,

would be to confer with the political leaders of the "so-called Communist
Party," and with the military leaders of the Communist troops.

"This will

be," Hurley iltd±cated, "a short" preliminary survey for the:· purpose of
finding a basis of agree:t:lent between the National Government and the Com
munist Party for the unification of all military forces in China."

l6

Meanwhile, as Hurley was making his preparations, John Patton

·
.
Caplta
. 1 a f ew wee k sear I'ler, 17 was
Wh 0 h a d gone to t h e Communlst
DaVles,
busily writing memoranda on his observations of the Communist leaders.
Although there is no indication of who received Davies' reports other
than Stilwell's headquarters, where all such material was sent from
Yenan, his perceptions are worthy of examination as indicators of the
strength of the Communists' negotiating position just prior to Hurley's
arrival.

16Hurley to Roosevelt, Ibid., 666.
17
As reported by Gauss to Hull) Ib}A., 663.
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Davies wrote three

repo~ts

on November 7, the first of which he en

titled tithe Chinese Coomunists and the Great Powers. tll8

In his opinion,

the Communists were at that time, confident of their own strength and no

.

longer felt that their survival or extinction depended upon foreign aid
or foreign attack.

They differed in that respect from the Nationalists

and Chiang, realizing, however, that acceleration toward their ultimate
goals could be affected drastically by actions which might or might not
be taken by the powers.
Although the Communists were uncommunicative about Soviet ass is
tance it was Davies' opinion that if the Soviets were to offer aid, the
Communists .,ould gladly accept it.

They hac! no fear of Soviet dominance

over them as a result of possible Russian movement through Manchuria and
Horttt'Cltina when the Soviets entered the Pacific war.

The Conununists

maintained that the Soviet Government had no expansionist intentions
toward China, Davies reported, believing as they did, that even Outer
Moneolia would be absorbed after the war, into the Chinese federation.
Britain, however, was believed to be playing its old imperial game
of dividing China into spheres of influence.

The Communists suspected

an Anglo-American deal which would give the British a free hand west of
the Philippines and Formosa.

They feared, furthermore, that a marriage

of convenience would transpire between the British and Chiang, whereby
Chiang would gain British support in exchange for special concessions
in South China.

Such a relationship would not harm the Communists per

se, it was felt, but a side effect of such a relationship would be
greater freedom for Chiang to wage war against the Communists making
18 Ibid ., 667.
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civil war that much more costly for the northern faction.

For that

reason, Davies wrote, the Communists were highly suspicious of the
British.
The United States, Davies contended, was"
and the greatest fear of the Chj.nese Communists. ,,19

• the greatest'hope
They realized, he

said, that if the United States was to provide them with aid equal to
that being supplied Chiang, they would quickly establish control over
most if not all, of China, and more likely than not, without civil war.
Most of Chiang's bureaucrats were opportunists, the Communists believed,
and would desert to the North if it appeared the Communists were gaining
the upper hand over the Central Government.
The United States was the greatest fear of the Communists, howe.ver,
becaus1!~.... the

more aid given tu Chia.."<S,as opposed. to an.. equaLdisrribu

tion between the two factions; the more able Chiang would be to wage war
against the Communists.

If that were to occur, Davies indicated, uni

fication of China would simply take longer and be more costly to the
Communists.

According to a reading of Davies report, although he did

not explicitly make the point, the Communists appear to have been quite
confident that they would eventually win the struggle.
In conclusion, Davies wrote:
So "the Chinese Communists watch us with mixed feelings. If
we continue to reject them and support an unreconstructed Chiang,
they see us becoming their enemy. But they would prefer to be
friends. Not only because of the help we can give them but also
because they recognize that our strategic aims of a strong, in
dependent and democratic China can jibe with their nationalist
objectives. 20
•
19 Ibid ., 668.

20 Ibid ., 669.
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In his second memorandum, Davies questioned the degree to which the
Chfn~se

Communists were really Communists.

backsliders, ,,21 he began.

liThe Chinese Communists are

They s till acclaimed the i.nfa1libility of

.

Marxian dogma and called themselves Communists, but"

• they have be

come indulgent of human frailty and confess that China's

corr~unist

sa1

vation can be attained only through prolonged evolutionary rather than

·
,,22
'
.
revo l
ut10nary
converS10n.
i mme d1ate

There were several reasons for

the moderation of the Communists, Davies suggested.
Chinese, and being so they were

inc1ine~

First, they were

in spite of their early excesses,

toward compromise and harmony in their human relationships.
they were realists.

Secondly,

They recognized that 90% of the Chinese masses were

peasants and that they stil1 lived in semi-feudaliflIl1.Not until China
had developed through several generations would it be ready for Communism.
The immediate program, they believed, according to Davies,

fl • • •

must

therefore be elementary agrarian reform and the introduction of political
democracy."

23

Furthermore. Davies pointed out, the Chinese in Yenan were more
nationalist than Communist.

Their primary emotional and intellectual

emphasis had shifted after seven years of fighting from internal revo
lution to nationalism.

And now that the Communists were beginning to

come into power, Davies added, they were, as had many revolutionary
2l Ibid .

23 Ibid ., 670.
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, groups before them, moderating and becoming sobered by their realization
o f respons1'b'l't
1 1 y. 24

In his third memorandum, Davies asked rhetorically, "Will the Com
Take Over Ch.fna?,,25
. ...
mUI1 .fsts
...

H"1S anS\ler was an unequ1lToca,
.
1 Yes.

Communists are. in China to stay,"
Chiang's but the Communists'.

26

he wrote.

"The

China's destiny was not

The Communists were so strong between the

Great Wall and the Yangtze River, he contended, they could look forward
to the postwar control of at least North China.

The chances were good

that they would also control many areas in Central and South China,
though not through the use of force, he implied.

"The COll1Illunists have

fallen heir to these new areas by a process which has been operating for
seve.n years, Yihereby Chiang Kai-shek loses his cities and principal lines
of communication to the Japanese and the co:mtryside to the Conununh;ts. ,,27
Chiang could crush the Conununist mOlTement only if he were able to enlist
foreign aid and intervention on a scale equal to the Japanese invasion of
China.

More likely than not, Chiang \vould plunge China into civil \lar,

but he would not succeed, Davies argued, " . . . where the Japanese in
more than seven years of determined striving have failed.
are 2.lready. too strong for him, ,,28 Davies concluded.

24 Ibid .

25Ibi~. , 671.
26 Ibid .
27 Ibid. , 670.
28 Ibic!. , 671.
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Davies undoubtedly prepared these reports in anticipation of Hurley's
arrival.

Normal procedure would surely require the Foreign Service offi

cer on location to advise an arriving political negotiator on political
conditions in the area, as well as the position of strength or weakness,
from which the party to the negotiations was bargaining.

It appears quite

clear that Davies saw the Communists in a vc.ry strong bargaining position.
It \laS his job to relay this impression to General Hurley upon his arrival

on November 7, 1944.
The story of Hurley's arrival at the Communist Capital is a color
ful one, and has best been recorded by the then

Co~~ander

of the Dixie

Mission, Colonel Barrett.
The arrival of the plane from Chungking was always a big event
in Yenan, and on the afternoon of the 7th of November, Chou En
1 a:L,aruL J wcre_ among a lRr8~ crowd of Chinese and Americans on
hand to greet it. After H had landed and the doors opened,
there appeared at the top of the steps, a tall, gray haired,
soldierly, extremely handsome man, wearing one of the most be~u·
tifully tailored uniforms I have ever seen, and with enough rli..b 
bons on his chest to represent every \var, so it seemed to me, in
whi.ch the United States had ever engaged except possibly Shay's
Rebellion. It was Major General Patrick J. Hurley, •• ,29
The exact date of Hurley's arrival had apparently not been announced
in Yenan, for neither Barrett, nor the Chinese officials were prepared to
find the General aboard this particular Yenan flight.

Barrett was asked

to hold Rurley there until Mao could be summoned, and shortly, the high
Communist official arrived in the only piece of motorized equipment that
the Communists owned, an old broken-down truck with a covered cab, which
looked as if it should not have made it even to the landing strip.

Fol

lowing the truck, came a company of infantry, hastily mustered at a nearby
barracks.
29

The entourage was a humorous sight to behold, claimed Barrett,

Barrett, 56.
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as it quickly lined up in guard-of-honor formation to be reviewed by the
arriving dignitary.

But even more humorous, Barrett recounted, was Hur

ley's review of the Communist formation.
After the General had returned the salute of the officer cOIT~and
ing the company, he drew himself to his full impressive height,
swelled up like a poisoned pup, and let out an Indian warwhoop.
I shall never forget the expressions on the faces of Hao and Chou
at this totally unexpected behavior on the part of the distin
guished visitor. 30
Following this display, one which the Russians had experienced as
well, when Hurley was visiting the Soviet front earlier in the war,

31 Mao

and the General boarded the and.ent truck and with Barrett along as an
interpreter, moved tmvard their quarters in Yenan.

Barrett's remembrance

of this journey is equally as entertaining as his report of Hurley's mil
itary

revie~v.

This [interpreting] was a task of some difficulty, due to the
saltiness of the General's remarks, and the unusual language in
which he expressed himself. His discourse, in addition, was by
no moans connected by a.ny readily discernible pattern of thought.
Seeing country people on the road would remind him of anecdotes-
which probably meant nothing to Mao--about old friends back in
Oklahoma. One old farmer having trouble with a balky mule which
had been frightened by our truck elicited a yell from the General,
"Hit him on the other side, Charley!" These and other spontaneous
remarks required quick thinking and free translation on my part
in order to give the chairman and Chou En-lai some faint idea of
what the talk was all about. 32
Barrett was, on the other hand, impressed by General Hurley's skill
as a negotiator, once the official meetings opened on November 8.

Hurley,

Barrett pointed out, was quite cautious and leaned over backward to be fair

30 Ibid .

31

Lohbeck, 179.

32 Barrett, 57.
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to both the National Government and the Communists.

He emphasized that

the American interest was only in accomplishing the filial defeat of Japan as
opposed to interference in the internal affairs of China.
Hurley quickly presented Hao \vith a copy of what Barrett assumed to
have been the "Revised Draft" of Hurley's "Basis for Agreement."

After

reading the draft handed him by Hurley, }lao asked the General whose ideas
the five points of the document represented.

Hurley replied that they

represented his ideas, but that they had been worked on by the Generalis
simo and some of his advisors as well.

In Barrett IS opinion, and, as he

told Hurley at the time, Mao actually wanted to know i f the Generalissi.mo
had agreed to all the points, a question which Barrett felt was under
standable as the points presented to Mao were not at all in· keeping with
the-usual vmy :i.rrwhicb· Chiang· c-xpres-sedhimselC.

lJtl"rl-sY'·indac.tl.ted that

the Generalissimo had agreed to the points. 33
This first meeting was more for formalities, and little was ac
complished beyond casual introductions and the presentation of the Kuom
intang-revised draft.

That afternoon, however, the group met once again,

and this time became involved in more substantive issues.

Mao opened

the discussion with a long tirade against the National Government, claim
ing it was Chiang's intransigence and corruption which blocked all ef
forts by more reasonable Chinese to unify the country and fight the Jap
anese.

Defending the National Government, Chiang, and the Kuomintang,

Hurley was met with the response that what Hao had said about Chiang

331bi~., 58. Barrett did not see the actual document which Hurley
gave to Mao, but based his judgment on his recollection of the wording
as read to Hao, compared to the two documents printed in Foreign Relations,
]944, VI, 569 and 666.
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Kai-shek and the Kuomintang had already been said by President Roosevelt,
Winston Churchill, Doctor Sun Fo, and Madame Sun Yat-sen.

These people

were not enemies of China, Mao indicated, bringing Hurley to task for
the suggestion he had made that Mao's criticisms had sounded like the
words of China's enemies.
Hurley rallied to this challenge, and in Barrett's opinion, showed
considerable skill as a negotiator, by simply telling Mao that he had ap
parently misunderstood the Communist leaders remarks, and admitted that
there was some corruption in the Chinese Nationalist Government.

He then

quickly took another tack, ack."lowledged the-sincerity of Mao's desires
for a peaceful and united China, and turned to the Kuomintang's proposals
as evidence of Chiang's sincere de.sire for a settlement with the C01l".ll1unists.
Matt,

however:> was not sw.::.y t!d by the NaL:rufral·· GO\"'et"11ntent.t-s so--called

"Sincerity," for as Barrett related, Mao simply "pooh-poohed" the Nation
alist's offer of a seat for the Communists on the National Military Coun
cil.

It meant nothing, Mao indicated, and to Hurley's suggestion that

this would at least be a foot in the door, Mao pointed out that a foot
in the door meant nothing if one's hands were tied behind one's back.
Many members of that Council were denied knowledge of its action, Mao
charged and furthermore, the body had not even met for some time.
With this, Hurley wisely suggested that i f the Communists did not
consider the Kuomintang's terms fair enough, they should offer their mm
terms for joining in a coalition with the National Government.
Conw~unists

agreed to do if given time to prepare svch terms.

This the
The meeting

ended, thereupon) to convene once more on the following afternoon, when
the Communists would be prepared to pre:sent their terms. 34
34 Barret ..'-, 58-·61.
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When the group met aBain on the afternoon of November 9, Mao handed
Hurley the

Co~~unist

proposals.

Barrett did not read the document re

ceived by Hurley but recalled that Hurley had read it and had stated that
the proposals appeared to be entirely fair, but did not go far enough.
Hurley then said, according to Barrettts account, "if Chairman Mao has no
objections 1. would like to study them carefully and make some suggestions
which I shall present tomorrow morning."

35

According to Barrett, the Com

munists seemed surprised that Hurley wished to broaden the scope of their
proposals, but did not object.

The meeting was adjourned then, and Hur

ley departed for his quarters to work on the Communists' proposals.
It is unfortunate that there was no official transcript made of
the negotiations, other than a recording of the events by Hurley's per-·
sonal.· sQIi;'l"etaxy; a Sergean.t: Smith, tvni-eh conflicts dra.g.,tical1y with Bax
rettts account of the events.

36

According to Barrett, the

documell~ which

Hurley returned to Mao on the morning of November 10, evidenced very
clearly Hurley's ideological contributions.

Point two of the five-point

35 Ibid ., 62.
36Ibid ., 36. It is of significant interest that in the report
written by Hurley ' s personal secretary, and printed in Foreign Relat~ons,
1944, VI, 674, there was no mention of this action taken by Hurley. Bar
rett made note of this fact and wrote that "It is my distinct recollection
• • • that after the General had said he found the terms fair but not
broad enough, he took them back to his quarters and worked them over, and
did not offer his suggested modifications until the final meeting on the
morning of 10th of November. 1I Barrett, 62. Sergeant Smith's report of
the negotiations indicated that all revision took place on the afternoon
of November 8. But there is no mention by Smith, of Hurley's alleged
re-writing of the Communist proposals. The evidence tends to support
Barrett's account, as a reading of Smith's report indicates that the
negotiations had to have consumed more than a period of one day. Fur
thermore, the final draft of the Co~~unist proposal was in fact, signed
on November 10, 1944, yet Smith indicated that the final draft was at
tached to his November 8, report. Because the entourage left Yenan on
November 10, a further question arises over what occurred on November 9,
and why Smith left that day out of his report.
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proposal had called for the reorganization of the National Government into
a

Coalition National Government which would embrace all anti-Japanese par

ties and non-partisan political bodies.

Then, in point three, the Com

munists proposed that "the Coalition National Government will support the
principles of Sun Yat-sen for the establishment in China of a government
of the people, for the people and by the people.,,37

This terminology had

also been placed in the draft basis for agreement presented by Hurley to
the Kuomintang and the Communists, and related to the political philosophy
articulated by Sun so many years earlier.

But in addition, point three

stated that
The Coalition National Government will pursue policies designed
to promote progress and democracy and to establish justice, free
dom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, free-
dom of assembly and association, the right to petition the govern
ment for the redress of grievances, the right ot writ of Habeas
Corpus and the right of residence. The Coalition National Govern
ment will also pursue policies intended to make effective those
two rights defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want. 38
It appears that at least one member of the negotiating party was

well-versed in the provisions of the American Bill of Rights.

It is

doubtful that the above terminology was placed in the proposal by the
Chinese.

As Barrett has written:

The fine Italian hand of General Hurley in the above terms
is clearly apparent. If the Cowmunists present at the meeting
had never before heard of the Bill of Rights in the Constitu
tion of the United States, they had a good opportunity to learn
about them on this occasion. 39
The Chinese do not traditionally show their feelings on their faces,

37Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 687.
38 Ibid ., 688.
39

Barrett, 63.
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Barrett pointed out, but on this occasion it was quite evident from their
expressions that they were extremely pleased with the document presented
them by Hurley.

They had eVery right to believe that Hurley had taken

the document to reduce their proposals to fit those of the Kuomintang.
But he had come back with all they had offered and more--including every
right guaranteed Americans under the first ten Amendments of the United
States Constitution.

40

According to Barrett's account, Hurley's presentation on th.:= morn
ing of November 10, was followed by a "love feast" with everyone in a
very happy mood.

Both events lasting far past the lunch hour, that meal

was bypassed and sometime after noon the group departed for the landir.g
strip for the return flight to Yenan.

But as they ,.,ere about to leave

the-'seen."'of the meeting,. Bar.rett: recounted, Hurley turnnd to f.faoh and
suggested that the two of them sign the document just agreed upon, to
indicate that they both considered the terms fair and just.

Mao agreed,

and just as they were about to place their signatures (Mao signed the
copies rather than placing his chop upon them), Hurley said to Mao, "Chair
man Mao, you of course understand that although I consider these fair
terms, I cannot guarantee the Generalissimo will accept them. tAl

Hurley

was obviously trying to point out to Mao that the documents being signed
were not final agreements.

Unfortunately, it would be Hurley who would

forget this fact in later months, and charge the Communists with a breach
of faith for not standing behind what they had solemnly agreed to at Yenan
on November 10, 1944.

40 lbid .
4l}bid., 64.
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As Hurley left Yenan to return to Chungking, his confidence in him
self, to the extent that he believed he had made giant strides toward af
fecting a settlement between the Communists and the Kuomintang, had been
greatly bolstered.

And he now believed even more that he vas dealing

with two political factions each with democratic motives, and each willing
to compete democratically for a voice in the ruling of the country.
But when Hurley reached the National wartime Capital, his confidence
ebbed somewhat.

Driving straight to his villa, he met with T.V. Soong,

the Kuomintang Foreign Minister, who looked at the Communist proposals,
and informed Hurley that the agreement was little more than a "bill of
goods."

Greatly disappointed at Soong's immediate rejection, Hurley, al

ready suffering from a cold contracted in the north, went to bed where he
stayed for the better part or a wlilek, reeeiving nQ.vi.s.it.ors. and nut.. re
turning to his work until

Nov~.mber 16. 42

When he did finally return to his desk, he found waiting. for him, a
Kuomintang counter-draft prepared and delivered by Dr. Wang and General
Chang on November 15.

This counter-draft was couched in similar terms

as that handed Hurley on November 7, but now called for the total subo.
m~ss~cn

0

f t h e Commun~st
.
f orces to t h e ru 1 c o
f th e K
'
43
uom~ntang.

The

two factions were still separated by a considerable distance, therefore,
neither really wanting a coalition government which would give the other
the chance of surviving as a permanent political force in China.
But Hurley had not given up hope, and was still confident that he
could eventually bring the two together, as he continued to promote

42Smith, "Alone in China," 89.
43Foreigp Relations, 1944, VI, 697.
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negotiations between the Kuomintang and Chou En-lai, the latter having
flown with Hurley to Chungking for just that purpose.

But at the same

time, Hurley was facing other obstacles which would soon, in his mind at
least, become major impedi~ents to a successful settlement of the Chinese
problem.

CHAPTER VII
TOWARD ALIENATION A!ID ISOLATION

In a memorandum dated November 14, but apparently not sent until
sometime after November 16,

1

John Patton Davies reported on conversa

tions between him and Hurley in which Hurley had evidenced "guarded op
timism" over the negotiations which had begun between the Kuomintang
I

representatives and Chou En-1ai.

But in additt,on to Hurley's optimism,
I

there was det'ected by Da,vies, a degree of sl<:epticism and distrust in
Hurley's view of other personnel around him"

HUI1ey had indicated to

Da¥1r&&that any bi-eekdown, in the, negotiatiolts,wus-m@xeap.t: to..,.be the..
fault of the Government than of tIle Communists.

He believed that the

I

Generalissimo was willing to reach an agreel)lent with the Communists but
I

that Chiangts wishes were being sabotaged by the Nationalist leader's
I

subordinates.

Hurley claimed he was being

~old

one thing by Chiang and

another by the men surrounding the Genera1hfsimo.

Furthermore, Hurley

revealed to Davies, he had had a conversatiqn with Sir Horace Seymour,
the British Ambassador to China, and Sir HOllace had attempted to convince
I

the General of the desirability of China remaining divided, and to dissuade Hurley from working to bring the

I

Gove~nment

and the Communists to

gether.
1Davies Memorandum, "Conversation With Major General Hurley," For
eign Relations, 194t~, VI, 692. Davies indicated that Hurley had seen the
Kuomintang counter-draft to the Communist draft agreement brougllt back
from Yenen. Hurley did not see this draft until November 16. Therefore,
Davies must have started his memorandum on November 14, but not finished
it until after November 16.
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Davies apparently felt it wise to follow up on Hurley's contention,
and on November 17, lunched with Mr. John Keswick, Counselor of the Brit
ish Embassy.

2

From their

conversat~on,

Davies gathered that the British

had little concern about the expansion of the Chinese Communists, taking
that expansion for granted.

Keswick pointed out that Chiang had proven

himself in the past to be a wily, hard-headed politician, and that if he
had not become inflexible and if he was still provided with accurate 1n
formation, he might succeed in unifying China.
however, that this was still the case.

Keswick was doubtful,

He felt that if a coalition were

formed and the National Government reformed, " • •• many 'rice bowls would
be broken,"3.meaning, according to Davies' interpretation of the remark,
that many of Chiang's closest advisors were opposed to a coalition which
w'o.uld. include the Communists.

Keswick's overall attitl1de, Davies observed,

was one of slightly perplexed resignation.
I asked him what British policy wa.s. Keswick replied that i t
was to stay out of involvement in the present Chinese political
scene. He said that the British felt that there was nothing
they could do at this stage to help the situat:Lon; that they
proposed to wait and see. 4
Keswick's remarks to Davies were not quite in keeping with the atti
tude Hurley claimed to have detected from Sir Horace, though, understandably,
Keswick may not have been at liberty to express such to Davies at the time.
Sometime around December 4, however, Hurley became cognizant of a report
of an interview held by a Bri.tish Colonel '-lith a Kuomintang General in
which the Chinese General had allegedly said that i t was a mistake to
2Davies Memorandum, "British Views on the China Situation," Ibid.,
JOO.

3 Ibid ., 701.

4Ibid .
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attempt to unite the Kuomintang and the Communists.

Hurley had called in

the Chinese General to question him about the statement, and was met with
a denial, the General claiming that'he had never made such a statement.
Hurley, now believing the British were engaged in a conspiracy to
frustrate his attempts at unification, called in Sir Horace, to whom he
branded the report false and charged that it had been intended to in
fluence the A.'1lerican Foreign Service officers against unification.

The

British Ambassador was reportedly bewildered by this attack, but never
theless, told Hurley that he would withdraw the report.

5

Hurleyts charge that there was an attempt being made to influence
Foreign Servi'ce officers, must surely have stemmed from several reports
which had come to the Generalts attention at about the same time he was
experiencing his first set-backs in the Communist-Kuomintang negotiations·.

On November 15, Davies had submitted a memorandum entitled, "Amer
ican Chinese Relations During the Next six Months,,,6 in which he urged
that Chiang Kai-shek not be abandoned, but at the same time, that the
United States be realistic, and exercise caution in supporting a bankrupt
regime.

Pointing out that the Russians might soon enter the Pacific war,

Davies wrote that ". • • we must make a determined effort to capture po
litically the Chinese Communists rather than allow them to go by default
wholly to the Russians. 1I7
A coalition government would be most desirable, Davies suggested,
and pointed out that Hurley was negotiating with both factions to that
5Smith, "Alone in China,lt 103.
Relations, 1944, VI, 695.
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end.

But if that proved impossible, then the United States must deter

mine \"hich side it would support.
spare, Davies urged.

Meanwhile, there was little time to

"W'nile being careful to preserve the Generalis

simo's 'face', we should without delay begin to expand our limited
representation and activities at Yenan."

8

Then, he wrote, if a coali

tion government was established, the United States could immediately
launch large scale operations against the Japanese in the Communist con
trolled areas.

If negotiations broke down, however, there would still

be well-established relations with a Communist regime that would, in all
likelihood, inherit

Nm~th

Chi na and Manchuria.

The greatest danger, as Davies Sa\l it, was in the United States'
being pla.ced in .'.'\ disadvantageous middle position, bet\.[cen "the British,
undercutting us with Chiang, the Russians undercutting us with the COln
munists, and we . . . impotent with indecision.,,9
Davies concluded his memorandum \"ith seven points which the United
States, he wrote, should keep in mind as basic considerations.

The

seventh indicated his strong feelings about the whole political situation
in China, and his pessimism toward the negotiations then going on between
the two factions:
. • still presupposing a collapse of the current negotia
tions, should we reject the Communists and continue to back
Chiang we shall be committed to a regime dependent upon Anglo
American support for its truncated existence, a regime of
slight use to us in our final attack on Japan.lO

lOIbid., 697.
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In addition to Davies' rather negative views on the possibility of
a successful outcome of the Communist-Kuomintang negotiations, Rurley
had become aware of the views of John Stewart Service, who, when Hurley
was in Yenan, had been in Washington conferring with policy makers.

On

October 10, 1944, Service had submitted his report No. 40 from Yenan, but
the report had not reached the Embassy until November 9.

11

Hurley undoubt

edly saw it for the first time when he returned from Yenan on November 10.
In submitting this report, Service indicated that in the past he
had been allowed to express his opinions based on observations in Yenan,
with perfect frankness and that he trusted he would be permitted the con
tinued frankness which was evidenced in his attached report--a report in
which he would advocate a stronger American policy toward Chiang Kai-shek
and the Central Gave rr..men t .
Service began his report by pointing out that the United States'
dealings with Chiang Kai-shek conti-nued to be on the basis of an unrealis tic assumption that he was necessary to the cause.

It was time, Ser

vice suggested, that the United States, for the sake of the war and her
interests in China, take a more realistic line.

The Kuomintang was bank

rupt, he contended, and with that party's failure,
rapidly growing in China.

~issatisfaction

was

The Kuomintang was dependent upon American

support for its survival, but the reverse was not the case--the United
States was not dependent upon the Kuomintang.
Service then went on to expand upon five areas in which the United
States was not dependent upon Chiang's government or his party.

"We do

1lJohn Stewart Service, Report No. 40, "The Need For Greater Realism
in Our Relations witi:l Chiang Kai-shek," Ibid., 707.
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h e emph
' d•
aS1ze

The National Army was

not, nor was it capable of, fighting an effective· offensive against the
Japanese.

Eut because of the sentiment of the people, the National govern

ment could not refuse to allow American forces to fight the Japanese on
Chinese territory, Service contended, implYlllg that the United States
should perhaps, launch its own offensive despite the objections which
might arise from the Central Government over large numbers of American
troops on Chinese soil.
Nor did we need to fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition, Service
claimed.

The Party and its leader, the Generalissimo, would stick by the

United States because victory was certain and the United States was their
only hope for conti.nued power.

United States support of the Kuomintang,

only encourage it to continue

n •••

so~ing

the seeds of future civil war

by plotting with the present puppets for eventual consolidation of the
occupied territories against the Communist-led forces of popular res is
tance."

13

Collapse of the Kuomintang Government need not be feared, he con
tinued, because all the other groups in China wished to mobilize to fight
the Japanese.

Any new government would be more cooperative and better

able to mobilize the country.

By continued support of the Kuomintang

government, Service contended, the United States.was tending toward pre
vention of the reforms and democratic reorganization of the government
which were essential for the revitalization of China's war effort.

l2 Ibid ., 708.
l3 Ibid ., 709.

With
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United States

support the Nationalists would continue on their present

course, becoming more corrupt and more impotent, and the other factions,
particularly the Communists~ would eventually be forced to protect their
interests by more direct opposition to the Central Government.
Furthermore, Service noted, the United States did not need to sup
port the Kuomintang for international political reasons.

The day when

China was to be considered one of the "Big Four" had come to an end, he
argued.

The United States could no longer hope that China, under the

Kuomintang a.s it then stood, could be an effective balance to Soviet
Russia, Japan, oJ.' the British Empire in the Far East.
Service added,

II

On the contrary,

the perpetuation in power of the present Kuomin-

tang can only mean a weak and dis'united China--a sure cause of interna
tional involvelnents in the Far East. ,,14
Finally, Service contended, the United States need not support
Chiang in the belief that he represented pro-American or pro-democratic
groups.

All the people and all other political groups in China were

friendly to the United States, he argued, and they looked to the United
States for their salvation, both then and after the war.

Furthermore, the

party ideology at that time, as evidenced in books written by Chiang
himself, was fundamentally anti-foreign and anti-democratic, both po
litically and economically.
In conclusion, Service pointed out that American policy toward
China should be guided by two facts.

First, the United States could not

hope to successfully deal with Chiang without being hard-boiled. Second,
the United States could not hope-to solve the problems in China without
14

:
Ibid., 710.
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considering the opposition forces there--Communist, provincial, and
liberal.
As had others before him, Service drew the parallel between the
Communist influence in China and the situation in Yugoslavia.

The United

States should not seek to solve the problems in China by talking only to
the Kuomintang officials in Chungki.ng as the British had tried to do in
Yugoslavia, through Mikhailovitch and King Peter's government, and by
ignoring Tito.
Reiterating his contention that the United States should not fear
the collapse of the Kuomintang government, Service held that it might
very well collapse,
• but :H will not be the collapse of China's resistance.
There may be a period of some confusion, but the eventual gains
o£...tha..K\}QIH-in.tang1 s .collapse. will more thaa ,m~. up ,for this.
The crisis itself makes reform more urgent--and at the same
time increases the weight of our influe.nce. The crisis is the
time to push--not to relax. 15
These reports were crossing Hurley's desk at the same time that he
was experiencing set-backs in his attempts to negotiate a settlement be
tween the Communists and the Kuomintang.

The proposal which he had

brought back from Yenan--a proposal which he thought was fair and rea
sonable--had been rejected out of hand, by the Kuomintang.

This must

surely have been a personal defeat for Hurley, if in fact, as the evidence
seems to show, he did have a considerable influence on the wording of the
Communist proposal.

But other events were occurring which, when combined

with a generally negative attitude expressed by Foreign Service personnel,
were beginning to lead Hurley to believe that his attempts were being
undermined by those around him.
15 lbid •
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Shortly after Stilwell's recall, Ambassador Gauss had resigned, and
on November 17, President Roosevelt indicated to Hur1ey!hat he would like
to appoint the General to the position of Ambassador.

Apparently the

President was of the opinion that Hurley was by then familiar with the
situation in China, and as capable as anyone of assuming Ambassadorial
responsibilities.

But though Hurley commanded the respect of the President,

he was not highly respected by the men who would work under him--men who
had held Stilwell and Gauss in esteem and who saw Hurley as lacking in the
professional military and diplomatic expertise of his predecessor.

These

men saw Hurley, furthermore, to have been to a degree, responsible for
Stilwell's recall and Gauss' subsequent resignation.

They were of the

opinion that Gauss had resigned in protest to Stilwell's recall--an op
in.:LQn...W'~.,hel.din_W~shingt,on

as.

~\"ell.

16

From the moment of Hurley's arrival in Chungking, he had witnessed
a display of pessimism on the part of nearly all those with whom he came
in contact, toward the possibilities of uniting the Chinese.

Gauss had,

from the beginning, been quite skeptical of the probability cif successful
.,
b etween t h e two compet1ng
'
f act1ons,
'
17 an d h'1S s k
'
ha d
negot1at1ons
ept1cism

been shared by others such as Davies and Service.

Initially, however,

Hurley had shrugged off the pessimism and had moved ahead with confidence.
But shortly after he had been confirmed as Ambassador, the person
ality conflict became very pronounced over an incident which was a severe
affront to the man who had displayed no lack of pride in the past.

Prior

to his appointment and confirmation as Ambassador, Hurley had maintained

l6Smith, "Alone in China,1I 122.
17 Ibid •
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quarters provided by the Army.

But once he assumed his Ambassadorial

position, he thought it only fitting that he reside in the Ambassador's
residence.

Upon investigation, however, Hurley discovered that after

Gauss' departure a number of Foreign Service officers had occupied the
house, and that the Ambassador's bed had been comandeered by George
Atcheson, the senior officer in the Embassy.
Hurley immediately demanded that the house be vacated, including
the bed, but Atcheson claimed that the men had a right to live there
and that the bed had been Gauss' personal property.

Gauss had turned

the bed over to him as a gift, Atcheson clair.led, and advised Hurley to
maintain his Army residence.

Hurley then ordered the men out of the

residence, but met with initial resistance.

Eventually the house was

vm:at-ed 'and Hurley moved. in, though i t has never been learned "lho kept
the bed.

Nevertheless, the incident did not rest well with Hurley, and

did not make his relations with the Foreign Service personnel any
smoother.

· id ent. 18
Apparent1y, t he Genera1 never f orgot t he ~nc

To compound these clashes of personality, there soon occurred a
drastic split in opinion about American policy in China, between Davies
and Hurley.

On December 12, Hurley reported to President Roosevelt that

after a long delay, Chou En-lai had returned to Yenan and had, on December
10, notified Hurley that the Communists would not accept a three-point
proposal submitted by the Kuomintang.

19

On that same day, Davies, in a

memorandum which was transmitted to Harry L. Hopkins at the White House

19Hurley to Roosevelt, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 733.
"Third Counter Draft by Chinese Representatives," Ibid., 706.

See also
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as well as to Hurley,

20

charged that the negotiations aimed at finding a

basis for settlement between the Communists and the Kuomintang had failed,
although it was not impossible, he added, that one side or the other might,
in the near future, revive the talks with new proposals.
But as long as the deadlock existed, Davies wrote, or as new nego
tiations dragged on, it was reasonable to assume that Chiang would con
tinue to refuse the United

S~ates

permission to exploit militarily the

position held by the Chinese Communists which extended far into the Jap
anese zone of operations.

With the war proving so costly to the United

States, Davies argued, ". • • '\>le can ill afford to continue denying our
selves positive assistance and strategically valuable positions.,,2l
was time,

Davi~s

It

continued,

that· we unequivocally' told Chiang Kai-shek that we will
work with and, within our discretion, supply whatever Chinese
forces we believe can contribute most to the war against Japan.
We should tell him that we .will not work with or supply any
Chinese unit, whether Central Government, Provincial or Com
munist, which shows any inclination toward precipitating civil
conflict. We should tell him that we propose to keep him, as head
of the recognized goverlllnenh informed of what supplies we give
the various Chinese forces.
In an earlier report of December 9, which was also sent to Hopkins,

23

Davies had charged that unless driven to an extremity, Chiang Kai-shek
would not form a genuine coalition government.

This was quite the con

trary to what Hurley had been indicating to Roosevelt, and to what he
again relayed to the President in his December 13, telegram:
20
Davies Memorandum, "Proposed Statement of American Policy,"

Ibi~.,

2l Ibid ., 735.
22 Ibid .

23

Davies Memorandum, "The Generalissimo's Dilemmas,1l Ibid., 724.

734.
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• • • Chiang Kai-shek again advises me that it has been and is
his earnest desire to arrive at a settlement with the Communist
Party. He assured nle again and wished me to assure you that it
is now his purpose to make a settlement with the Communist Party
his first order of business. 24
The day following the despatch of Davies' memorandum in which he had
claimed that the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations had ended in failure,
Hurley wired the Secretary of State to stress that although the Communists
had rejected the Central Government!s counter-proposals, the door to fur
ther negotiations was definitely not closed.
tion immutable, he argued.

Nor was the Communist posi

'''While they are unquestionably in a strong

bargaining position," he 'lI7rote, "they will probably be willing to retreat
somewhat from their original proposals provided that they are convinced
that the Generalissimo is genuinely desirous of meeting them on an equitAwa~ 0

f Dai\li~s' mell1m::>aooum to HOi>ki.ns, Hur ley no doub t

sent this message to the Secretary in an attempt to diminish the impact
of Daviei remarks.
By late December, 1944, it had become clear to Hurley that certain
members of his staff, both those working directly with him and those as
signed as observers in the north, were viewing the general political sit
uation with much less optimism than he.

In a report to the newly-ap

pointed Secretary of State, Stettinius, dated December 24, Hurley indicated
that he believed there was considerable opposition to unification, but
mentioned only that which he thought was coming from foreigners.
Generally speaking the opponents to unity in China are the im
perialist nations who are now fighting for the reconquest of
24

25

Hurley to Roosevelt, Ibid., 734.
Hurley to Stettinius,

Ibi~.,

737.
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their colonies in Southeast Asia and for the reestablishment
of imperi.a1ist colonial governments in the colonies. All of this
group try to convince the Chinese that everything America does
to unite and strengthen China is interference in Chinese internal
affahs. 26
But in a December 29, report to the Secretary, Hurley di.d, in an
indirect way, implicate American Foreign Service personnel in such ac
tivity.

Under the guise of reporting on several rumors being spread in

China and in the United States that Chiang had arrived at or was nego
tiating secret peace arrangements with the Japanese, Hurley informed
the Secretary that he was presenting all of the points to that effect
which had been covered in the reports made by American diplomatic rep
resentatives, who, among others, were persons ". , , who have predicted
or who desired the collapse of the Chinese National Govertl.lnent, 1127
T1'r:f's very slight hint that some American diplomatic personnel in

China desired or predicted the collapse of the Kuomintang government,
was the first on record made by Hurley,

Although few, if any, of Hur

1ey's superiors in Washington saw it as such, it was as well, the first
hint of Hurley's alienation from the professional diplomats in China.
Shortly after Hurley's clouded charges were made, John Davies, who
had been the first to openly and directly confront the General with op
inions which by this time were quite opposed to the Ambassador's way of
thinking, arranged a transfer to the Embassy in Moscow.

Just prior to

his departure, he was confronted by Hurley and involved in an exchange
which clearly evidenced lIur1ey's reaction to those who were by this
time being viewed by the Ambassador as his enemies and as enemies of the
..
Ib'd
26 Hur 1ey to Stett1nlus,
__
1_"
27

737 .

Hurley to Stettinius, Ibid., 214.
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United StHtes.

The confrontation was reported by General Wedemeyer,

who was a witness to the exchange.
While having breakfast with Hurley, Wedemeyer was visited by
Davies who had corne by to bid the latter farewell.

In the Genera1 t s

words:
It was inevitable that he and Mr. Hurley should exchange some
remarks, which became rather acrimonious. Other members of
my staff were present, so I suggested that we three go to an
other room. The Ambassador and Hr. Davies then launched into
a very heated argument during which Hurley accused Davies of
being a Communist and of failing to support the directives of
his country in support of the Chinese Nationalists. Tears
carne to the eyes of Hr. Davies as he heatedly denied Hurley's
accusation. Hurley said that he was going to have him kicked
out of the State Department. 28
Wedemeyer apparently calmed the two, however, and reported that Hurley
relented somev:hat. telling Davies that he would not immediately take
.
.
h'1m. 29
actlon
agalnst

With that, Davies left the t\110 and, on the same

day, left China.
The break

be~ween

Hurley and Davies was a forewarning of future

conflicts which would develop between Hurley and the majority of his
senior Foreign Service officers.

That Hurley's charges against Davies

were unfounded, is, without doubt, in retrospect.

But Hurley at the

time was facing failure, perhaps for the first time in his life, and
was experiencing difficulty in determining the causes of his failure.
By all indications, the negotiations should have been a success, he
felt, for each side had professed the same objectives, each avowedly
seeking democratic unity and the defeat of Japan.

28A1bert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer
29 Ibid ., 319.

Re.E.~.l'ts!

But the negotiations

(New York, 1958), 318.
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had broken down, and Hurley, hard pressed to determine why, began to see
less than loyal forces at work which were beyond his control, and in fact,
working directly against him and what he viewed to be the policy of the
United States Government.
In his December 24, report to Stettinius, Hurley had written that
it had been his understanding that the policy of the United States in
China was, among other things, "to prevent the collapse of the national
government" and "to sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic
and Generalissimo of the Armies.,,30

But there is no indication that the

State Department or the President had explicitly stated this to be the
policy of the United States, either publicly or privately.

The last for

mal policy statement on China had been that which Hull enunciated to the
JapeAceein--19 Irl--one which had denounced interfe.rence in the! internal
affairs of other countries.

Privately, Roosevelt had made it quite

clear that he intended China to be one of the Great Powers after the war,
and that the United States recognized the National government to be the
legitimate government of all China.

But there had never been an official

policy articulated which called for the prevention of the national gov
ernment's collapse or for sustaining Chiang Kai-shek as President of
the Republic and Generalissimo of the Armies.

Without doubt, the United

States t po1itica1 and military leaders hoped that someone would bring order
to the chaos which was China, but their concern by 1944, was with getting
China into the war against Japan.

The European conflict was drawing

nearer to victory for the Allies and the theatre would soon shift to the
Pacific.

If Chtna was divided when Japan met defeat, there would be a

30Hurley to Stettinius, F?reign Relations, 1944, VI, 745.
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political vacuum on the continent--one which might be filled by the Soviet
Union if some form of stable unity had not been found by the Chinese.
Roosevelt had told Hurley in August that the United States would continue
to support Chiang, not because Chiang was a good leader, but because
Chiang was the best there was at the time and under the circumstances it
would be unwise to sh:i.ft support to a leader who was untried.

In other

words, Chiang held at least nominal power, and at such a late date a
shift in power might have resulted in greater chaos than already existed
in China.
But by the end of 1944, two major changes had been made in the
American diplomatic chain.

Hurley had been named Ambass·ador and Stet

tinius had been named Secretary of State to succeed Cordell Hull.

This

meant that Hurley was Lack in the State Department chain and no longer
communicating directly with the President.

It also meant that he was

now communicating with a Secretary of State who was unaware of the pre
vious developments in China.

Therefore, when Hurley arti.culated what he

saw as policy in China, he received no word from Stettinius to the con
trary.

Roosevelt was, by January, 1945, making preparations for his

journey to Yalta to confer with Churchill and Stalin, and no doubt put
China in the background for the moment, confident that things were pro
gressing well there as Hurley had been so optimistically reporting.
With no word coming from Washington to contradict his view of
American policy, Hurley came to believe that what he was promoting was
the official policy of the American Government.

Criticism of Chiang

and the Kuomintang from any source other than the President or the
Secretary of State, therefore, appeared to Hurley to be in conflict
with the wishes and desires of the United States Government.

Although
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Hurley was not even a well-trained professional soldier, he was more
that than a well-trained diplomat.

Being more militarily-oriented, he

was more disposed to the idea that servants of the American Government,
both military and diplomatic, were obliged to follow orders.

His orders,

as he saw them, were to prevent the collapse of the Kuomintang Govern
ment and to sustain Chiang Kai-shek in power.

Any person other than his

Commander-in-Chief or the Secretary of State, after Hurley had been ap
pointed Ambassador, who suggested doing other than what had been ordered,
was, in a sense, committing an act of insubordination.

But llurley's mil

itary orientation was not the sole source of his attitude that others
were being insubordinate.
O\\'ll

He was clearly a man who took"pride in his

perceived abilities and position.

authGr~thnl#i""that

He recognized few who had greater

possessed by hinlself, and

~me"'ea3ily"offcmied

by

oth~

ers who seemed to be acting toward him with less than the respect he felt
was due him.

And as his attempts to find a reasonable basis for settle

ment were met with continued frustration, he became ever more sensitive
to criticism, until finally, he and the American policy in China, became
inflexible in support, albeit de facto, of Chiang Kai-shek.

CHAPTER VIII
CONFLICTING VIEWS OF A}ffiRICAN POLICY
That Hurley's conception of American policy in China was not as con
cretely accepted in Washington as it was by the Ambassador is well evi
denced by State Department probings and expressed views of December, 1944
and through the early months of 1945.
Hurley's December 24, 1944 report to Stettinius had been in response
to the new Secretary's inquiries into the Ambassador's activities and his
views of the situation in China to that date.
t:tn±us

reporte&~to

l

On January 4, 1945, Stet-

President Roosevelt, the impres-gious" gathere-d from

Hurley's return telegram.

2

Briefly reviewing the impediments to a settle

ment which had been imposed by both the Communists and the Nationalists,
Stettinius suggested to the President that an alternative to a final
settlement, if the latter proved impo$sible, might be an American military
command of all Chinese forces.

Both ~ides in China seemed to be in agree

ment on such a command, and it would ~ake possible a limited supply of
ammunition and demolition material to the Communists--material which n.
all observers agree could be effectively used.,,3

An American command

would, Stettinius informed the President, obviate political difficulties

1stettinius to Hurley, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 744.
2Memorandum, Stettinius to Roosevelt, Ibid., 1945, VII, 154.
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in case of an American landing in coastal areas adjacent to Communistheld territories.

If Russia came into the war in the Far East,there

would be considerable advantages to having an overall American command
in China rather than a

disuni~ed

Chinese command.

"And finally, an

American command could serve as a stabilizing political influence in
the period immediately following the conclusion of hostilities in China.,,4

On or about January 12, the Division of Chinese Affairs had sub
mitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a memorandum entitled "Political Ap
preciation of the Situation in China."

S

This memorandum was sent to Hur

ley on February 8 by the Secretary of State, who remarked in his accom
panying instructions that this and other material being sent to Hurley
"may be helpful to the embassy as indit:::ating general lines of policy
and thinking in

th~

Department with regard to China and matters affect

ing present and post-war international relations in the Far East.,,6

The

memorandum was, in form, little more than a contingency report, which ex
amined the various possible developments in the event tha.t the Japanese
captured Kunming and/or Chungking.
The loss of either or both of the two cities would, the report be
gan, seriously weaken or destroy the Central Government's armies and its
political position, which was already quite precarious.

Such a loss

would encourage the disaffection of the Central forces and probably lead
to their disintegration, after which the dissident elements would become
active and consolidated in a movement to form a "representative" govern
ment, either through

pressure~n

Chiang to support such a government, or

SMemorandum prepared by the Division of Chinese Affairs, Ibid., 169.
6 Ibid ., fn. 27.
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independently of him.

In such a government, "the 'Communists' would prob

ably participate • • . and in any case the weakening of the Kuomintang
armies and the heterogeneous, incohesive character of other groups would
make the 'Communists' the tiominant force in China. ,,7

Along \-lith Hurley

and many of the Foreign Service personnel in China, the Division of Chi
nese Affairs was not yet convinced that the forces led by Hao were, in
fact, Comnlunists.

But by this time there was little doubt of the strength

of those forces.
If the Japanese were to fail to capture Kunming and/or Chungking, or
if they did not attempt to do so, the situation would probably remain as
it was., although if the Japanese did attack and were turned back by the
Chinese, Chiang's political position would be made much stronger.

The

crit..a.....i sm.··o f.· Chiang's regime, the.,. repor't sa.:i...d, .. hact. been basQd.· partial,ly
on the failure of the Central Government armies to impede the Japanese
thrust into Free China.

Without a Japanese drive against Kunming/Chung

king, the conditions would probably continue at about the same rate of
deterioration as had been the case in the past.

No perceptible change

under those circumstances was expected by the Division until Americans
landed on the China Coast or until the entrance of Russian forces into
China, if the Soviet Union came into the war against Japan.
There were two portions of this report which were no doubt of con
siderable interest to Hurley.

The first brought into doubt the success

of his efforts to unify China.

The second, if read in a certain light,

would reinforce the Ambassador in his view of the China policy. The re
•
port was pessimistic toward the possibility of the Nationalists and Com
munis ts being united.

7Ibi~., 170.

II

A Kuomin tang- I Comnlllnts t' rapprochement \oJhich
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would provide the basis for real cooperation, is believed unlikely,,,8 the
report read.

If Chiang were to succeed in stopping the Japanese drives

his position would be strengthened to the point that he would be less
likely to cooperate with the Corr~unists, and the Communists could not be
expected to modify their terms.

If Chiang's position were to weaken, how

ever, the Communists would probably be. encouraged to press for
the Generalissimo would stubbornly ,oppose.

tel~S

which

While Chiang would probably

agree to Communist participation in the Government, he would not, it was
believed, give them or any other non-Kuomintang participants any real
voice.

Informed Chinese observers, the report read, felt that in a genuine

coalition government Chiang would slovlly lose his power 'and position and
that he was aware of this fact and \vas thus opposed to a real coalition.
Of-'greater hope, the report"'suggestE.d,. \-]Ould be- the cou-C'lusi-on of
a Kuomintang-Communist agreement, which would involve the coordination
of military activities through a coalition military councilor through
an Allied command of the armies of the two competing factions.
This suggestion was obviously a stop-gap measure aimed at putting
the Chinese armies into the field in a joint effort to fight the Japan
ese.

It was not a political measure.

at best to be tenuous.

The political situation was seen

The greatest fear, it appears, was that the Cen

tral Government would fall at about the time the primary theatre of war
shifted from Europe to the Pacific.
fall, the report indicated,

'I • • •

If the Central Government were to
a considerable period of confusion

might ensue before a new Government could be established and its machin
ery put into operations. II
8 Ibid •
9Ibid.. , 171.

9

During this period resistance 'vould be
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disorganized and, quite likely, even less effective than it was at
present.
The Division believed, therefore, that under the existing circum
stances it would be advisaEle for the United States to continue dealing
with the presently recognized government. of China.

To deal with other

elements as long as the Central Government remained in power would ser
iously endanger the existence of that government.

However, when tpe

United States found it necessary to land troops in areas of China where
the authority of the Central Government ,,,,as non-existent, ". • • the
American commanders could not be expected to deal with friendly local
groups.through the medium of Chungking or to await Chungking's approval
of supplying them with arms."
co~""

10

Under such circumstances, the report

military e:d.ngencies uould require the use of' aid to any and

all groups able and willing to fight the Japanese--" • • • irrespective
of such groups' political affiliations and the state of their relations
with the Central Governments."ll
From this report, one which was definitely not a policy statement,
Hurley probably gathered that his view of American policy had been rein
forced, though it did indirectly cast doubt upon the possible success of
his exuberant attempts to find a basis for agreement .between the Communists
and the Kuomintang government.

But the report also focused on an idea to

ward which Hurley had expressed and would continue to express veherr.ent
opposition--the possible arming of the Communists.
This report did not reach Hurley until February 8.

In the meantime,

the Ambassador had submitted the first of a four-part report to Stettinius
lOIbid., 172.
llIbid.
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reviewing in considerable detail the steps he had taken in China; first
to settle the problems between Stilwell and Chiang, and then to negotiate

.
Part1.es.
.
12
·
an d Communl.st
a sett1ement b et,yeen t h e Kuoml.ntang
Hurley had apparently sent this report to his staff for review, for
in a memorandum of the same day to the Ambassador, George Atcheson, Coun

selor of Embassy, had responded with a protest in defense of the Embassy
staff and others, against accusations which Hurley had apparently.leveled
· Or1.g1na
. . 1 d ra f t. 13
i n h 1.S

Hurley must have charged members of his diplo

matic staff with advocating that the National Government be by-passed in
favor of the Communists, for Atcheson responded:
~e would question the statement in the next to the last para
graph of the telegram that there is opposition among our own
diplomatic representatives. There is no one on the staff who
believes we should by-pass the National Government in dealing
w.ith the Communists. From a recent conversation with-Hr; Ser
vice
. I am convinced that he does not think we should by
pass the National Government in dealing with the Communists. 14

Hurley must also have expressed in the original draft a feeling that
his efforts were being unjustly criticized by his staff, for Atcheson a1
so informed Hurley that in reference to comments about the staff in the
preamble to his report:
We would question the penultimate sentence of the second para
graph. We have not heard anyone on the staff express an opinion
that your conduct of the negotiations is an unusual and unjusti
fied departure from State Department procedure. We do not believe
that any member of the staff holds such opinion. There is no mem
ber of the staff that I know of who has not who1e-hearted1y hoped
for the success of your negotiations and the benefit to the war
effort which will obviously result therefrom. IS
12

Hurley to Stettinius, Ibid., 192.

13
Memorandum, Atcheson to Hurley,
14 Ibid ., 191.

15 Ibid .

Ibi~.,

190.
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Hurley apparently took Atcheson's comments to heart, for there is
little in his report, as sent, which would indicate that the criticisms
which Atcheson and the Embassy responded to had been retained.

Hurley

did, however, charge that he was meeting with opposition from some of the
United States' military staff in China,

n •••

on the ground that the Com

munist armed party is stronger than the National army and we should deal
•
16
directly with the Communists, bypassing the National Goverhment."

opposition, Hurley concluded, was based on erroneous and ursound
Hurley made no mention of American policy in China.

I

This

premi~es.

The report was

meant to review his activities ar-d to give the new Secretary of State an
idea of how the negotiations had progressed to that pOint.1

He did point

out, in concluding, that throughout the period of negotiadions he had in

si:1!tt~"'tha"!::'

the-United St'ates uould not supply or'

othe"'''''i8Ie~aid

the Ch:i:

nese Communists as an armed political party or in an insurrection against
the National Government.

Any aid to the'Communists, he

through the National Government of China.

w~ote,

must go

But in making JiS point, Hur

ley emphasized that,
nle Chinese Communist Party had never indicated to me that they
desired to obtain control of the National Government 4ntil, if
and when" they achieve control through a political election. 17
Stettinius responded to Hurley's report with
Hurley's activities.

remark~

supportive of

In addition, the Secretary indicated that he was in

full agreement with the view expressed by Hurley that there was opposition
coming from the American military to continued support of the National Army.

16

Hurley to Stettinius, Ibid., 197.

17 Ibid., 196.
l8Stettinius to Hurley, Ibid., 197.

18

Stettinius was referring here to a plan of which Hurley had become
aware and had informed the President about on January 14.

In the process

of trying to determine why the Cownunist-Kuomintang negotiations had bro
ken do'i.."I1 in December, with Chou En-lai' s return to Chungking, Hurley had
discovered a plan which had been formulated by General Robert McClure,
Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff, for the use of American paratroopers in the
Communist-held areas.

The plan, according to Hurley, provided for the

use of Communist troops led by Americans in guerilla warfare.

As Hurley

related the plan to Roosevelt:
The plan was predicated on the reaching of an agreement between
the United States and the Communist Party, by-passing completely
the National Government of China, and furnishing American sup
plies directly to the Communist troops and placing the Communist
troops under command of an American officer. 19
This plan had become kno\\ru to the Communists, Hurley wrote, and had
offered them exactly what they wanted all a1ong--recognition and Lendlease supplies from the United States, and the destruction of the National
Government.

If the Communists were to succeed in making such arrangements

with the United States Army, Hurley contended, it would be futile to at
tempt to save the National Government.
Hurley had not known that the plan had been presented to the Commu
nists, he informed the President, until he became aware of a message from
the Communists, transmitted through Wedemeyer with instructions to by-pass
Hurley, requesting passage of Mao and Chou to Washington to talk to the
President.

Wedemeyer had revealed this request to Hurley, and the Arnbas

sador deduced that it was a result of the McClure plan having been revealed
19

Hurley to Roosevelt,

Tbi~.,

174.
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to the Communists.

Hurley believed that this was the reason for the

break-down in negotiations.

With such a plan, which would provide aid

to the Communists without that aid being directed through the National
Government, the Communists had no need for further negotiations.

20

Following a thorough investigation instigated by ,General Marshall
at Roosevelt's suggestion, it was discovered that the plan, of which Hur
ley was aware from the beginning, had been divulged to the Communists by
an overanxious McClure.

Hurley had thought the plan a feasible one, but

only i f it had the approval of Chiang.

Against Hurley's advice, HcClure

had discussed the plan with Soong and General Chen Cheng, both of whom
expressed an 'interest but made no commitments.

Excited at the response

his plan was receiving, McClure sent Lieutenant Colonel Willis H. Bird,

plore with the officials there the practicality of a special unit for
operations in Communist territory.

Unfortunately, Bird conveyed to the

Communist leaders, much to the consternation of McClure who had not in
tended such, that a plan for a special unit was in the making.

He did,

however, consistently point out that such a plan was tentative and sub-

.
j ect to ch anges 1n

Am'
er1can po I'1Cy. 21

Once these events became known to Wedemeyer and Hurley, the two
agreed wholeheartedly upon the facts of the case, but disagreed completely
on the results.

Hurley felt the revelation of this plan to the Communists

had been the cause of the breakdown in negotiations.
emphatically.

Wedemeyer disagreed

Nevertheless, in initially conveyi.ng the information to

20.!.!:id., 176.
2IR •T. Smith, "Alone in China," 134.
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vlashington,

Hur1~y

led the President to belteve that high ranking officers

of the United States Army had been negotiating separately with the Commu
nists.

For this reason had Roosevelt directed Marshall to instigate an

investigation of the situation,22 and it was this inci.dent which Stetti
nius had in mind when he wired Hurley on February 1.
In part two of his four-part report to Stettinius, Hurley reviewed
the events surrounding the leak of the McClure plan to the Communists, and
pointed out that "as soon as I sensed this situation by opposition was more
than aggressive, it [was] impeccable and, as the results have indicated,
successful. tr

23

It was a proud and boastful man, therefore, who received

shortly thereafter the report issued by the Division of Chinese Affairs
which had suggested that when the United States found it necessary to land
t:r:a.opc...,...:i.n._ComlUl.Ulist-hGld tcrrHory) t.he American

corrml~e£-s<

shOttld provide

the. local groups with arms and supplies without gaining Chungking's prior
approval.
In the period during "lhich the main thrust of the war had been to
ward Europe, the United States had been using valuable time in the Far
East seeking political stabilization in China in preparation for the in
evitable assault on Japan.

By January, 1945, time was running out, and

China was in worse shape than ever.

Those closest to the scene in China,

except perhaps Hurley, were increasingly concerned, not about stability
for its own sake, but rather over the ability of the United States to
successfully prosecute the \Var in the Far East, given the unstable ccndi
tions existing in China.

On February 14, 1945 John Stewart Service and

22 Ibid ., 137.

23

Hurley to Stettinius, !oreign Relations, 1945, VII, 210.
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Raymond P. Ludden expressed that concern in a lengthy memorandum to Gen
eral Wedemeyer,

24

a task which, for Service, must have been difficult.

Having been in Hashington since October, Service returned to China
in January to replace Davies.

Returning at about the time that Hurley was

involved in the controversy over the McClure plan, the Foreign Service
officer had been summoned to the Ambassador's office where he was told by
Hurley that if he interfered with the Ambassador in any way, he would be
broken.

Service took this to mean he was not to make any more policy
.

recommen dat10ns.

25

But he proceeded to do so, nevertheless, with Ludden

in February.
While in Washington, Service had been working in the Department of
State and was in close contact with the attitudes being expressed there
belbw the level of the Secretary.

Unfortuaately, the Deparbnent had

played a minor role throughout the war period, with Roosevelt conducting,
as he did, his mvn diplomacy.

In Service's opinion, the Department was

not strengthened, but was, after Stettinius' appointment, " . . • drifting
under a new and inept Secretary."

26

As the European war was drawing near

er to a close, the apparently imminent civil war in China and its post-·
war implications began to concern the State Department below the Stettin
ius level.

Hurley was seen to be interpreting his mission more and more

as that of supporting Chiang, and the analysis of Service and the men
around him was that this was likely a losing cause.

As Service had written

in retrospect, "the State Department in this murky situation was operating
24

Memorandum, Service and Ludden to Wedemeyer, Ibid., 216.

25R. T. Smjth, "Alone in China," 139.

26 John Stewart Service, Personal Letter to Author, November 23, 1970, 3.
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hesitatingly and with difficulty and caution.

Its desire was that we be

able to maintain some flexibility in what promised to be an unstable sit
uation in China to avoid all-out commitment to Chiang and his government
i f they should go down."

27

But the State Department was not, according to Service, " . . . in
a position to shout from the housetops, to issue orders, ot to slam the
table. II

28

The Department did make its position clear, however, in a mem

orandum, which was subsequently sent to the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee as well as to Hurley, pointed out that the short-term objective
of the United States government was " . . . to assist in mobilizing all
of China's human and material resources for prosecution of the war against
Japan."
to ".

29

The long-term objective in China, the report continued, was
assist in the development of a united, democratically progres

sive, and cooperative China which will be capable of contributing to
security and prosperity in the Far East.~30
The mission of the United States' military authorities in China,
the report said, should be focused upon the short-term objective.

Mea

sures aimed at containing Japanese forces in cooperation with the Chinese
would call for a degree of rearmament, but, it was believed, " . . . mea
sures undertaken at this time to rearm China in order that it might be
come a strong Asiatic power would be impracticable.

II3l

The Department

27Ibi.i., 4.
28 Ibid .
29Memorandum, John Carter Vincent to Joseph C. Grew, Foreign Rela
tions, 1945, VII, 38. See also, fn. 52, Ibid., 37.
30 Ibid ., 38.
3l Ibid .
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would like, it was added, to see the rearmament of all forces willing to
fight the Japanese, " • . • but the present unsatisfactory relations be
tween the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists makes it impol
itic to undertake measures for the rearmament of the Chinese Communists
even though it is generally conceded that they could effectively use
..
. 1 s. 11 32
.
quan t 1. t 1es
0 f sma 11 arms ammun1t10n
an d d emo 1"1t10n mater1a

If op

erations were undertaken along the China Coast, however, it was suggested
that American military authorities should be prepared to arm any Chinese
forces which they believed c~uld be effectively used against the Japanese.
It was the United States' purpose, the report stated, to utilize
its influence to bring about, both as a short-term and as a long-term ob
jective, the unification of China.

But i t did not necessarily follow,

" • • • that· China should be: 'unified under Chiang Kai-shek. 1I33

However, with regard to the short-term objective, Chiang appears
to be the only leader who now offers hope for unification. The
alternative to the support of Chiang for the attainment of our
immediate objective might be chaos. With regard to our long
term objective, it is our purpose to maintain a degree of flex
ibiHty Ylhich would permit cooperation with any leadership in
China that would offer the greatest likelihood of fostering a
united, democratic and friendly China. 34 '
The report made by Service and Ludden on February 12 was in keeping
with this two-pronged policy statement which Hurley had received on Febru
ary 9.

The United States had but one immediate objective, the two men

wrote:

"the defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least

expenditure of American lives.,,35

But the attainment of this objective

32 Ibid •
33 Ibid .
34Memorandum, Service and Ludden to Wedemeyer, Ibid., 216.
35 Ibid .
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demanded the effective mobilization of China in the war against Japan.
There was ample evidence to show, the men argued, that the "'ar agains t
Japan was of secondary importance to the Kuomintang Government.
Generalissimo's

.
intentions of

The

eliminating all political opposition, by

force if necessary, had not been abandoned, nor had its desire to con
serve such military force as it possessed for use in maintaining its po
litical power.
The aim of the American policy in China, the report continued, was

"

• the establishment of political unity in China as the indispensable

.
.
.
,,36
· .
pre 1 1M1nary
to Ch"1na s e ff ect1ve
m1'I'1tary mo b 1'1 1zat10n.

But the execu

tion of American policy had not contributed to the achie'vement of this
stated aim.

It had, in fact, retarded its achievement, the men argued.

It has had this undesired and undesirable effect because our
statements and actions in China have convinced the Kuomintang
Government that we will continue to support it and it alone. 37
The United States could not

hop~

for any improvement in the situa

tion, the argument ran, unless the decision was made to throw considerable
influence upon the Kuomintang Government in the direction of internal
unity.

"We should be convinced by this time that the effort to solve the

' t ang- Commun1S
. t d'ff
'
Kuom1n
1 erences b y d'1p 1 oma t 1C
means h as f a ~-lled,,,38 they
concluded.
The men went on to offer suggestions on execution of American pol
icy, referring, as had many in the past, to the British approach to the
36 Ibid .
37 Ibid ., 217.
38 Ibid .
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situation in Yugoslavia, and Churchill's declaration of support for Marshal
Tito.

Quoting Churchill's statement, which in effect said that ideolog

ical preferences were irrelevant to the problem, and that all parties and
factions should be judged by their readiness to fight the enemy, Service
and Ludden admitted that for the Commander-in-Chief to take such a stand
would mean the withdrawal of support from the Central Government.

But "that

would be both unnecessary and unwise,,,39 they continued.
It would service notice, however, of our preparation to make use
of all available means to achieve our primary objective. It
would supply for all Chinese a firm rallying point which has thus
far been lacking. The internal effect in China would be so pro
found that the Generalissimo would be forced to make concessions
of power a~d permit united front coalition. The present opposi
tion groups, no longer under the prime necessity of safeguarding
themselves, would be won wholehe;:trtedly to our side and we would
have in China, for the first time, a united al1y.40
Service and Ludden were no doubt thinking of the original United States
policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, when
they then noted that, like it or not, the United States was, by its very
presence in China, becoming a force in the internal politics of that country.
Then, in their concluding paragraph, they made their strongest point:
Our objective is clear, but in China we have been jockeyed into
a position from which we have only one approach to the object:i.ve.
Support of the Generalissimo is but one means to an end; ,it is not
an end in jtself, but by present statements of policy we show a
tendency to confuse the means with the end. There should be an
immediate adjustment of our position in order that flexibility of
approach to our primary objective may be restored. 4l
This final point was clearly directed at Ambassador Hurley.

That he

had felt its impact as well as that of other messages reaching him by this
39 Ibid •
40 Ibid .
· . , 218.
41 Ib ~a.
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time was revealed when, on February 18, he despatched part of his report
to Stettinius.

After reviewing the developments of the negotiations, de

velopments which by that time looked to him to be somewhat favorable if
each side would make a few slight concessions, Hurley suddenly shifted
from a discussion of the negotiations to an obviously bitter denunciation
of the Communists.
All the arguments and all the documents submitted should indi
cate to you that the Chinese Communist Party is not democratic;
that its purpose is to destroy the control of the government by
the Kuomintang before there has been an opportunity to adopt a
constitution or to return the control of the Government to the
people on a democratic basis. 42
It is difficult to determine whether Hurley intended to express his
own opinion with this statement or to relay the thinking of the Kuomintang,
for with the sentence 1i7hich followed he began a lengthy listing of argu
ments against the Communists as expressed by Chiang and his close associ
ates.

In sum, these arguments said, in effect, that the Communists were

simply interested in overthrowing the one-party rule of the Kuomintang
and replacing it with the one-party rule of the Communist Party.

All the

criticism which had come from the Communists and all the propaganda about
the Communists being democratically inclined had been just that--propa
ganda, disseminated by the Communists "

for the purpose of breaking

the faith of the United States in the integrity of the Chinese National
Government. 11

43

But whether or not they were his own arguments or those of the Chi
nese Nationalists, it was clear that Hurley agreed with them.

42
43

Hurley to Stettinius. Ibid., 227.
Ibld., 228.

In his
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closing two paragraphs he pointed out that he was convinced that the United
States was right in its decision to support the National Government of
China and the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and that General Wedemeyer
had read the report and had stated in his ovm opinion that it was an ex
ce11ent and logical presentation of the facts.
Hurley was, in a sudden and vehement manner, expressing his frus
tration to the Secretary of State, a fact which was made perfectly clear
by comments attached to his February 18 report, sub-headed, "New Subject."
On February 6, Hurley had received a telegram from Acting Secretary of
State Grew, in response to a report the Ambassador had submitted two days
earlier.

Hurley had enclosed in his report a copy of the tentative agenda

to be followed by T.V. Soong in his soon-anticipated meeting with govern
..-l.
ment:' 1eCl:uers

•
1 SOV1(!t
•
U'"Ulon. 45
ln
t'le

Gre\o.T J s response to Hurley \-Jas in part

intended to caution the Ambassador:
• • • we feel, and believe you will concur in our Opl.nl.OIl that,
while we are at all times anxious to be helpful to the Chinese
Government, we should not permit the Chinese Government to gain
the impression that we are prepared to assume responsibility as
"advisor" to it in its relations with the U.S.S.R.46
Although Grew's message was directed specifically at Hurley's at
tempts to involve himself directly in the coming negotiations between the
Chinese and Soviet government, Hurley apparently took it to be an admoni
tion for his close involvement in the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations
as well.

In his February 18 attachment he informed the Secretary that he

had prepared a reply to the February 6 telegram, but had not sent it as
44 Ibid ., 229.
45
46

Hurley to Stettinius, Ibid., 851.
Grew to Hurley, Ibid., 852.

44
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he intended to see him shortly and discuss the matter more fully in per
son.

Nevertheless, Hurley proceeded to express his opinion of Grew's

suggestion:
In your message you appear to have reduced my role in these neg
otiations to the position of merely making suggestions without
implementing my suggestions. It is my earnest desire to be amen
able to every suggestion from [the] State Department even when I
believe our position is weakened and accomplishment postponed by
lack of vigorous implementation of suggestions. 47
Hurley had obviously misread Grew's message, for the Acting Secre
tary had not suggested a reduction in the Ambassador's role in the nego
·
.
U'
t i at10ns
wi t h t h e SOV1et
n10n. 48

But by this time, Hurley's behavior was

48

.
In an interview with John Stewart Service on December 7, 1970, the
present library curator at the Center for Chinese Studies, Berkeley, Cali
fornia, made a point which meant little at the time but which has become
much more meaningful in light of the consistent nisinterpretation of docu
ments by Hurley, Grew's message of February 6, 1945, being-a particular
case in point. Service. said that in all the time he had known Hurley in
China he had never seen the man read. Hurley had always, Service said, had
his material read to him by one of his staff or by his personal secretary.
At the time, Service indicated, he had thought that Hurley simply disliked
reading. But he had later come to believe that the man was somewhat short
on reading skills and to avoid a task which must have been tedious, had oth
ers read material to him.
Taken at face value and in light of treatment Service received in the
years following the war, the statement may have been vindictive. But an ex
amination of Service's and other State Department reports, compared with
Hurley's interpretation of those reports, indicates that for one reason or
another, Hurley was missing the primary thr.ust of their arguments.
If Hurley was, in fact, having those reports read to him, and was not
spending time studying them, it is easy to understand how they might have
been misinterpreted. Many of them deserved careful scrutiny, being complex
in verbage and the subtle logic of trained State Department minds.
On the other hand, it is hard to believe that a man with the legal
background of Patrick J. Hurley would not be a skilled reader. The fact
remains, however, that notwithstanding his legal training, Hurley had re
ceived no schooling until he was 14 years of age, and then, what he did
receive until he attended law-school was sub-standard. While he might have
struggled through law training with low reading ability, the chances were
great that the task remained a tedious one. If so, the chances were quite
good that Hurley did, in fact, prefer to have one of his aides do his read
ing for him.
A far more reasonable explanation, and one which has been attested
to by Mrs. Eugene Pierce, a New Mexico resident who has done a considerable
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becoming symptomatic of one suffering from paranoia.

He had ordered

Service to cease interfering with him, had threatened to break both Ser
vice and Davies, accusing the latter of being a Connnunist, and had turned
abruptly against the Connnunists.

In the short period of eleven days,

since his telegram of February 7, in which he had noted· that the Connnu
nists were not in fact Connnunists, but rather were striving for democrat
ic princi.ples, Hurley had made a complete about-face, charging now that
the Connnunists were not democratic.

In the earlier telegram, he had

written that the Connnunist Party had never indicated to him that they
desired to obtain control of the National Government "

until, if

and when, they achieve control through a political election.,,49

Yet,

eleven days later he noted that the Connnunists' purpose was to destroy
the contrul of the government by the Kuomintang before there had been
an opportunity to adopt a constitution.

Patrick J. Hurley was on the

defensive.
It appears to be quite clear that during these first weeks of 1945,
American policy in China was, in many respects, uncertain.

The Secretary

of State was in the process of trying to gather background information,
most likely to get a feel for the situation in China so that he could
formulate policy.

The State Department, below the level of the Secre

tary, was moving with caution, but at the same time held the opinion that
the first priority was the defeat of Japan in the quickest way possible.
48 amount of research on Hurley and had contact with the late Ambassador, as
well as with his wife and son, is that Hurley, in his vanity, refused to re-'
veal that his eyesight was deteriorating while.in China. He probably did
not wish his associates to know that he needed ereglasses to read. It surely
would not have been beyond the man, given his egomania, to lead his subordin
ates to bel~_eve that in deference to his position, it was only proper that
material be read to him.
49

See fn. 17.
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To that extent, some form of military unity in China was imperative.
The drive against Japan was foreseen to be quite near and the Department
believed the Chinese forces would be vital for the containment of Japan
ese forces on the continent.

Because of the immediacy of the s.ituation,

it would be unwise at that point to shift support from Chiang to any
other political or military leader.

He at least controlled a government

which was, if only to a degree, functioning.

Service and Ludden, in

their February 14 message, had not advocated that the United States
shift its support away from Chiang, only that it shift from a "diplo
matic" to a hard-line approach, and force Chiang, under the threat of
cessation of aid, to create an effective fighting force which would in
clude all those willing to fight the Japanese.
Tha..ogr-eatesi -fear being expre,'>[;ed by Se.t::vl.ce,_ Ludden and the De
partment, was that Chiang would come to believe that he had the complete
and permanent support of the United States, not only against the Japan
ese but against the Communists as well.

If there were any clear-cut

American policy in China, it was merely to sustain Chiang Kai-shek in
his fight against the Japanese, not in his fight against the

Corr~unist

Chinese or any other dissident Chinese group.
But Hurley had come to believe that American policy was to sustain
Chiang Kai-shek in power-··period.

He therefore saw not only himself but

American policy as well being criticized by all, except perhaps the Sec
retary of State and the President.

As he received messages which, unfor

tunately, were aimed at his activities in subtle rather than explicit
terms, he became outraged and defensive.

As indicated in his message

attached to the February 18 report. his approach to the task facing him
in China had included "vigorous implementation of suggestions," to the
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negotiating parties.

But as has been shown, his idea of vigorous imple

mentation was active involvement to the extent of incorporating his per
sonal ideological convictions into proposals supposedly written by the
negotiating parties--convictions which were alien to the political cul
ture of the Chinese people.

And as evidenced by his final report to

Stettinius, Hurley had made the shift which members of the State Depart
ment had feared--he had rejected the Communists and had thrown his per
sonal support to Chiang.

Through Ambassador Hurley, the United States

had taken sides in the internal affairs of China, and had violated the
policy of non-interference articulated by Cordell Hull in 1941 •

•

•

CHAPTER IX
THE OPPOSITION FAILS

On February 19, 1945, Ambassador Hurley departed Chungking for the
United States for consultations with the State Department.

Immediately

upon his departure, the Embassy staff at Chungking grasped at an oppor
tunity they had not previously been offered.

Challenged by Hurley's au

thority, threatened by the Ambassador's warnings to Service and his fight
with Davies, faced with the accusations in Hurley's January 14 draft re
port to Stettinius, and in general, objecting to Hurley's naive and un
realisrlt view of his a.bility to

<l

find a

soluti"Ol1~to

the-pro&lems of

China, the staff, led by the no" ranking officer in the Embassy, George
Atcheson, prepared a report to the State Department.
The draft report, which was actually written by John Stewart Ser··
vice,l was signed and sent by Atcheson on February 28, with the closing
remark that it had been drafted ".

with the assistance and agree

ment of all the political officers of the staff of this Embassy. , ,

,11

2

It reached Washington shortly before Hurley arrived on March 3, and the
next day was brought to the Ambassador's attention.
"The situation in China appears to be developing in some ways that
are not conducive to effective prosecution of the war, nor to China's

lR.T. Smith, "Alone in China," 157.
2Atcheson to Stettinius, !oreign Relaticns, 1945, VII, 246.

160
future peace and unity,,,3 the report began.

The recent diplomatic and

persuasive attempts by the United States to assist the Chinese factions
in arriving at a compromise settlement of their differences was a neces
sary first step, it continued.

And unity had been correctly understood

to be the best way toward the effective conduct of the war by China, as
well as toward the speedy emergence of a peaceful, strong, united and
democratic China.

But recent developments had combined to increase

Chiang Kai-shek's feeling of strength and had resulted in an unrealistic
optimism on the Generalissimo's part which had in turn led to his lack
of willingness to c.ompromise.

4

The Communists, on the other hand, had come to the conclusion that
the United States was definitely committed to Chiang's support, and that
there w'ould ..be no force exerted to compel him to a IJ. Ov! aid to or cooper
ation with them.

The Communists were, therefore, for their own self-

protection, taking a line of action, and aggressively expanding their
area of control southward.

In doing so, it was the Communists' in ten

tion to make themselves invincible before Chiang's armies were ready,
and to present the United States with the dilemma of accepting or refus
ing COID."llunist assistance if American forces were to land anywhere along
the China Coast.

Some Communists close to the Yenan leaders were, as

well, beginning to discuss the possibility of seeking Soviet aid. 5
The conclusion seemed clear, the Embassy staff reported:
although our intentions have been good and our actions in
refusing to deal with or assist any group by the Central Govern
3 Ibid . , 242.
4 Ibid .
5 Ibid ., 243.
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ment have been diplomatically correct, if this situation contin
ues and our analysis of it is correct, chaos in China will be in
evitable and the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict
.
will be accelerated. 6
If the high military authorities of the United States Government

agreed, the report suggested, that some aid and cooperation with the
forces that had proven themselves willing and able to fight the Japan
ese was necessary, it was the staff's opinion that any further steps in
American policy should be based upon this military question.

"The pres

ence of General Wedemeyer in Washington as well as General Hurley should
be raJ favorable opportunity for discussions of this matter,,,7 they urged.
Assuming that the military necessity existed, the staff proposed,
for the Department's consideration, that the President inform Chiang in
no uncertain terms "that military necessity requires that we supply and
cooperate with the Communists and other suitable groups who can assist
in the war against Japan • • . and that we are taking direct steps to
accomplish this end."

8

Assurances could be made to Chiang, they added,

that the United States was not contemplating a reduction in aid to the
Central Government and that the Central Government would be kept fully
informed of the extent and types of such aid.

Chiang could also be im

pressed with the idea that aid at that time would insure him against any
independent action on the part of the Communists, and would lessen the
chances that the Communists would turn to the Soviets for aid.
As one result of the recent Kuomintang-Communist negotiations, the
report claimed, the principal and over-riding issues had become clear:
6 Ibid •
7Ibid., 244.
8 Ibid .
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The Generalissimo and his Government will not at this time on
their own initiative take any forward step which will mean loss
of face, prestige or personal power. The Communists will not,
without our guarantees in which they have confidence, take any
forward step which will involve dispersion and eventual elimin
ation of their forces upon whiC'.h their present strength and fu
ture political existence depend. 9
The steps the staff was proposing, therefore, would exert upon both
parties the necessary force needed to break this deadlock.
~randi"

The "modus

embodied in the proposals would, furthermore, initiate concrete

military and eventual political cooperation which would, in turn, provide
a foundation

II

, for increasing future development toward unity,II

10

The staff's proposals 1;.;rere quite reasonable:
(1) The formation of something in the nature of a supreme war
councilor "lar cabinet in which Communists and other groups
would have effective representation and some share in respon
sibility for the formulation and execution of joint war plans,
arrd (2) the nominal incorporation of COllmll'lnist~ and othel" se
lected forces into the Central Go~'ernment armies under the op
erational command of American officers designated by the Gen
eralissimo on the advice of General Wedemeyer, on agreement by
all parties that these troops would operate only within their
present areas or specified extended areas. ll
The report stressed, however, that it should be made quite clear
that the above proposals would not be contingent upon reaching final agree
ment, on internal Chinese arrangements.

In other words, the immediacy

of the situation called for implementation of the proposals before reach
ing a negotiated settlement between the Communists and the Kuomintang-
contrary to the condition lvhich Hurley had demanded.

9 Ibid • , 245.
1.° Ibid •
11.

l bid . , 244.
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Again, the staff referred to the Yugoslavian predicament which was
handled successfully, it appeared, by Churchill.

The statements of policy

should perhaps be made to Chiang in private, they suggested, but in the

.

event that he refused to cooperate, the policy should be made public, just
as Churchill had done in Yugoslavia.

But even if not made public, the

fact of American assistance would quickly become known throughout China,
and would, the staff believed, have " • • • profound and desirable.polit
ical effects in China.,,12

There was tremendous pressure in China for

unity based on a reasonable compromise with the Communists, which would
perhaps give the repressed liberal groups a chance to express themselves.
Liberals within the Kuomintang had been ignored in the recent negotiations
by their own government, but not by the

Cow~unists.

This group had be

come djJ3illusioned and discouraged by what they saw as an AmericaI1commit
ment to the reactionary Kuomintang leadership.

But if the steps being

proposed were implemented, the Embassy staff argued, the morale and pres
tige of these liberal groups would be raj.sed considerably, "

• and we

would exert the strongest possible influence through these internal forces
to impel Chiang to put his own house in order and make the concessions
necessary to unity.,,13
The Chungking Embassy staff had been genuinely concerned over the
situation 'in China for some time.
the good possibility that the

A great part of that concern was over

Co~~unists

for aid, purely out of necessity.

would turn to the Soviet Union

This concern was expressed again in

the February 28 report, when the staff argued that

l2 Ibid ., 245.
246.
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. by such a policy, \orhich we consider realistically accepts
the facts in China, we would expect to secure the cooperation of
all of China's forces in the war, [and) to hold the Communists
to our side rather than throw them into the arms of Russia (which
is otherwise inevitable if Russia enters the war against Japan).14
There can be no doubt that the Division of Chinese Affairs received
this report with approval.

On March 1, John Carter Vincent addressed a

memorandum to Undersecretary Grew and to Joseph W. Ballantine, the Direc
tor of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs,15 in which he wrote that
• • • the probability that unity of command will not be achieved
in the near future, considered in the light of prospective mili
tary action in China this year, compels us to seek an alternative
solution to the problem of effective utilization of all forces in
China capable of fighting the Japanese. 16
.There was every likelihood, Vincent wrote, that United States forces
which might land in coastal areas north of Shanghai would find Chinese
COnl.'!l!ttni:b~troops

near-by.

There- se-emed to 1:.e· every ind:ff.c,ation., he con

tinued, that the Communist forces would be of assistance to the American
troops, not only in coastal landings but in related operations against the
Japanese in North China as well.

The United States should be prepared,

therefore, " • • • while continuing to exert our influence to bring about
Chinese political and military unity, ,,17 to supply those forces It,hen the
need arose, with arms and ammunition.
But this had been said many times over in recent weeks by several
State

Dep~rtment

men.

What had not yet been said, and what Vincent now

wrote, was:
l4 Ibid .
15 Ibid ., 247. fn. 19.
l6 Ibid ., 248.
17 Ibid •
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There should be no question of choosing between Chiang and the
Conununists; of withdra\val of support fron Chiang. But likewise
there should be no question of an exercise of our prerogative,
dictated by military necessity, to utilize all forces in China
capable of cooperating with us in the fight against Japan.
Chiang, having failed to effect military unity, should be told
that he has forfeited any claim to exclusive support. 1S
Vincent then added parenthetically, that since writing the above report
he had read Atcheson's February 28 report, and felt that it should receive
.
°
19
t h e most serlOUS
conSl°d eratlon.
On

the following day, the Division of Chinese Affairs issued a

statement entitled, "American Policy With Respect to China."
Everett

~1.

Written by

Drumright with contributions from Vinc.ent and Edwin F. Stanton,

Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, this policy statc
ment incorporated every suggestion and argument made by the Embassy staff
and by Vincent in his memo'l:"andum of the previous day.

20

Although not'

versed in terms as strong as those used by the Embassy staff, the policy
statement did press the point that Chiang should be " • . . frankly in
formed that because of the vital importance of the vigorous prosecution
of the war we may find it necessary to give military assistance not only
to his forces but to other groups who in the op'inion of our military au
thorities can be effectively used in specific military operations against
t h e Japanese.

,,21

It was clear, the statement read, that the United States,

must, in its own interest, maintain a flexible policy, vis-a'-vis Chiang
Kai-shek, for two reasons.

18 Ibid .
19 Ibid .

20 Ibi e!..

,

249.

21 Ibid ., 252.

First, the United States might be in a posi
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tion to withdraw support from Chiang should his government become impo
tent; and second, " . • . the United States appears to possess, in its
discretion to grant or to withhold support and assistance, a weapon which
may be used to induce Chiang to cooperate • • • . ,,22
Although the title of this statement indicated that it was one
which defined American policy toward China, the fact remained that but
one person made policy in Washington--President Roosevelt.

Unless Roose

velt directed Hurley to follow the policy outlined on March 2, the Ambas
sador tllould continue to follow what he considered to be the President's
original instructions.
Joseph Grew, Acting Secretary of State, received the policy state
·
ment on t he same day l.t
th·at·-hC'~sent···the

~-Jas

.

~,yrl.tten.

23

Although there is no indication

vJIro:l:e- document, he did transmit to the'President the

Embassy telegram of February 28, with the comment that despite a number
of encouraging developments in China over past months, the Department
had become increasingly concerned over indications that Chiang had adopted
an intransigent attitude toward a settlement with the Communists.

"These

developments," Grew wrote, "emphasize the need of flexibility in applying
our policies toward China."

24

The coming meeting with Hurley and Wede

meyer, Grew concluded, would provide an opportunity to go over the whole
situation with them, ".

in particular the Embassy's recommendation

that we consider giving war supplies to the Chinese Communists as well
as to Generalissimo Chiang.,,25
22 Ibid .• 251.
23Bal1antine to Gretv, Ibid., 253.
24

Grew to Roosevelt, lbid., 254.

25 Ibid .
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On March 4, 1945, Hurley was shown the Atcheson telegram at the
State Department and his reaction to its contents was violent.

26

Claim

ing to have been "called on the carpet" by Vincent and another man, Hur
ley, recounting the incident in 1946, charged that the two men had put
him on the defensive about his activities in Chirla, but that neither of

I

the two had understood America's role there.

"H~ told Vincent the pol

icy he had been implementing as Ambassador in Ch+a was the policy of
the President, which had been in effect since thel beginning of the war

I
:

I
There exists no record of Hurley's conversations with Vincent on
I

I

.

that day, other than Hurley's own account given t? Life Magazine in
January, 1946.

28

I

There does exist, however, a reqord of a telephone con-

I

versation between Hurley and Joseph Ba.llantine Orlithe following day, in
I

which Hurley's objections to the Atcheson telegracl are clearly revealed.

I
Hurley had called to tell Ballantine that he

woul~

scheduled appointment with him on that day, and

not be able to make a

ha~ then referred to the
I
I

conversations of the previous day about the Atchespn telegram.

He wanted

to know i f his point of view had been understood. ! Ballantine told the
I
Ambassador it had, although it was felt that Hurley had read into the
message implications which were not in accord withlt-he Department's in
terpretation.

29

Apparently Hurley had argued that Iarming the

would be a recognition of their belligerent status

26R•T• Smith, "Alone in China," 159.
27 Ibid •
28 Ibid •

Co~~unists

Such recognition
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would be inconsistent \yith the United States' recognition of the National
Government as the government of China.

Ballantine attempted to point out

to Hurley that he did not see how Atcheson's recommendations would in
volve recognition of Communist belligerency, but to little avail.

Hurley

simply turned to the ethics of the telegram, telling Ballantine that he
felt the sending of it was an act of disloyalty to him on the part of his
staff.
Hurley had argued furthermore,
• • • that it reopened a question which he had thought had al
ready been decided, that it revived the question of the recog
nition of the Communists as armed belligeren~s, and that it was
over that issue that General Stilwell had been recalled. He
felt that the sending of the telegram made it necessary for him
to fight all over again with the State Department, the War De- 30
partment and the White House the issues raised in the telegram.
Bailant:ine rep6"rtedly tri-ed· to convinceIIurleythao Atcheson had
merely been doing his duty in sending his estimate of the most recent de·
velopments in China along wi.th the thoughts of the Embassy in that connec
tion.

But Hurley had responded that he had ended the Army's opposition
• getting the die-hards transferred.,,31

to his policy by "

It looked

to him as though he still had the State Department career officers to
contend with nmy, " • . • who were upholding each other and who resented
Ambassador Hurley's policies.,,32

The net effect of,the telegram, Hurley

told Ballantine, was to undermine his efforts.

The Communists would not

be conciliatory i f they thought that they were going to get supplies from
the United States.
30~.,
b'd
261
3l Ibid •
32 Ibid .

Ballantine then closed the conversation with Hurley,

.
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informing the Ambassador that any decision made would be done so at
high levels and that Hurley should talk to Mr. J.C. Dunn, Assistant
Secretary of State and to Mr. Grew.

On the day fOllowing'the Ballantine-Hurley telephone conversation,
Ballantine, Stanton and Vtncent drafted a memorandum to Assistant Secre
tary Dunn, in which they stated that as far as they could determine, there
was no difference in view between them, (including Atcheson) and Hurley.
They again reviewed the recommendations which had been coming through the
Department, and those which they had favored, particularly the ones which
urged the creation of a unified military force commanded by an American
officer and that of giving aid to all military forces irt China.
As far as they could understand him, Hurley was concerned that the
supplying of military arms· to the Communists would constitute re.cognition
of that party's belligerent status, and would result in the speedy over
throw of the Nati.onal Government.
counts, the message indicated.

They differed with Hurley on both

Arming the Communists to the degree

~lhich

they had in mind, would neither provide them with enough to overthrow the
National Government, nor constitute recognition of belligerency.

This

did not involve any question of concluding a formal agreement with the
Communists, they reported, or the taking of any steps which would consti
tute recognition of belligerency on the part of the Communists or any
other group.

33

Again, the message urged that a statement be made to Chiang that,
• • • with a viet... to expediting operations against the Japanese in
the Jo'ar East our military "authorities may give limited quantities
of military equipment to the Communists or any other Chinese group
33Ballantine Memorandum, Ibid., 262.
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which in their opinion would effectively use such equipment in
carrying on guerilla warfare against the Japanese. 34
In concluding the report, they stressed that Atcheson's plan had
been proposed as a method to be turned to only in case of a deadlock.

If

there should be no deadlock, and " • • • if an agreement is reached between
Chiang and the Conununists, which Ambassador Hurley feels confident will be
achieved by the end of April,,,35 then no alternative plan would be war
ranted, and the need for Atcheson's plan would not arise.
What Hurley vIas doing during this period is not quite clear.

Th.e

most comprehensive coverages of the events following his reaction to the
Atcheson telegram are to be found in R.T. Smith's "Alone in China,1t Her
bert Feis' ..china

Tangl~,

and Don Lohbeck's Patrick J. Hurley.

Smith's ac

cOJJnt, one which 'was based almost entirely on the Hurley Pa.pers, merely
states that, Itconfident that he still enjoyed the support of President
Roosevelt, Hurley began the process which would bring the situation in the
Chungking Embassy under control. ,,36

Smith then goes on to report that

Atcheson and Service were eventually reassigned at Hurley's request.
offered no documentation on either of the two points.

He

In China Tangle,

Fei.s wrote that Hurley talked to Stettinius, Marshall, Stimson and the
President about the issues, and, "in the upshot the'President upheld Hur
ley.

It was again decided that we would not help the Communists unless

and until Chiang Kai-shek consented.,,37

Here again, no documentation is

provided.
34 Ibid .,264.
35 Ibid .
36 R• T. Smith, "Alone in China, II 161.
37Feis , China Tangle, 272.
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As

Lohb~ck

Pat Hurley
the sabotage
Secretary of
Secretary of

reported in his biography on Hurley:
did not accept defeat. He carried his fight against
of American policy to higher quarters; he talked to
State Stetti.nius, with Chief of Staff Marshall, ,vi th
War Stimson, and finally President Roosevelt. 38

.

Lohbeck then quoted Hurley as having later said, "I won over all of
their criticism for one reason only

The President sustained my

position and said it was in keeping with the traditional American policy
in China.,,39

There is no indication by Lohbeck of where he obtained this

information, except that the above quoted statement was made by Hur.1ey in
retrospect.
It is truly unfortunate that no record or documentable information
is available to substantiate the three claims put forward that Hurley was
upheld by the President.

Not to be debated is the fact that Atcheson and

Service were transferred shortly after Hurley's clash in Washington.

But

there is nothing in the record to show that this was a result of Roose
ve1t's interference on Hurley's behalf.

Furthermore, there was no need

for the President's interference in this action.

Hur1eY'was Ambassador,

and the'reca11 of Foreign Service officers is a prerogative of an Ambassa
dor.

The alternative would be for the Secretary of State to refuse and

cause the Ambassador considerable embarrassment which would, in turn, no
doubt lead to his resignation.

That the latter was' highly undesirable at

that time is without doubt.
That the President upheld Hurley on the question of American policy
in China, as Hurley understood it, is questionable.

'1'he evidence which

is available leads to the cone1usion that Hurley did not take a strong
38

Lohbeck, 382.

39 Ibid •
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stand with the President over the China policy which was being debated
between the Ambassador and the Department of State.

By the time Hurley

did see Roosevelt the issue raised was one dealing with the recent agree
ments arrived at between Roosevelt and Stalin at the Yalta Conference-
agreements which were secret, but which had been the subject of rumors in
China, and about which Hurley intended to learn more.

On

that point, more

will be written later.
Suffice it to say that there existed no substantial agreement be
tween Hurley and the State Department on China policy.

The Department

was calling for flexibility to meet certain military exigencies which
might arise as the war in the Far East progressed toward the final as
sault on Japan.

It was not,yet known if the United States would be 1and

il'lg"American fOTcesalong the China coast. though it was suspected.

If

that should be the case, it was felt wise to prepare for the use of what
ever Chinese forces were available to fight the Japanese in the landing
areas and possibly elsewhere.

This meant that Communist troops might

have to be armed--if and when that exigency arose.
tion was as yet

unkno~m.

The post-war situa

But even on this question the Department was

advocating a flexible position.

Flexibility meant, to the State Depart

ment, keeping the United States free to shift its support to a political
leader other than Chiang Kai-shek if he should prove impotent, and unable
to maintain a viable government.

The Department was carefully avoiding

an all-out commitment to Chiang and his government, but it was also cau-'
tious not to indicate that American support. if it did shift from Chiang.
it would go to the Communist Party.
Hurley, on the other hand, was vehemently opposed to even the sug
gestion that relatively small amounts of assistance be given to other than
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the National Government and its forces.

Not only had he become inflex

ible in his support of the Kuomintang Government, he had reached the
point where he would not even consider a course of action lv-hich was pro
posed to take effect only in
Chinese factions together.

~he

case of his failure to bring the two

The very suggestion was a challenge to his

ability and he firmly believed that aid in any form to the Communists
would constitute the recognition of their belligerent status in a civil
war.

He held this opinion in spite of the fact that men who were edu

cated and trained in international relations rejected the argument that
aid to the Chinese Communists to fight the Japanese would constitute rec
ognition of that Party's belligerent status vis-a-vis the National Gov
ernment.

Perhaps Hurley believed that because he had been trained in

law, he was better prepared to make such a judgment.
Nevertheless, Hurley believed that the outcome of his clash with
the State Department was renewed support for his

China policy.

He had

been victoriouG over those whose intent it was to sabotage all that he
had accomplished so far.

Service and Atcheson were to be recalled, and

in his opinion the President's faith in the Ambassador to China had been
reaffirmed.

That reaffirmation came in the form of another special mis

sion upon which Hurley was sent following his meetings with the President.

. CHAPTER X
THE VICTOR FAILS
Ambassador Hurley did, on several occasions, talk to the President
during his February, 1945, visit to Washington.

He confronted the Pres

ident in fact, though he immediately softened his approach upon seeing
Roosevelt's extremely poor physical condition.

Having had no success in

gathering information about the Yalta agreements from the State Depart
ment, Hurley went to the President, as has been reported on numerous oc
casions, "with my ears back and my teeth skinned, to have·a fight about
what. hac,l... been: done."

1

But when·- the Ambassador saw-how- ill the Pres<ident

was, he lost all the fight he had in him, and quietly inquired about
what had occurred at Ya1ta.

2

According to most accounts, Hurley and the President discussed the
Yalta Conference on several occasions far into the month of March.

Hur

ley finally prevailed upon Roosevelt to let him examine the documents,
and once this had been accomplished, the Ambassador attempted to show
the President that the secret portion would be a violation of China's
territorial sovereignty.3
1Fe1s,
.
China Tangle, 279.

See also, Lohbeck, 366.

3For "Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union into the War
Against Japan," signed on February 11, 1945 by Roosevelt, Churchill and
Stalin, see Foreign Relations; The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945,
968-84. See also Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta (Ne,,, York, 1970), Appen
dix A, 315. The agreement ,,7as as follows!The three signatories agreed
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According to all that Hurley said and testified to in later years,
the President finally came to agree that"

•• Hurley's fears seemed to

be justified," and gave the Ambassador a special directive--" • • • to go
to London and Moscow; to speak to Churchill and Stalin; and seek a way
to ameliorate the betrayal of China and return to the traditional Ameri
can policy in the Far East."

4

But with a view to the discussions which subsequently took place
between Hurley and the British and Russian heads of state, the directive
which Hurley claimed to have received from Roosevelt must be questioned.
There is no indication whatsoever that Hurley discussed the amelioration
of the Yalta secret agreement with either of the two.

In substance, his

discussions with Churchill and Stalin revolved around questions of suppOl:4:.of the American policy in China.

In addition, Hurley discussed

with Stalin the coordination of joint Soviet-American disclosures of the
Yalta accords to Chiang Kai-shek.

Chiang had not been at Yalta, and

Roosevelt and Stalin had decided to hold back on revealing the secret
agreement to him, both feeling that if he received the information pre

3that Russia would enter the war against Japan within two or three months
after Germany had surrendered and the war in Europe had been terminated.
The conditions of Russian entry were: (1) The status quo in Outer Mon
golia shall be preserved; (2) The former rights of Russia vtolated by the
treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored viz: (a) the south
ern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be
returned to the Soviet Union, (b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be
internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this
port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of
the USSR restored, (c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchur
ian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated
by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, i t being under
stood that the preetninent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safe
guarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria; (3) The
Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.
All of the above were conditioned upon the successful conclusion of
a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China.
4

Lohbcck, 368.
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maturely, it might quickly be leaked to the Japanese.

But as R.T. Smith,

who had examined the Hurley papers, has written, " • • • the subject of
changing the terms of the [Yalta] agreement did not arise." S
Roosevelt had no doubt expressed some reservations about the agree
ment to Hurley in February and March, but it appears that those reserva
tions were over questions of implementation.

He had received word from

the State Department about the possibility of the Chinese Communists
seeking Soviet aid i f not aided by the United: States, and was well aware
of the problems of disunity in China.

These problems were no doubt re

emphasized by Hurley in his discussions with the President.
of the,fact that Hurley's mission to London

a~d

But in view

Moscow was to gain a re

statement of Churchill's and Stalin's commitment to American policy, it
a~ars·"that

Roosevelt's concern'was more witl1 gaining' guarantees that

the Soviet Union in particular 'WOUld support the Central Government rath
er than the Communists, when the Russians ente:red the Pacific War.
Judging from the concerted efforts made ¢arlier in the war to convince Chiang Kai-shek that he need not fear

I

th~

Russians, Roosevelt

I

might very well have sent Hurley to London and!Noscow on his return trip
I
I

to China, so that when the Ambassador returnedlto Chungking he could
I
again announce to the Generalissimo that he ha4 talk,ed to the Russians
and had received their guarantees of support.

I

iChiang, as well, had ex

pressed fears of continued British imperialism lin China and Hurley's stop
in London was quite probably aimed at alleviating those fears.
SR.T. Smith, "Alone in China,1I 170. For reports on Hurley's conver
sations with Stalin, see Hurley to Truman, Foreign Relations, 1945, VII,
867; Kennan to Secretary of State, Ibid., 339. For Hurley's report of
conversation with Churchill, see H~rley to Secretary of State, Ibid.,
329.
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That this was most clearly Roosevelt's intent in sending Hurley to
London and Moscow, is revealed in Hurley's telegram of April 14, 1945,
sent through the Secretary of State to the new President, Harry S Tru
man, on the occasion of Roosevelt's death.

6

As the Secretary was aware,

Hurley began, he was then presently on a special mission which had been
directed by President Roosevelt to confer with Churchill and Eden in
London, and Stalin and Molotov in Moscow.

Hurley then went on to out

line the intent of his mission:
It was the President's suggestion that I undertake to obtain co
operation from the British and Soviet Governments for the Ameri
can policy to support the National Government of China; to unite
the military forces of China to bring the "lar with Japan to a
speedy end and to support all reasonable efforts of Chinese lead
ers for the purpose of creating a free, united, democratic China. 7
Although Hurley did not and was not instructed to, seek an amelior
ation of the Yalta secret agreement on his'mission, he did become en
lightened on at least one point of British policy toward China.
ish, he learned, had no intenUon of giving up Hong Kong.

The Brit

While Hurley

and others had suspected for some time that the British were not support
ing American attempts to unify China, his suspicions that they were in
tent upon continuing their imperial position in the Far East were rein
forced while in London.

It

was here that a basic portion of the views

expressed in his later letter of resignation--that the United States was
"using its reputation to •

bolster imperialism, "--\"ere formed.

What

he learned from Churchill, and what he would observe in China at war's
end, would combine to convince him of America's rejection of the Atlantic
Charte~

principles.

6 Ibid .
7

Ibi<!., 330.
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Vice-president Wallace, it will be remembered, had indicated Roose
velt's intent to return Hong Kong to China when he visited Chiang Kai
shek in June, 1944.

In Hur.ley's report to Truman of April 14, 1945, he

wrote that Roosevelt had briefed him ". . • regarding Hong Kong," and
had authorized him to discuss it with Churchill if the question was in
troduced.

The question had apparently been raised, for, according to

Hurley, "Churchill flatly stated that he would fight for Hongkong to a
finish. II

Furthermore, Hurley went on, Churchill had said that "'Hong

kong will be eliminated from the British Empire only over'my dead body. ," 8
Hurley had discussed the matter further with Churchill and had re
marked that if the British were to decline to observe the principles of
the Atlantic Charter and continue to hold Hong Kong, then Russia would
probal:l>ly- makQ., similar demands on areas in North China.

This would fur

ther complicate the situation and probably nullify most of the principles
for which the leaders of the United Nations had said they were fighting.
Expanding on his reported remarks, Hurley added:
I said that such a position would also be a complete nullifi
cation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter which was re
affirmed by Britain and the Soviet [sic] in the Iran Declara
tion. At this point Churchill stated that Britain is not bound
by the principles of the Atlantic Charter at all. I then called
his attention to the fact that he reaffirmed the principles of
the Atlantic Charter
• when he signed the Iran Declaration.
Notwithstanding all this he persisted that Britain is not bound
by the principles of the Atlantic Charter. 9
Hurley announced in a press conference, upon his return to Chungking,
that he had discussed American policy with the heads of state in London
8

.
Ibid., 331.
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and Moscow, and had found,
i cy.

,,10

ft • • •

all in agreement on the Chinese pol

But when the time came, three months later, to accept the Japan

ese surrender throughout China, it was quite obvious that the British
had not agreed on the American policy toward Hong Kong.

On August 11, 1945, shortly after the Japanese

a~ceptance

of the

terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the new Secretary of State, James F.
Byrnes informed the Chinese Government, through Ambassador Hurley, that
the Allied acceptance of Japan's surrender had been forwarded through
the Swiss Government.

1l

On that same day. but in a separate message,

Byrnes notified the Chinese Government that in accordance with the word
~ng

of the acceptance of surrender General MacArthur had been designated

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that he was to coordinate
and carry-into effect the general surrender of

the~.Japanese

armed forces.

12

In addition, the message stated:
It is also contemplated that General'MacArthur will direct the
Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to have Japanese forces
in China, other than those opposing the Russians, surrender un
conditionally to you or your subordinate commanders. 13
But on August 16, Hurley revealed to Byrnes a difference of opinion
between the Chinese and the British over what constituted the China The
atre.

The British Embassy, Hurley informed Byrnes, had notified the

Chinese Government that they were arranging for
10

n •••

the despatch of

Hurley to Secretary of State, transcript of press conference re
marks, Ibid., 377.
11
12

Byrnes to Hurley, Ibid. , 494.
Byrnes to Hurley, Ibid. , 495.

l3 Ibid .
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the necessary British forces to reoccupy and restore the adnlinistration

,,14

of Hong Kong. •

The Chinese had informed the British that this

action was " • • • not in accord with the general order of surrender
which President Truman has' sent to the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers. • •• ,,15

Reviewing t h e wording of t h ose orders, which clearly

designated areas of Japanese surrender and to whom the Japanese forces
were to surrender, the Chinese Government's note pointed out that " • • •
Hong Kong is not included in the places to be surrendered to the Supreme
Allied Commander of Southeast Asia Command and it is in the area which
Japanese, forces are to surrender to the Generalissimo of the China
Theatre."

16

In conclusion, the note stated quite emphatically that

The Chinese Government respect all legitimate British interests,
and are prepared to accord them every necessary protection. But
as-'a conce'rted plan of accepting the su~render.· of the, Jap'aneae,
forces is essential to the restoration of peace and order in
Asia, i t is suggested that'His Hajesty's Government should make
arrangements for the acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese
forces in accordance with the general order of the Allied Nations
and refrain from landing troops in any place in the China Theater
without getting authority from the Supreme Commander for Allied
Powers and the Supreme Commander of this theater. 17

In

addition to this note to the British Embassy, which Hurley for

warded to the Secretary of State, Chiang Kai-shek memorialized the Pres
ident, informing him that " • . . if the British Government does take such
actions in contradiction to the agreements and the cooperative spirit of
the Allied Nations, it will be indeed a matter of great misfortune to the

14

Hurley to Byrnes, Ibid., 500.

15 Ibid •
16 Ibid ., SOL
17 Ibid.
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'
,,18
All l.es.

Chiang then suggested that Truman bring the matter to the

attention of the British Government and request that they make their ar
rangements in accordance with the general order of surrender.

On August 18, Prime Minister Atlee informed Truman that the British
Government did not concur in the Chinese Government's interpretation of
the general order of surrender.

The British could not accept, Atlee wrote,

" • • • any interpretation of general order number one as meaning that
Hongkong, which is British territory, is included in the expression 'with
in China'. ,,19
Truman apparently agreed with the British interpretation, for on
the same day that he received Atlee's message, the President informed the
British government that "f::-om the U. S. standpoint there is no objection
to' the,,·,su-pl'eooer of Hong Kong being accepted-by a British~officer~, ,,20
as long as full coordination had been effected between the British, Chi
nese, and American forces in the area.

Such action, however, did not,

as Truman had informed the Chinese Ambassador,

n •••

in any way repre

sent U. S. views regarding the future status of Hong Kong. lin

In other

words, Truman was accepting for the present the British demands that they
accept the Japanese surrender, but was reserving for the time any deci
sion on the part of the United States pertaining to the future political
status of Hong Kong.

18Chiang to Truman, Ibid., 502.
19Atlee to Truman, Ibid., 504.
20

As reported to Chiang in Byrnes to Hurley, Ibid., 509.

2l Ibid •
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In forwarding Truman's message of August 18 to Chiang, Secretary
Byrnes made it quite clear that the problem was " . . • primarily a mili
tary matter of an operational character."
Byrnes informed the Generalissimo, "

No question had been raised,
with regard to British sover

eignty in the area.,,22
Chiang's response to these messages was quite diplomatic though
somewhat arrogant.

He simply informed the United States that he would

delegate to a British officer the right to accept the Japanese surrender
on behalf of the Chinese Government
accepted by Truman.
~age,

24

23

_-a position which was tactfully

Chiang was surely "saving face" with this mes

for it\olaS quite clear that Truman had accepted the British ar

gument that Hong Kong

"laS

a part of the British Empi.re, and that it

was the legiti.mate right of the British to take the surrender,

therc~

The Japanese had taken the island from Great Britain and the Chinese had
not taken it back.

Under the circumstances, there was little Chiang

could do.
During the same period in which the question of Hong Kong was be
ing debated, problems had arisen over the taking of the Japanese sur
render in Indo-China as well.
the Chinese Government had

be~n

Hurley notified Byrnes on August 13 that
I

approached by the French Charge d'Affairs,

Jean Daridan, requesting that the Chinese use the approximately 5,000
French troops in the vicinity of Kunming for the occupation of French

22 Ibid .
23Chiang to Truman in Hurley to Byrnes, Ibid., 51.
24

Truman to Chiang, Ibid.
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Indo-China.

Apparently Daridan had earlier informed a Chinese Government

official that there might be "serious trouble" should Chinese troops en
ter Indo-China, and that Sino-French relations might be gravely prejudiced
if the Chinese did not allow the aforesaid French forces to join in the
occupation of that area.

25

Byrnes had acted on Hurley's message by instructing the American
Ambassador to France to inform Georges Bidault, French Minister for For
eign Affairs, that the Japanese in Indo-China were to surrender to Chiang
Kai-shek in the north and to the British under Mountbatten in the south.
This division, Byrnes wrote, was to be considered purely operational and
. h out any po 1·~t~ca
. 1

w~t

.

. f lcance
.
wh atsoever. 26

s~gn~

On

August 31, however,

Byrnes informed Hurley that the French had been notified that if they
could make arrangements with the Chinese, which would provide for Chi
nese acceptance of the Japanese surrender in the north and French accept
ance on behalf of the British in the south, the matter would be left to
the discretion of
writing that the
v'

Gen~ral

Chines~

MacArthur.

27

Hurley responded on September 6,

Government felt that because surrender arrange-

ments were by then so far advanced, it would not be practicable from a
military point of vie,,7 for them to accede to the French request.

28

By September 11, Hurley had become totally dissatisfied with the
developing situation in China, and in a telegram to Byrnes, expressed
that dissatisfaction.

25

Giving himself credit for having prevented the

Hurley to Byrnes, Jbid., 498.

26 Byrnes to Caffrey, Ibid., 499.
27
28

Byrnes to Hurley, Ibid. , 513.
Hurley to Byrnes, Ibid. , 555.
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collapse of the National Government predicted by Vice-president Wallace
and two Congressional leaders in 1944, Hurley outlined Roosevelt's di
rectives to him as personal representative to Chiang.

The Ambassador

then pointed out that the United States had some long-term diplomatic
objectives in China and that those objectives were" •• ' • to support the
aspirations of the Chinese people for the establishment of a free, united
democratic government in China.,,29

The President had directed him to

London and Moscow in April, Hurley wrote, where he had discussed with
Churchill and Stalin all the problems pertaining to China, both military
and civil, and had gained public endorsements from both, of the longrange American policy.

Implying that the United States' China policy

had been well-established under President Roosevelt, Hurley proceeded
to suggest that it was being violated.
The fundamental issue in Asia today is between democracy and
imperialism; between free enterprise.and monopoly. The Ameri
can delegation at San Francisco last May voted with Great Brit
ain and France against China and Russia on the question of co
lonial independence. Then came the reversal of the Roosevelt
Atlantic Charter policy on Indo-China and, perhaps, Hong Kong. 30
Although these actions had probably been exaggerated, Hurley wrote,
the fact remained that an opinion was steadily grolving in Asia, ".
that America is supporting the imperialisms of Britain, France and the
Netherlands as against democracy."

31

President Roosevelt had definitely

stated in their last meeting that the United States had favored the sus
taining of the Republic of China as the strongest stabilizing force in
29

Hurley to Byrnes, Ibid., 555.

30 Ibid ., 556.
3l rbid .
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Asia, Hurley contended.

But it was being stated that these imperial na

tions favored sustaining Japan as the dominating regulatory force in Asia.
He was, therefore, " . • • convinced that all of the imperial nations rep
resented in China are supporting a policy intended to keep China divided
against herself.,,32
Perhaps the United States had decided not to continue what Presi
dent Roosevelt had outlined as the long-range policy toward Chlna, Hur
ley concluded.

tfuether or not this was true, he added,

fl.

•

•

there

seems a definite trend in American policy toward the support of imper
ialism rather than democracy in Asia.,,33

With that, Hurley requested

permission to return to Washington.
There could be no argument with the fact that the situation in the
Fa:r·F.as,\iwaslittle le&(;, than chaotic when the war ended ,there.

The

atomic bomb had pre-empted long··range. coordinated planning for surrender
arrangements.

The speedy capitulation of the Japanese had come as a 8ur

prise to most, as had the effects of the two bombs dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.
of the day.

Quick decisions and equally quick planning were the order
Hurley was not prepared, however, for the rapidity of events

around him, nor for the vagaries accompanying those rapid developments.
For a man with limited patience and a hasty temper, such an environment
was hostile and uncomfortable.
One incident in particular had doubtlessly stuck in Hurley's mind,
and was surely a contributor to his opinion that American policy was
changing, without there being any concerted effort to inform him of those
32 Ibld .
33 Ibid ., 557.
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On August 20, he had wired Byrnes to inform the Secretary that

changes.

the day before he had been summoned to the Generalissimots country resi
dence, where Chiang had read to him, a cable from the Chinese Ambassador

in Washington.

.

The cable constituted an outline of the United States'

post V-J Day policy on Lend-lease, UNRRA, and the arming of Chinese for
ces, in addition to general statements concerning the United States'
post V-J Day economic assistance to China, as well as its relations with
China.

Asked if he was aware of these policies, Hurley was forced to

admit that no such information had as yet reached him.
then summoned and the cable was read again.

Wedemeyer was

Wedemeyer was asked if he

4ad been in receipt of this information, and was also put in the embar
rassing position of ansvlering as Hurley had.

The Generalissi.mo then pro

ceeded to instruct the two to meet with the appropriate government of
ficials to begin planning for implementation of American policy.34
Although this information did come to Hurley the next day, and
although it was e more tentative appraisal of American po.licy than
Chiang's cable had indicated, the fact remained that Hurley received
the information
theirs. ,,35

II • • •

some 44 hours after the Chinese had received

Given Hurley's rather high estimation of himself and his

position, a grave error in diplomacy had been committed, not between
the Americans and the Chinese, but between the Department of State and
the Ameri.can A.1J.1bassador himself.
Perhaps a trained and experienced diplomatic representative would
have understood the
34

circumsta~ces

in which this incident had occurred,

Hurley to Byrnes, Ibid., 535.

35 Ibid .,537.
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and would have taken it in stride.

"

But Hurley lacked such training and

was definitely without the ability to respond to the incident with subtle
grace.

On this particular occasion he merely informed the Department

that such was in keeping with the normal course of events, which had
found the Embassy in Chungking receiving its first indication of changes
in American policy from other than Department sources. 36
Shortly after Hurley had informed Byrnes of his desire to return
to Washington, the Ambassador discovered that George Atcheson and John
Stewart Service had been assigned as political advisors to General MacArthur.

In protest, Hurley composed a strongly-worded memorandum,

c,harging that Atcheson and Service had opposed American policy in China
and had supported the imperialistic nations in their objectives of a
divided China.

Both men, Hurley charged, supported the Chinese Communist

Party, whose purpose it was to overthrow the government of Chiang Kai
shek, and to bring about civil war in China.

He had accomplished his

mission in China, Hurley noted, only over the extremely able opposition
of the

t~o

Foreign Service officers.

Hurley then turned to the State Department's Division of Chinese
Affairs, arguing that the Division had long been attempting to subvert
his goals in China.

Even after he had gained the concurrence of Churchill

and Stalin" in American policy, the Division of Chinese Affairs had done
all it could to report every minor skirmish and every political and per
sonal clash, as indications of impending civil war in China.
Talks were still continu!ng between the Nationalists and the Commu
nists, Hurley having managed to bring Mao to Chungking, in what he thought
36 Ibid •
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was the final successful move on his part to bring the two factions to
gether.

But the presence of Atcheson and Service in the Far East would

disrupt the conferences, Hurley.wrote, as the two would again attempt
to break up the talks just as they had in the fall of 1944.
But Hurley did not send this letter of protest.
pears that he left that task to Chiang Kai-shek.

38

37

Instead, it ap

On September 20, Hur

ley wired the Secretary of State that the Generalissimo had requested he
transmit an enclosed aide-memoire to the President. 39

The aide-memoire,

allegedly written by Chiang, pointed out that recent press reports had
indicated that George Atcheson and John Stewart Service were to be mem
bers of a Political Advisory Board for General MacArthur's assistance in
determining American policy in the Far East.
also indi'Ceted

tha~·

These press reports had

the Board- migbt- be trc.veling to Chungking, Chiang

added.
Both men, the Generalissimo argued, were generally accepted in
China as having strong convictions that a coalition between the Commu
nist and the Kuomintang Parties should be imposed arbitrarily.

They

had both expressed views that were definitely unfriendly to the Central
Government and had clearly revealed their support for the policies of
the Communist Party.
The Kuomintang Government and the Communists had been in important
conferences for the past three weeks, Chiang pointed out, and each side
\>las sincerely striving to reach an equitable and reasonable arrangement
37R• T. Smith, "Alone in China," 216.
38 Ibid ., 218, fn. 21.

39

Hurley to Byrnes, Foreign Relations, 1945, VII, 565.
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and to alemiorate their conflicting views.

But there had recently oc

curred a noticeable change in the Communists' attitude, and they were
reliably reported to have taken,the view that

n •••

prominent Ameri

cans will soon come to China with the mission of firmly supporting the
Communist Party."

40

They know that Mr. Atcheson and Mr. Service are sympathetic and
they interpret the above referred to appointments as indicative
of the change in the United States policy on China.4l
lIe felt certain, Chiang concluded, that the United States, having
done so much to assist China in its attempts to realize unity and dem
ocracy, would not knowingly approve the appointment of officials"
that might militate against the hoped-for success of the present Central
Government. 1142
l~," HUi"d:ey·. finally

departed from Chullgking on September 23, sev

eral things were clear in his mind.

The United States had supported

Great Britain in its desire to accept the surrender of Hong Kong, and
had deferred to the French in their desire to accept the surrender of
French Indo-China.

The fact that the United States had clearly stated

its position as one which applied only to the military exigencies of
the time and not to the future political status of either area, was of
little importance to Hurley.

In addition, the United States Government

had by-passed him, or at least had treated him with less than the dig
nity he deserved by informing the Chinese of policy or tentative policy
without first informing the Ambassador.
40 Ibid ., 566.
4l Ibid .
42 Ibid •

To make matters worse, Atcheson
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and Service had been reassigned to the Far East, an act which was a direct
affront to the man who had succeeded, he thought, in discrediting them.
Yet, as Hurley left China, Mao Tse-tung himself was in Chungking,
conferring with the National Government--evidence, in Hurley's view, of
the continuing success of his efforts.

Hurley had met with Chou En-lai

on September 16, and had received a draft communique to be issued as a
joint declaration by both sides.

Chou's draft contained six points,

each with a number of subdivisions. 43 . Hurley set to work on the draft
and simplified it to nine, one of which called for the promotion of a
bill of rights.

44

Just prior to his departure, Hurley dictated a letter

to be sent to the Secretary of State, in which he pointed out that beth
sides had agreed on all points but two.

Those two had not been rejected,

the--1!les'!!!;1!tge'stated·, but were merelybeinrr re'eOlls"!f:de-:red by the Communists.
As usual, Hurley's message was versed in optimistic terms:
The spirit between the negotiators is good. The rapprochement
between the two leading parties of China seems to be progressing
and the discussion and rumors of civil war recede as the confer
ence continues. 45
Nor was the message lacking in self-glorification, for added to the
dictated report was a separate statement of praise informing the Depart
ment that both negotiating parties had "

. agreed upon a paragraph

to be included in their proposed final resolution thanking the Ambassador
for his great services to China in bringing about the conferences and
for his general helpfulness as mediator during the negotiations.,,46

No

doubt Parker LaNoore, who had written a glittering biography of Hurley
in 1932 and who had gone to Cmna in 1945 to act as one of Hurley's press
43 Chou to Hurley, Ibid., 464.
44R•T. Smith, "Alone in China," 219.
45Hurley to Byrnes, Forei8? Relations, 1945, VII, 468.
46 Ibid •
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aides, had taken Hurley's dictated message and, with Hurley's knowledge,
had added the additional comment.
This suspicion is more credible in view of the fact that shortly

.

after Hurley arrived in Washington, LaMoore was credited with an article
printed in the New York World Telegram which, in R.T. Smith's words,

fl.

made it appear that Hurley had single-handedly united China in the face
of a

Corr~unist-inspired State Department plot to subvert his activities.,,47

Here was the final rock for Hurley's foundation of charges yet to be
leveled in his letter of resignation.
Only a short time earlier Hurley had met with James Forresta1,
Secret·ary of the Navy, and had told the Secretary that the Chinese Com
munists were not Communists at all, and that the Soviet Union was sup
port'ingfu11y the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

The Russians did not

want civil war or anarchy in China, Hurley told Forrestal, because theh
own problems in Asia were far too complex as it was.

But he had, at the

same time, indicated to the Secretary the problems he had experienced
with the Foreign Service personnel, and had suggested that these men were
communistically inclined

48

_- a contradiction to say the least.

Thus, having presented himself to American in an aura of success-
victorious over the communist-inspired opposition of nearly all State
Department" men with whom he had been associated--Hurley marched proudly
into the President's office on October 13, 1945, to offer his resigna
tion. 49

He had done his duty for America, had served well and faithfully,

and now that China was clearly on the road to unity and democracy, it
47R. T• Smith, "Alone in China," 224.
"8 Ibid ., 223.

49Ibi~., 225.
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was a fitting time for the old General to step down.
But Truman would have none of it.

Refusing to accept his reisgna

tion the President told Hurley to have a checkup at Walter Reed Army Hos
pital and to take a few weeks' rest in New Mexico.
again discuss the matter of Hurley's resignation.

Only then would they

50

On October 14, the Secretary of State announced that Hurley would
'
51
return to Ch lna.

The announcement came amid numerous reports of pro

gress in the Communist-Kuomintang negotiations.

By October 29, the

Chungking Embassy was able to report on a news release issued two days
previously by the Chinese Minister of Information, telling of an agree
ment between the two sides to maintain the status quo of the Communist
forces around the northern railway zones, provided the Communists left
the." r ailr.oada , alone. 52

This had been the Unal point of. conflict be

tween the two men when Hurley departed from Chungking.

With this re

solved, i t looked as though unity had finally come to pass.
But the report raised false hopes.

On October 31, another Embassy

report revealed that the National Government's news release was designed
only for foreign consumption.

The National Army, according to a later

report to the Embassy, had managed to acquire United States arms and equip
ment, and now that the Japanese had been disarmed, the Kuomintang forces
were turning to the elimination of the Communists.

53

A second report of

the same day, relayed a message from Wang Shih-chieh, Chiang's

~finister

50 Ibid •
5l Ibid .

52

Charge in China to Byrnes, Foreign Relations, 1945: VII, 480.

53 Ibid ., 481.
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of Foreign Affairs, which

h~ld

that the Russians had forbidden the landing

of Chinese Government troops at the port of Dairen.

They had made arrange

ments for landings at the ports of Yingkou and Hulutao, but both were in
fcrior to Dairen, and there were reported to be large concentrations of
Chinese Communist forces near Hulutao.

The Commun:i.st-Kuomintang negoti

ations had been going well, the Minister told the Embassy, until about
September 24.

Since then the Communists had cut every railway line over

which the Government's forces were to be transported north to occupy for
merly Japanese-held territory.

Government forces had, furthermore, suf

fered from numerous unprovoked attacks by the Communists, there having
been heavy Government troop casualties in a recent surprise attack in
Shansi Province.
Th~l11tlister

had informed the Embassy that in the opinion of the

National Government, the actions of the Chinese Communists and the re
fusal of the Russians to allow landings at Dairel1 had a direct relation-

.

S h lp.
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In. Santa Fe, New Hexico, Ambassador Hurley was receiving this news

with considerable consternation.

It was becoming quite clear not only

to Hurley, but to the American press as well, that civil war in China
had not been averted.

By late October it was even clearer that full-

scale civil war was being waged there, and the press had begun openly
and harshly to criticize the Ambassador for his activity in committing
all-out support to the Kuomintang Government.

An editorial in the New

York Herald Tribune of November 2, leveled these charges at Hurley,
claiming that he had made the United States a virtual ally of the

54 Ibid ., 1036.
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Kuomintang Government in its civil war with the Communists.

Accord

ing to R. T. Smith's account of the editorial:
The most outrageous a.spect of the situation, the editor said, was
that the State Department offici,als knelv very little of what was
going on in China, primarily because of Hurley's refusal to for
ward to Washington any reports by subordinates which contained
criticismof the Kuomintang. 55
Nor was the criticism limited to the press.

On November 5, 1945,

the issue was raised in the House of Representatives by Congressman
Albert J. Engle, whose critical remarks followed the general line of neg
ative press reports, then circulating throughout the nation.

56

With an eye to this increasing criticism, Hurley decided the time
had come for him to resign, and on November 15, returned to Washington
to prepare a letter to that effect.

With assistance from Parker LaMoore

and" 8notirer of his China press c:.ides, Lacey Reynolclt;, Hurley drafted·
and, on November 25, signed his letter of resignation.

The next morn

ing, the Ambassador to China met with Secretary Byrnes to tell him his
reasons for resigning.

57

He had not been getting the support he felt he deserved from the
Administration, Hurley told Byrnes.

He had heard rumors that as soon as

the war was over his post was to go to a deserving Democrat, and that if
he returned to China some pretext would be found to discharge him.

Fur

thermore, 'in spite of the opposition which had been expressed to the as
signment of Service and Atcheson to the Far East, the men were still there.

55 R. T. Smith, "Alone in China," 231.
56 Ibid ., 230.
57 Ibid ., 232.
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IByrnes' response was cautious as he told Hurley to reconsider his
I

I

desire! to resign while he, the Secretary, had time to investigate the
charges the Ambassador had leveled.

Hurley left his letter with Byrnes

but agreed to meet with him again in the afternoon to discuss the matter
further.
Meeting again that day, Byrnes attempted to convince Hurley that
the Administration did support him and that it had the greatest confi
dence in his ability to continue his work in China.

Finally, Hurley

gave in and agreed to fly back to China, but not until after he had ad
dressed the National Press Club on November 28.

Byrnes then informed

Truman that Hurley would return and that a plane was being readied for
his flight to China.
Ful.l¥, int:ending to return to". his duties in. China, Hurley arose
on October 27, and began casually to glance through a recent Congres_
siona1 Record.

Much to his shock, he happened upon the printed record

of a speech given by Congressman Hugh Delacy on November 26.

Delacy

had charged in his speech that the United States had contributed mili
tary supplies to a government bent upon suppressing the aspirations of
millions for a new democracy which they had spent years in building for
themselves.

Delacy blamed Hurley for bringing about Gauss' resignation,

and said that Hurley's step by step reversal of the Roosevelt-Gauss
policies in China had made civil war unavoidable.

Piling charge upon

charge, Delacy finally accused Hurley of committing the United States to
armed intervention in China.
Although Delacy's charges had been based upon reports coming from
newsmen in China, Hurley was convinced that the

Congressman had received

his information from the Ambassador's reports, the contents of which,
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Hurley believed, had been "leaked" by personnel in the State Department
who were in opposition to his views.
he could stand.

Hurley had taken all the criticism

He immediately telephoned various press headquarters to

inform them that he would hold a news conference at twelve-thirty.

One

half-hour later, the reporters had assembled, and without first informing
his superiors of his fi-nal decision, Hurley announced his resignation to
the American people.
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Patrick J. Hurley, who had stepped from the poverty of the Oklahoma
coal mines to a career of ".

consulting with Presidents, admonishing

Prime Ministers, consoling Generalissimos, debating with Dictators, and
giving advice to Kings,,,59 had, perhaps for the first time in his life,
failed.

In 1938, just as the negotiations to settle the }lcxican oil ex-

p~!:a_on"

dispute had broken d-own, Patrick EurJ.cy, representing the

Sinclair interests, had gone to Mexico and had independently negotiated
an acceptable agreement.

For his services he had received in excess of

one million dollars and Mexico's highest honor.

But that dispute had

been between the Mexican Government arid American private enterprise.
Occurring at the height of the Good Neighbor era, the United States had
refused to interfere.

From 1941 to 1945, however, the United States

was involved in a world war.

No longer were matters to be settled by

virtue of the gregarious nature of diplomats, or, for that matter, by
the outgoing personality of a President.
did not agree.

Unfortunately Patrick Hurley

In 1944, Hurley went to China holding the belief that,

as in Mexico, his personality would bring the competing factions together.

58 Ibid ., 234-237.
59

'I

See Chapter I, 23, fn. 61.
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His independent action and approach had worked for him in 1938; why
should it not work again?
But as he became more deeply involved in the negotiations, the
struggle became more and more his own.

Viewing each side to be demo

cratically-inclined, Hurley quickly introduced his own, perhaps his
nation's, political philosophy into the proposed terms for agreement,
and thus became personally committed to a political structure alien to
the negotiating parties.

This alone would perhaps not have been in

error had Hurley not become so personally dedicated to the kind of unity
which he had designed.

But once he had made the commitment, the out

come of the negotiations became the test of his mvn success or failure,
and the man became inflexible and quite vulnerable to criticism, which
he'always' thereafter saw dire(.:.ted at him personally, rather than, as it
was at firRt, to\-Jard the government of Chiang Kai-shek.
That John Stewart Service, George Atcheson and other State Depart
ment Foreign Service personnel

who came to be Hurley's scapegoats, were

not siding with the Communists, must be considered an understatement.
Their loyalties \-rere to their government.

Their recommendations were

made with what they saw as their government's best interests in mind.
As John Stewart Service still maintained, in a Dece.mber 1970 interview,
the greatest fear of the Foreign Service men with whom he was associated
was that the. Chinese Communists, who by all indicators were far superior,
militarily and in terms of popular support, to the Central Government,
would be alienated by American refusals of support and would thus turn
to the Soviet Union.

If that were to occur, Service said, it was be

lieved that the United States would eventually lose China as an ally.60
60lnterview with John Stewart Service, December 7, 1970.
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Though the statement was made in retrospect, the evidence shows
throughout, that these were opinions held by many in 1944-45.
Service and the others who had witnessed the activities of the
Communists in Yenan were far from captured by the Marxian rhetoric
they heard.

They in fact had discounted it, as had the Russians, accord

ing to Hurley's consistent reports.

Service had considered the "so

called" Communists to be democratically-inclined.

So had Hurley, up to

the time of his last meeting with Forrestal.
But in spite of Service's ideological view of the Communists' form
of democracy relative to that in America, the fact remains that his pri
mary emphasis was on the fact that the Chinese Communists had a popular
following compared to the Kuomintang, that because of this popular sup
poact;

tha.~ Yel't&n-contt'o11e&

forces were the only ones effectively fight

ing the Japanese., and that unless the United States

directE~d

aid to the

Communists as well as pressure on Chiang to bring the Communists into
the Central Government, there would be civil war following the Japanese
surrender.

If, by that time, the United States had not shown support,of

the Communists, but had instead supported the National Government, the
Communists would in all likelihood turn to the Russians.

But even with

out Russian support, the Communists were clearly strong enough to defeat
the National Government troops, and in such an event the United States
would have supported the losing side.
It

was with this in mind, Service commented in December, 1970, that

he and others who held the same views received with dismay the ne\V's of
the Yalta secret agreement and the Sino-Soviet friendship pact.
two 8.greements guaranteed civil

~V'ar

in China, Service said,

Those

Once Chiang

was assured that the Russians would not support the Chinese Communists,
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he had confidence in his ability to win in a civil war and was no longer
hesitant to launch an all-out effort to eliminate the Communists.

6l

But -Hurley had viewed the Sino-Soviet pact much to the contrary.
He firmly believed that once the

Co~~unists

realized they would receive

no aid from the Soviets they would come to terms with Chiang's govern
ment.
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Hurley could not have been further from the truth.

There can be no doubt that Patrick J. Hurley was a dedicated and
sincere American.

He put a considerable amount of energy into trying

to bring unity to China.

One would be amiss in placing even a moderate

portion of the blame on his shoulders for the problems which developed
in post-l.Jorld War II China.

It any blame were to be placed for the mis

takes Hurley made during his tenure in China, it would he better directed
at a President who placed too much confidence in personal representatives,
one of whom did not prove worthy of the assignment.
But the problem went farther than that of Roosevelt having made a'
poor choice of Ambassadors, for Roosevelt could hardly haye been blamed
for hisovm death.

Here lay the base for the final breakdown of rela

tions with China--in the shift from the diplomacy of Roosevelt back to
that of the State Department; in the face of Truman's overwhelming respon
sibility in picking up the pieces cf world events; and, because the big
gest pieces were European, China and the American Ambassador were given
secondary consideration in the final months of the war.

Policy was in a

state of flux through the summer and early fall of 1945, and Hurley had
not, in fact, been kept up to date on developments.
had many others.

61 InteIvlew
.
. h SerVlce.
.
Wlt
62 Ibid .

But then, neither
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The fact remains that a more competent and less vain man, and one
with more training, might easily have weathered the storm of shifting
policy.

As George F. Kennan, one of America's more experienced diplo
•

mats, indicated throughout his Russia Leaves the War,
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the Ambassador

is often the last to know when policy changes have occurred.

Had Hur

ley been an experienced international politician he might have under
stood this fact of diplomatic life, and would not have left his position
in such an irresponRible manner.
But Hurley's temperament had not allowed him to weather the storm,
and as the criticism toward him increased at home in the fall of 1945,
his vanity and pride did not enable him to fade quietly from the scene.
He felt his reputation was at stake, so he took his case to the American
peep-l'!;!; nearly' ruining the

liv~s

of several whum he picked as scapegoats

in the process.
One of those persons was John Stewart Service, who, on June 6, 1945,
had been arrested following a raid on the office of Amerasia Nagazine in
New York City.

In that raid, 600 documents were discovered, classified

from personal to top secret.

They had originated in the State Department,

Department of War, Office of Strategic Services, Office of Naval Intelli
gence. Office of War Information, and the Federal Communications Commis
sion.

A considerable number of them had been written by John Stewart

.
64
SerVlce.
But on August 10, a federal Grand-Jury refused to indict Service
and two others of the six who had been arrested at the same time.
63
tion~

George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War:
1917-1920 (Princeton, 1956).

64 AmeraS13
. PaRers,'~'
'3

Soviet American Rela

201
Documents written by Service had, in fact 1 been among those confiscated,
·but there was no evidence to show that he had supplied them.
Jury voted 20-0 against indicting Service.

The Grand-

Subsequent investigations

ascertained that the material written by Service had been stolen from
the Departmentts files and turned over to p~erasia.65
Nevertheless, the fact that the arrest llad occurred, strengthened
Hurleyts charges and made it much

e~sier

for him to use Service as one

of the principal scapegoats when he! testified before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee following his resignation.

The raid itself had no

doubt confirmed Hurleyts suspicions that information was "leaking" from
the Department.

With Service being implicated, the Ambassador became

convinced of a conspiracy against himself.
It has been clearly shown that neither John Stey.,art Service nor
any of the others whom Hurley charged were guilty of atteIllpting to over
throw the National Government of China.

Further evidence that Service

in particular was unjustly charged by Hurley and later by others, ineluding Anthony Kubek most recently, has been provided in a 36-page
rebuttal memorandum by Service following the publication of The Amerasia

Paper~ in February, 1970. 66

In this detailed refutation of Kubek's at

tempt to place Service in the "central role" in the Amerasia case, Service
provides the strongest evidence of his innocence by listing ", , • a
whole series of decisions conscientiously reached over the years,1t which
were in his favor:

66
. See Appendix 1, "Memorandum: A Partial Examination of One Aspect
of the Many Gross Errors Contained in The Amerasia Papers,"
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a)

the grand jury, which voted unanimously against my indict
ment,

b)

the State Department, under Secretary Byrnes, which cleared
me and returned me to duty in August, 1945,

c)

the Loyalty Security Board, under General Snow, and the re
sponsible security and personnel officers of the Department
of State, under Secretaries Marshall and Acheson, who cleared
me in some seven investigations and hearings between 1946 and
1951,

d)

the Tydings Subcommittee, including Senator Lodge, found Sen
ator McCarthy's charges--simi1ar to those here revived by Dr.
Kubek--to be unfounded,

e)

the State Department, under Secretary Dulles, which accepted
my return to duty (after the Supreme Court had ruled unani
mously that my discharge was illegal) and which, under Secre
tary Herter, restored my security clearance in 1959 after
another full investigation. 67
It is sufficient to say in conclUSion, that Patrick J. Hurley's ex

pM'ieooe' in China had a profound. effect on the lUe of at least one
American, to say nothing of his contribution to the ideological orienta
tion of America for at least two decades.

SELECTED REFERENCES
PRU1ARY SOURCES
The principle source materials for this work were:
State, Foreign Relations of the

Uni~ed

States:

Department of

Diplomatic Papers, 1944,

VI, China (Washington, D.C., 1967); and 1945, VII, The Far East:
(Washington, D.C., 1969).

China

Although these two volumes contain the predom

inant amount of diplomatic correspondence and documents on China, some
relevant material had previously been printed in Department of State,
United States

R~lations

with China 'tlith ~cial

194449l!.9· (Hushington, D. C., 1949).

White Paper t

I,

,-Jas

Refe~ence

to the Pe.!'iod,

This latter. publication, tht? "China

pub1:tshed in 1949 in an attempt to explain the develop

ments in China leading to the Cm:amunist takeover of that year.

It \olas,

therefore, lacking somewhat in its coverage of the role Hurley had played
in the last two years of the war.
Of related use, though they were referred to for information indi-·
rect1y related to Hurley's role in China, were the Department of State
publications:

Foreig~

Relations of the United States:

Diplomatic Papers:

The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943 (Washington, D.C., 1961); and
The Conferences at

}~lta

and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C., 1955).

Of considerable interest was Hurley's terltimony in the hearings on
The Military Situation in the Far East before the Committee on Armed Ser
vices and the Committee on Foreign Relations, 82nd Congress, 1st Session
(Washington, D.C., 1951).

v.1hile Hurley's testimony offered considerable

insight to his view of events, the reader must be aware that the
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ex-ambassador's perception was clouded by what had by then become an id
eological crusade.

It may have been this that motivated Hurley's biograph

er (Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley [Chicago, 1956],) to avoid mentioning
this final Hurley testimony.
Of greater significance was Hurley's testimony before the Senate
Investigatio~

Foreign Relations Committee's
lished] (Washington:
3045.

of Far Eastern Policy [unpub

National Archives), Decimal File Number 120.1/11.

These hearings, conducted very soon after Hurley resigned, were held

to determine whether or not a full investigation of the Department of State
was in order.

Hurley's testimony showed clearly the vagueness of the ex

ambassador's charges, and his unwillingness to cooperate when, finally,
he refused to go into executive session where the contents of the documents,
which would purportedly substantiate his arguments, were to be examined.
For the student interested in pursuing Hurley's career to a greater
extent, a task which has not yet been accomplished, the Patrick J. Hurley
Collection, Bizzeel

Library~

Manuscript Division, University of Oklahoma,

would be an invaluable source.

Unfortunately, that collection was closed

to other than Russel D. Buhite, Professor of History at the University of
Oklahoma, when an attempt was made to do research there in the summer of
1970.
The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, at Hyde Park, New York, would al
so reveal a considerable amount on Hurley if the student could travel there.
Some material in this work did come from the Roosevelt Collection, thanks
to the cooperation of Associate Professor Jim Heath, Portland State Univer
sity, \",ho devoted part of his valuable time to search for some pertinent
information at the Hyde Park Library in the summer of 1970.
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Some very valuable insights to Hurley's personal ideological in
volvement in the Communist-Kuomintang negotiations are to be found in
David D. Barrett's remembrances, Dixie Mission:

The United States Army

Observer Group in Yenan, 1944 (Berkeley, 1970).
Also from Berkeley came the very willing and gracious remarks of
John Stewart Service, who must surely be tired of answering questions
pertaining to his role in China.

Unfortunately, the time spent with

Service was extremely limited, though well spent indeed.

Any study of

Hurley's role in China is incomplete and v1ill continue to be so until
Mr. Service sees his way clear to publish his ow11 me:lloirs.

A great deal

can be learned, however, from his testimony before the United States
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations' State
gation13"'"-(Hash±ngton, D.C., 1950).

Departl~el~!-oya..!Si.

Investi

Because of the e}.tcmt of that testi

mony and the limited nature of this work, only the actual documents
written by Service in China, his 1970 interview statements and his Nov
ember, 1970 personal letter to the author, were cited in this Hork.
Of secondary interest are personal works which were of but slight
value to this paper.

General Albert C. Wedemeyer's Wedemeyer

(New York, 1958), and Dean Acheson's Present at the Creation:

R~orts!

My Years

in the State Department (New York, 1969), would be of value for a more
comprehensive account of the whole China situation after 1944.

But for

purposes of examining Hurley's activities, both are of limited value.
same might be said of the Stilwell
ranged by Theodore H. w'hite.

P~ers

The

(New York, 19q8), edited and ar

Extremely superficial relative both to his

complete works and to his relationship with Hurley during the period of
principle focus in this work, Stilwell's edited papers do provide the.
reader with a clear indication of why he was called "Vinegar Joe," to say
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nothing of the opinions he held of Chiang Kai-shek.
That portion of this work which briefly outlined Roosevelt's dip
lomacy-by-personal-representative was based in part on a previous seminar
paper enti.tled "To the Hurley Mission in China:

A Case Study in Roose

veltian World War II Diplomacyl1 (Portland State University, July 29, 1970),
which used, in addition to many sources cited herein, Cordell Hull's Hemairs (New York, 1948).

An Examination of Hull's Memoirs clearly shows

----

.

the degree to which the Secretary of State's responsibilities were chan
neled more in the direction of creating the structure for a post-war in
ternational peace-keeping organi.zation than toward traditional diplomatic
activity.

Also clear in this work are his and other's opinions about

Roosevelt's use of personal diplomatic representatives and the President's
n~~

of,the'··State

DeI~artment

"vhen it came to informing the Department

of these representatives' activities around the world (see:

Ibid., II,

1585).
Though not cited in this paper, Harry S Truman's

Memoir~,

Volume I,

(New York, 1955), are of value to the student interested in the difficulties
Truman faced following Roosevelt's death, and the implications this had on
China and the policy there--a policy which had been formed primarily in
Roosevelt's mind and was transmitted in garbled form to the new President
by Hurley "through the equally uninformed Secretary of State Stettinius.
SECONDARY SOURCES
The most comprehensive account of Hurley's activities in China to
date is to be found in R.T. Smith's "Alone in China:

Patrick J. Hurley's

Attempt to Unify China, 1944-1945" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation,
University of Oklahoma, 1966).

The predominant amount of Smith's material
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came directly from the Hurley Collection at the University of Oklahoma.
He focused to a great extent on the actual negotiations between the Com
munist Chinese and the Kuomintang representatives, and Hurley's involve
ment therein.

He unfortunately did not have the benefit of the Foreign

Relations volumes on China for the years 1944-1945.

He was, therefore,

unable to examine the great number of reports submitted by Service,
Davies and other Foreign Service officers in China, other than those
which Hurley had retained in his personal files.

His account suffered

as well, from the unavailability of documents relating to internal State
Department attempts to formulate a reasonable China policy.

Nor did he

have the benefit of such insights as those provided by Barrett, relating
to Hurley's inclusion of a bill of rights into the Communist Five-Point
Prtrposal coneluded· at Yenan in' November, 19411.
Herbert Feis' China Tangle:

The American Effort in China from

Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton, 1953 [Atheneum 1965 re
print used herein]), is without question the most comprehensive coverage
of wartime China diplomacy.

Published prior to the printing of the For

eign Relations 1944-1945 volumes, Feis had been granted the privilege of
having prior access to the archival material.

But because of the compre

hensive nature of his work, Feis devoted little space to the deep-seated
conflicts between Hurley and the Department of State personnel.

"The

main seams of the terrain of difference between Hurley and the Foreign Ser
vice officers," were "briefly traced" by Feis in a total of five pages (see:
Ibirl,"

260-264).

The one incident expanded upon was that \vhich developed

after the Atcheson telegram of February 28, 1945 (see:

Ibid., 268).

Relative to these t\VO very excellent accounts, this paper may be
considered to have combined and expanded upon the information they both
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provided, with material which has since become available.

In addition

to the primary sources cited above, several related secondary sources
were, in thAt respect, of added value.

Barbara Tuchman's Stillwell and

the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (New York, 1971), in spite of
its incomplete documentation and general classification as "popular his
tory," is the best, most comprehensive account of Stilwell's life, and,
in

particul~r,

his experiences as the Commander of American Forces in

China until his recall in 1944.

James HacGregor Burns' Roosevelt:

The

Soldier of Freedom, 1940-1945 (New York, 1970) might also be classified
a "popular history" but offers, nevertheless, a valuable contribution to
the study of Roosevelt's life during the war years.

Burns' work tends to

substantiate that of Gaddis Smith, in his American Diplomacy During the
Second World War, 1941-1945 (New York, 1967), which develops the theory
that the Department of State was reduced to the subordinate task of creat
ing a structure for the future United Nations Organization.
Again, Feis must be credited with having written the most comprehen
sive account of world diplomacy during the war, in his Churchill, Roosevelt,
and Stalin:

The War They Waged and the Peace They

Sough~

(Princeton, 1967),

His account, combined with Charles F. Romanus and William Sunderland's
Stilwell's Mission to China (Washington, D.C., 1953),

Stil~ell's

Command

Problems (Washington, D. C., 1955), and Time Runs Out in C. B. I '. (Washington,
D.C., 1959), and Smith's American Diplomacy, provides an accurate account
of Roosevelt's intent to make China a Great Power following the war and the
gradual frustration of that policy by a China which did not live up to the
Pres::!.dent I s expectations.

William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason I s The

Undeclared War, 1940-41 (New York, 1953), contributes to an understanding
of Roosevelt's early desire to end world colonialism, and therefore
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complements the five accounts cited immediately above.
The weakest portions of this and all other works which deal with
Hurley are those relating to the man's complete life.

There have been

two biographies written on Hurley, one by Parker LaMoore, Pat Hurley:
The Story of an American (New York, 1932), the other by Don Lohbeck,
Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago, 1956), both of which were politically moti
vated polemics and of little use to the scholar, except for general in
formation.

Additional material may be found in two sketches of Hurley,

both of which were quite superficial.

George Milburn's "Mr. Hoover's

Stalking Horse," (American Mercury, XXVI, No. 103 [July, 1932], 257),
was a rather cynical review of Hurley's life and activities leading
to his appointment as Undersecretary of Defense by Hoover.

Combined

with a sket:ch in Who Was Who in America (Chicago, 1968, IV [1961-1968],
477, Lohbeck's and Milburn's works offer enough information for a work
of this nature.

The task is left, hO"lever, for a more complete and ob

jective accounting of Patrick J. Hurley's life and experiences, with par
ticular reference to the effect he had on the ideological orientation of
the nation after 1950.

Appendix 1.

Memorandum: A Partial Examination of One AsPect of the !vtany Gross
Errors Contained in Tne Amerasia Papers.
From:

John S. Service

Date:

September 18, 1970
A few months ago (in February, 1970), the Internal Security

Subcommittee, with the help of Dr. Anthony Kubek as editor,
published a massive tviO-volume compendium entitled The Amerasia
Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China.
good clue to the theme.

The title offers a

It is an elaborate attempt to breathe

new life into many of .the charges of Senator Joseph J:.!cCarthy and
the China Lobby.

Except for some re search schol6.r s ("';\'ho welcomed

the publication of documentary materials on the period) and publi
cists in Taiwan (who expressed opinions I'unning the gamut from
"a turning pOii,t in hi story" to "a book of the centt<ry"), the book
deservedly attracted little notice.
However, on August 21, 1970, the Government Printing Office
jn it s biweekly bullE: tin S8~~~~ed United state s ~-0 vel'nment_~~~~:~_~
tions carried--fOl' this nOl'mally austere and straitla.ced sheet--a
surprisingly flamboyant and imaginative notice.

---------.------------------
THE AMt::rV\.SIA PflPE::RS: A CLUE TO TH~ CATAS·
TP-OP:iEOF CIiIf'It'\. ThEse documents read like a spy Ihlillcr, but
is all the more interesting because it is true. They contain hundreds
of official doclJm~nts, many hitherto l!l1pu;;lished, which reflect abun
dantly the tragic errors in the Far Eastern pone}, of th~ Ul1ited Sta:~s
Government in the closing months of \'foTid War II. The sfory of what
happened to China prior t~, during, and jmlil~diately fJllcwing World
War II is the subject of a number of len£lhy historical studies, Oile
of which was the work of the aullNr of these documents. Thst story.
hi brid, reHews as Part t of this introduct:on. P.rt II treats tlil con
trov~rsiJl CilSd of Amer.'!sia ma;:azine, or "C~Sl of lila Six" as it
was called in the newspa~~rs ill INS wh~n six American ,iU::er.s l'I..:r~
suddenly ~m;;ted on C~I!rZ3S of conspiring ttl '<lmrnit esrionaf'~' oild
Part 111 pre~en!$ an an~ly~js of ~ome of Ihl! dccumeflt~. herein pUll
fished in Tull t~d. wilich w',re written i,1 19.t3-1SIS rs \lindal uis
patch€.5 by one of t:le ~rrc:it[d siJ: t John ~tC'1'jar~ Su.,ic..:., th~n a ;J>jun&
career diplo'nat on ~iaticn in Cll!;.a.

3!JN.
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'l'hc GPO bulletin obviously has a very '....ide circule,tion.

its appcf•. rance) I have been deluged
friend..ly and not so friendly.

~lith

inquiries from

i'3.!'

Sir.ce
and near,

People ask, What is this aJ 1 about?-

Does it contaln nel'l material on the case?--Hhy is it being reopened
after bventy-five years?

It is understandable that questlons are

directed to me, since I am the only person mentioned by name in the.
blUl'b.

In this respect (but in very few others), the GPO advertisement
is accurate.

Tr.e book does, indeed, seem to concentrate on me as

its main target.

As Dr. Kubek puts it:

His central role in the strange case of the purloined Govern
ment-papers:rests on the i.ntegral fact that Ser:vicewasthe-
author of so many of the documents .·,hich turned up in the New
York office of an ardent Communist sympathizer in 1945. The
content of these documents may prove, hO'llever, to be of even
greater i!11portance to the historical record than the fact that
they were s·tolen, because herejn the fall of China to Communi sm
was anticipated E'~d espoused. (Page 70: emphasis added. All
references are to-The~rasia Papers unless otherwise noted.)
Lest it be thought that I am irrnrodestly jumping to conclusions,
. here·:;.-brief'ly--is' what Dr. Kubek 1',.as done.

He has carefully studied

923 tlnon-personaltl documents turned over to the Subcommittee by the
Justice Depa..·. tme.I:t. Of' the se, he has selected 315 ('~more than a.
third") as signif'icant enough to warrant' publication.

And of the se

315, a fthundred-odd" (about a third of the total publishedl were
originally vrritten by me.
Each has been chosen for at least one special reason--its
source, its classification when known, its innate interest of
content, or its diplomatic significance. The last reason is,
of cour ze, the mo::.t important. Among the 315 different docu
ments to be published here, therefore, the hundred-odd items
from the pen of John Stewart Service that were recovered in
the Amerasia seizures are by far the most vital. (p. 71)
Of course I was not the only officer reporting as an individual
from China..

There vlere several Foreign Service Officers attached,

as I was, to the Army; others vlere scattered around the country by
the Err.bassy to observe and report.

From the mass of material avail

able, Dr. Kube3{ has made the folloydng selection:

3
8
7
5
5
5
3

E.E. Rice
E .1" • Drunll.' 5.ght

R.M.

Seryi~e

J.K. Penfield
R.S. l-18.l'd

J.K. Emmerson
P.D. Sprouse
R.P. I;udclen
O.E. Clubb
J.P. Davies
A.R. Ring,.,ralt
J.S. Service

2

2

2
1

1
101
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for eleven other experienced and
-capable Foreign Service reporters in China as against my 101. The
Embassy at Chungking \-las a large and comprehensive reporting organi
This comes out to a total of

zation s.nd certainly the principal source of information on China
reaching the Department of State. Only 30 of its reports are in
cluded, only 6 .from the important Consulate at Kunming, and only
12 documents i"rom the whole State Department. It is preposterous
to pretend
that I was that much more prolific or that my
reports had that much more "interest of content" and "diplomatic
s:l.e,uificance. " Some. of Dr . Kubek I s strains in build:ing up my total
will be discussed later.
To prepar'e the reader for the documents he has selected, Dr.
Kubek has contributed a 113-page Introduction. This has three parts:
a historical survey of' Kuomintang-Communist rela,tions, an account
of the Amerasia case, and an analysis of the ItAmerasia documents"
published.

The 30-page historical survey reaches John Davies, John

Service, et al, on page 22 and thereafter "Kuomintang-Communist re
lations" are largely ignored. I share the peroration with John
Davies:
••. the ha~ds at the control levers were those of a few young
men on diplo~~tic duty in China. What John Paton Davies and
John Stm·rart Service '\olere writing in their official reports
was of the greatest importance at the time. They were at the
scene as expert observers, and their despatches from China
contained opinion wh.ich was accepted as gospel in the Depart
ment of state. The slanted words of the career diplomats re
leased the stefu~) therefore, to reverse the wheels at this
juncttrre ~~d ch~~ge the direction of United States policy in
the Far East. (p. 30)

4
. . John Davies 'Vlas not, of course, involved in the Amerasia case.
So I clea:r:ly outshine him in Dr. Kubek I s
case.

~Q-.page

discussion of the

In fact, I even outdo Jaffe, ''''ho pleaded guilty, a,.t'Jd tar sen,

who pleaded nolo contendere.

Tvlelve pages seem to be devoted ,.,holly

to me, and I re ceive promi.nent mention on at least eight others.
Dr. Kubek tu:rns next to an analysj.s of the Amerasia "collection
as a whole."

He 'oJ'arns his readers that I 'Was not the onlr source

of document s reaching the "mysterlous network" of Amerasla.
While it has been emphasized that the hundred-odd documents
from the pen of John StevIal·t Service comprise the most
significant segment of the 315 items published in these
volumes, the reader ,.,ill readily recognize many other docu
ments to be highly impo~tant not only because of their source
but because of their content as well. (p. 7l{)
The 2lh documents not credited to me are then dealt with in 5 pages,
in which only 17 documents are specifically mentioned. By contrast,
Dr. Kubek devote s 26 page s to my report s, with ::;pecific mention of

68 of them.
Actually, the .point need not be made sts.tistically: Dr. Kubek
himself is quite direct---and insistent •
••• the one whose importance to these -volumes is paramount.
This person was John stewart Service. (p. 36)
••• the hundred-odd items from the pen of John stewart Service .••
are by far the most vital. (p. 71)
••• the hundred-odd documents from the pen of John Stewart
Service coreprise the most significant segment •.. (p. 74)
His fifty-odd reports from the Communist base ..• are by far
the most important documents in these volumes. (p. 86)
_For the busy reader, who has no time to wade through an un
avoidably rather lengthy discussio:., let me say, therefc>re, that
there is in fact nothing new in this ponderous effort of Dr. Kubek
and the Internal Security SUbcommittee--except that my peripheral
involvement in the Amerasia

~ase

has, after a lapse of twenty-five

5
years, been mi:-aculously metamorphosed into the "central role. If
If the reader is interested in the histury of
"rill not :!'ind it in The Amerada Payers.

~he

case itself, he

The authoritative source

is still the transcript and report of the Tydings Committee, published
by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in July, 1950.

*'

*

it-

*

Before examining how Dr. Kubek tries to achieve this remarkable
transformation, it may be more convenient to deal firsJ(. with his
second general charge (see first quotation on page :!::), concerning "the
content of the documents."
Dr. Kubek's concept j.s baffling in Hs simplicity.

Using,

and going beyond, the more extravagant statements of Hurley's extreme
late period, he essentially reduces American policy in China to un
limited support of Chiang Kai-shek.

Ergo,. to l'eport information

critical of the Chiang regime is to "oppose and subvert" American
policy.

And to foresee the failure of the Nationalist government

is to "espouse"

'.j..

1", •

Furthermore, the IDe:re submissfon of these re

port's v:as fated to becc;ne the direct cause vf "the fall of

Chi~1a ;.t~

But that is not all!
Just as these documents of W'orld War II provide a clue to the
catastrophe that befell China a few yea:r slater, so vlill The
~merasia Papers te seen to pertain irresistibly to the present
perplexities of American policy in the Far East.
When the United States umdttingly assisted the wrong side in
gain'ing control of China proper, Korea and Vietnam became in
evitable involvements for the nation that had to assume the
mantle of leadership in the free world. History will set it
dOvm as simply as that. (p. 113)
Not all scholars of the period will accept h:istory as betng
quite as simple as that.

And if they do,. argument--or even friendly

persuasio,n--is proba.bly wasted.

One thing that can be said, if

Dr. Kubek is correct, is that there has never been a higher testi
monial to the potency of Foreign Service reporting.

, Dr. Kubet's line of logic has--for him--certain clear advantages.
Since his real concern is vlhat pe alleges to be the effect of the
repo:rts, the actual conter.t of each report has no relevance except
as it may contain something which Dr. Kubek considers to be deroga
tory to the Kuom:i.ntang or favorable to the Communists.

Thus it is

6
entirely \umecessary for him to confront the question of the truth
or fa.lsity of the information reported, or to deal wH.h the broader
issue of the validity wId value of the reporting, either as helpful
to

tmderstanding of the contemporary situation, or a projection

~~

of likely future events and trends und their probable impact on the
long-ra.n;:;e interests of the United states.

This confrontation, it

may be noted, is conspicuously absent.
There are other advant.ages.

vlhat some scholars might consider

to be si.gnificant agreement regarding the situation in China by
isolat,ed reporting officers scattered allover that large country
need not, again, be related to the question of whether this une.nimity
might indicate something about the validity of the reporting.

On

the contrary, to Dr. Kubek i t is only suggestive of conspiracy.
Other questions can also be ignored if one is "'illing to
follmv Dr.

Kub~k

t

s circumscribed and predestined way.

nature of Foreign Service

reportin~,

of Foreign Service officers?

What is the

and what are the responsibilities

Ho'" is American foreign pol icy actually

made) and i'lhat shctlld the. role. of American public opi.nion be?

vlhat

part rr.ay have been played by the five or six hundred million people
of China in reviev;ing "the mandate of Heavenf!?

Should they have

been permitted (by us) to express and exercise that mandate?

And

so on.

*

* *

* *

Moving back to the first segment of Dr. Kubek I s charges, we
start dealing with things a bit more tangible.

My "central role"

in the Amerasia case, he says, rests on "the integral fact" that I
was the author of "so many" of the "purloined Government papers"
seized in the possession of Amerasia.

Dr. Kubek lays a foundation

by insistently drumming into the head of his reader three points:
a)

that all the documents ",hich he discusses E'..nd which are
publisheu in The Amerasia Papers were found by the FBI in
th(;; vffices of Amerasia magazine;

b)

that they ,;ere all official government documents "'"hich
had been stolen fron. the United States government; and

7
c)

that a

V<2.!';f

large numbe:c--"a hundxed-odd"--of these "pilfered

••• classified U.S. Government docun:ents" i'Tere drafted by me.
Thus one reads:

Dr. Kubek has examined some 1.700 Government documents seized
on Jun~ G, 19!f5, by the Feder~,l Bureau of Investigation from
the office of Amerasia.

(p. iii)

More than 300 of these stolen Yiartime documents i.;ill be found
in full text in the page s which follo'll. (p. iii)
Since all the documents published herein were recovered by the
FBI at the time of the spectacular arrest, these volumes are
entitled The Amerasia Paper s. (p. 2)
In March of 1945--special agents of the Office of strategic
Services made a midnight raid on the headquarters of the little
magazine. Here .•• were literally hundreds cf classified U.S.
Government docum2nts •.. almost a hundred bore the signature of
of John SteHart Service.... (p. 30)
••. the fact that they were stolen.

(p. '(0)

The prec:eding parts of the Introduction are to be regarded,
therefore, as background for the reader's personal study of
the recovered Amerasia papers themselves. (p. 70)
••• the hundred-odd items from the pen of John Stewart Service
that yrere recovered in the Amerasia seizures. (p. 71)
•.• the rich variety'of materials that Amerasia editors received
during Horld ,\-Tar II from their secret sources within the Federal
Government. (p. 73)
In no way, of course, does the date of a document indicate just
\-rhen the Amerasia people first sa',' it, but it may properly be
assumed ~hat the earliest were perhap8 among the first to be
pilfered. (p. 73)
The next documents from the pen of John SteYlart Service to turn
up in the knerasia collection were his field reports. . . . (p. 86)

8
Classification refers to the classificc.Uon noted at the time
the document "Has obtained from the Amerasia offices.... (p. 115)

Dr. Kubek recognizes that in the case of one document, No. 315,
he has a problem.
Since Se:.rvice 'Has making comment here en an article appearing
in the NC"l York Times the day before, his memorandum could
hardly have been either misdated or post-dated. It is possible,
therefore, that this document was never in the actual possession
of Amerasia, and that it ended up in the Department of Justice
simply because it 'Has among the papers confiscated by the F'BI
from Service's desk at the State Department at the time of
his arrest. (p. 112)
Only" skeptics /' he goes on, could wish to consider that this might
be the case with more than this single document.

But to confuse

even the skeptics, he concludes that it is "not really important ...
exactly how many documents Service passed--or how many documents
comprised the total "Thich Jaffe received from his network of sources"
(which j.s hal'dly the point Dr. Kubek started out to discuss).
It so happens that the actual number of my reports of which
copies were found in Amerasia has been no mystery since July, 1950.
That is ",!hen the 'I'ydings Subcommittee (of the Senate Foreign Rela
tions Conunittee) published the whole transcript of my lengthy hear
ings before the Department of State Loyalty Security Board in Pal't 2,
Appendix, of its own state Depal"tment Employee IJoyalty Investigation.
The e.ctual number--a matter of public record for twenty years--was

41.

Not "one hundred-odd."
While I am on the subject, testimony before the Loyalty Sec'L:.ri.ty

Board, and in the Tydings Subcommittee hearings, established a number
of facts about these reports:
a)

None of them was in a form that could have come from me.

b)

A number of them showed the fingerprints or bore the hand
'\olTiting of E.S. Larsen--who was indicted and eventually
pleaded nolo contendere.

c)

All of the doc'L:.ments had been routed to the section in the
State

d)

Depart~ent ~here

Larsen was working.

l.a1'ser, had admitted giving some of the reports to Jaffe,

9
and

"lUS

an inconsistent a.'1d cha.!lgeable witness regal"ding

9thers--ev2n concel'ning documents vlhlch he vIas kno,'ffi to
have given to Jaffe.
Dr. Kubek notes (correctly) that by official, "routine" a,pproval

of the U. S. Army headquarter s in -Chungking (for who!r. the report s
were v~itten)~ I had in 1~' possession personal copies of the memoranda
I had prepared d-uring the Yenan period.

He fails to note that I

had also personally acquired and collected what

vlUS,

at that time

in the United state s, probably e, unique collection of recent reseal"ch
materials deal ing w-ith the Chinese Communist movement: publications,
reports, speeches, notes of interviews, et cetera. There was, of
course, nothing secret or improper about this attempt to find out
all I could about the Chinese Communists: it had been !r~ principal
assigned official duty for a long time. All of these research
materials v/ere kept with the persona.l copies of my memoranda in my
desk at the State Department.

After my arrest, the entire contents

of my desk--personal copies of memoranda, research materials, personal
corraspo.ndence, address books, memos to myself--,'cere taken by the
FBI.

It was not long, however, before the Department of Justice

conceded that none of these materials were government property or
taken from official files, and that they were all my personal and
private papers. Accordingly, the Department of Justice very punc
tiliously returned them all to me--personally.
Fortunately, the Department of J-ustice was courteous enough
to provide a list of these personal papers that were taken and then
returned. Furthermore, so that I could be interrogated on them,
the Loyalty Security Board provided a list of my reports of which
copies were actually found in Amerasia. vllien these two lists are
compared vlith Dr. Kubek's so-called "Amerasia papers," some quite
interesting facts are revealed.
Sixty-nine of the documents which he selects to print were
never

an;~rwhere

near Amerasia.

They are purely and simply (if

those are the right words) lifted from my personal papers. The
Department of .rustice may have been proper and punctilious about
returning the originals to me, but it appears t'hat somebody thought

10

it might. come in handy to keep copies.
At one point in his Introdu(!t.ion, Dr. Kl.lbek claims that the
editors of Amerasia he,d obtained:
••. many translations of basic doctrinary pr'onouncements
of the Chinese Commun:i.sts .... In other words, the Amerasia
editors ,,;ere receiving grist of every sort, size, and
textu.re for the mill they .;ere operating in New York. (pp. 71-72)
This is a wonderfully graphic picture.

Apparently to help drive

home the point, Dr. Kubek prints a total of fifteen of these "doc
trinary pronouncements"--"t"hich t1.lrn out mainly to be wartime ,vritings
by Mao Tse-tilllg and Liu Shao-ch'i.

But it happens that all fifteen

are among the sixty-nine documents just mentioned that Vlere never
near Amerasia.

They all come from my personal papers--in this case

my research collection.
Some questions are suggested.' Dr. Kubelc tells us repeatedly
that he is concerned with stolen govel'maent document s, of diplomatic
and security significance.
here?

What, then are these papers doing in

Mao Tse-tung's Vlell-kno.m "InvGstlgation cf the Rural Village"

and J,iu Shao.-ch I i I sold stenc1by "On Self··CultivD.t:5.on" are not cle.ssi
fied, not stolen, not U, S. government documents, and not reports of
diplomatic significance.

Even if they had been found in Amerasia

(,,-,hicb in thif: case they I':ere not), so what?
magaz~ne

Amerasia was a specialist

:i.n Far Eastern affalrs ",ith a particular interest in China.

I

"iliat [scholar of modern China would not be c>..--pected to have in hi s
libra~y these basic materials, and others such as Mao's Selected

Works.

Does not Dr. Kubek, himself, have these publications in his

possersion or readily ava:i.lable?

It is hard, therefore, to see any

reasop for their inclusion here except to provide a suggestively
prejudicial stage-setting, The reader apparently is intended to
v!sutize a Communist magazine busily collecting Comnunist publica
tions! from a mysterious network of "pro-Communist ll conspirators
Withih the government.
here

fS

I suggest that the only thing mysterious

t

the naivt!te of Dr. Kubek, or his expectations of gullibility

on the pa:l:t of his audlence.

±come next

to an interesting group of thirty-one documents

among those selected by Dr, Kubek.

As printea., all thirty-one are

11

fro~

my

personal papers.

But the material contained in each of

them, thov.gh in somew'hat different form, actually
the Amerasia office.

,,,as

found in

The int(;resting CJ..uestion~ of course, is the

reason for this seemingly illogical choice.

Wny use a copy of a

report from my personal file, when another copy of the same report
was available from .:hat may. legitimately be called "Amerasia papers"?
I have some thuughts on this, .but they may come more logically at
a. later poj.nt.
And then, finally, Dr. Kubek has printed fifteen of my reports
which do not come from rr:y ovm personal papers.

These actually did

come from among the "Amerasia papers."
To summarize, among the 315 documents published in The Amerasia
Papers, a total of at least 115 are tied to me by authorshfp or were
a part of my personal research collection.

69 were from

n~

Of this 115 documents,

personal papers and were not in Amera,sia in any

form; 31 were n~ personal copies although the same material was in
Amerasia in a different form; 15 were from Amerasia.
. documents as printed are from my personnl papers.

Thus, 100

This makes Dr. Kubek' s

dismissal of "skeptics" seem perl1aps a bit disingenuous--sincc the
skept:i.cs cleaxly win by a score of 100 to 15.

Nor 0.0 I find it

possible to agree with Dr. Kubek that. the matter "is not really
important. "
One th:i.ng that obviously is' of importance to Dr. Kubek is to
build up the number of my reports.

This makes it difficult for him

to a.dhere to his otm standards for selection:
Each ~ocument publishe~ has been chosen for at least one
special reason--its source, its classification .rhen kno-..n,
'its innate interest of content, or its diplomatic significance.
The last reason is, of course, the most significant. (p. 71)
So far as reports by me '.rere concerned, diplomatic significance
apparently inclucled:
a request fcr travel orders,
an incomi:Jlete and abandoned draft of a memorandum,
very br:i.ef, sketchy outlines of contemplated but never v.Titten
memoranda

(5)" (How ciid unwritten memoranda help to

accomplish "the fall of China"?)
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brief, routine trclJlsmission of texts of nevIS broadcasts (3),
similar routine transmission of nevlSpnpers (at least 3).
strangely, my systematic collection and fori.;arding of Yenan newspaper s
seems to have been one thing that particula.l'ly upsets Dr. Kubek!
Service employed every device in the arsenal of propaganda ...•
One of his favorite method.s vlaS to deliver voluminous rr.aterials
from the Yenan daily newspaper, the Chieh ~'ang Jih Paa. • .• (p. 98)
'The research and informational value of this type of material hardly
needs emphasis to scholars.

Personally, I was rather pleased vlith

being able to obtain and forward the complete back file of this
important and hitherto unavailable Party newspaper.

And, as I

pointed out in my first transmitting memorandum: "The Chieh JPang Jih
Pao is probably of greatest value because it is a publicity and
propaganda organ of the Communist ;Party."

(Emphasis in the originaL)

Indeed, it appears (with one exception) that every single
piece of paper written by me, or attributable to me, that could be
found either in Amerasia or among my personal papers, has been selected
by Dr. Kubek for inclusion as an importa.'1t and diplomatically sig

nificant document.

If one could accept this evaluation with a

straight face, it would seem that no field reporter has ever before
had such a high batting average.

It is an accolau.e which, under

the circumstances, I decline.
The solitary exception--the only memorandum not selected by
Dr. Kubek--was my memorandum No. 5, written from Ch1.mgking in February,

1945 , entitled "Chinese Feeler s Regarding Formosa."

It reported

the concern of some responsible non-Communist Chinese in Chungking
that the national Government v7as not adequately prepared to take
over the a&linistration of Formosa (Taiwan) immediately after the
Japanese surrender.

In view of the record of events in Taiwan during

the first t.,O years of Nationalist administration, one wonders why
this report vras not considered to have some interest of content and
diploma.tic significance.
One v:ay tha.t my total is increased is by duplicate printing
of tlr!O of rrry memoranda.

In each case, the basic memorandum (from

my personal papers) is printed alone.

Then it is reprinted as an

enclosure to a transmitting Army report (from Amerasia).

It seems

reasonable to assume l ho,-rever, that anything so bi.earre i.s more
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B.kely to be the result of editorial ove:.--sight than consciolls intent.
There is another vlay in which the total is. given the appearance
of being increased.

Here is an exenrJ)le out of a group.

In the

bona fide "Amerasia papers" there '{e.s a copy of an Embassy despatch
which transmitted and
at Yenan.

6n a lIlcrcloranlhl'f1l "'hich I had prepared

c0Jill1ent~d

Among the per conal paper s from

file copy of that memorandUlil.

m~l

de sk, there

~{as

my

For reasons not apparent, Dr. Kubek

first prints the memorandum .from my personal file and then, at a,
considerably later point, the transmitting Embassy despatch from
Amerasia.

Since the headings for both documents make prominent

mention of "report from John S. Service," the umlary reader can
hardly be blamed for feeling inundated by Service reports.
at least the editor does not--as

i~

But

the paragraph abcve--reprint

the memorandum .itself for a second time.
Several pages ago, I mentioned that Dr. Kubek laid a founda
tion for his allegation of my centrality in the Amel'asia case by
three much-repeated

~ssertations:

(1)

that he is offering his

readers only' documents found iIl Amerasia; (2) that; they were all
documents stolen from the U.S. eovernment.; and (3) that. a hundred-odd
of thesE' stolen official documents were

dr~fted

by me.

It is now

amply clear that the first assertation is false: so far as documents
related to me are concerned, the pverwhelming majority were never
anywhere near Amerasia.

The second assertion is like-yrise false:

most of the papers he is talking about were not official documents,
were never in any official file, and were not stolen--they were,
in fact, my personal papers.
his third allegation.

Not much ts left, by this point, of

Dr. Kubek does indeed, by some !emarkable

exertions, put together one hundred pieces of paper originally drafted
by me; but the majority, being nothing more than

u~

personal papers,

were never :In Amerasia and thus have no relation to the Amerasia
case.
One would like to be able to conclude that Dr. Kubek had made
a simple mistake in treat.ing my personal papers and research materials
as having been seized in the Amerasia office.
Y..nOHS

But Dr. Kubek obviously

the record; and he could hardly be that simple.

The elaborate
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ms.nner in which he has prepared £lnu repea.ted these allegations
makes H clear ~ instead, t.hat !,he Amerasia ?apers is an attempt
at fraudulent deception of the readel'.

*

*

*

*

One might leave the matter at this point--but Dr. Kubek does
not.

'1'0 buttress his allegation that I played a central role in

the Amerasia case, he goes beyond the !!these-are-all-stolen-government
documents!! ploy in several important ways:
a)

doubt is cast on the number of memoranda which I loaned
to Jaffe;

b)

it is then suggested that "many" documents were fldelivered fl
by me to Jaffe; and finally,

c)

the record is ignored and distorted to suggest non-existent
mystery and official laxity in the prosecution of the case.

I have, of course, al'-lays ackno\-/ledged that I permitted Jaffe
to read and to retain for a time in his possession eight to ten
of my personal copies of descriptive reportorial memoranda which
I had.v.'ritten 5.n

China~-

••• 1 went through ray personal copies of n,y Yenan memoranda
and selected. several--I think about 8 or lO--whl.ch were
purely d<esc:riptive and did not conta:i,n discussl.on of American
m:ili tary or political policy. These I considered it \-lOuld be
appropriate to allov! Jaffe, as a writer on China, to see •••
These personal copies I refer to, and from among which I
allowed Jaffe to see selected ones of a descriptive nonpolicy
nature, were some of my file copies of memoranda \-/hich I had
written in China over my own signature, recording my own ob··
servations a~d conversations as a reporter. They did not rep
resent, nor purport to represent, the views of the Embassy,
the Army, or the Department of state. They bore only the un
official classification which I placed on them when I wrote
them, a classification \-lhich by this time was of no significance
since the information contained in them had been extensively
reported by American nei{Spaper correspondents who had visited
the Co~~nist areas. They were not removed from any official
files; they had never been in official files.
It was not U!1usuaJ. to allow \-rriters to have access to this
type of factual material for background purposes, r:ince reading
the materiel or taking notes on it "las always more satisfactory
from the vie'v:point of accuracy than merely relying on one's
memory and ore.l recitation. (Service testimony before the Tydings
Committee. State Dep~'tment EJPIOyee Loyalty Investigation
L?ereafter
pp. 1272-1273.

T17,
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.As alrea.dy noted, I had. offic:i.al permission to retain these

personal copies, and kept them in rr:y ctesk at the St.ate Department.
i'hey bore no official classificatiop.., vTere never part of the state
Department or any other government files, and lending them to a
journalist was not a violation of law

(thou&~

admittedly--particularly

with the benefit of hindsight--unwise and indiscTeet).

FurthermoTe,

the papers vTere loaned: not "supplied," "delivered," or "passed."
They vJere all returned by Jaffe to me, a..'1d no reproductlons or copies
were found in Amerasia.

The record is more than amply clear on these

points.

Mr. HITCHCOCK.

The personal copies which Service admitted
lending to Jaffe never were part of the state Department files.
(Testimony of Mr. Robert M. Hitchcock before the Tydings Committee,
V!8.y 26, 1950, llJ.T, Hitchcock ~"as spectal assistant to the Attorney
Genera.l in 1945 and in direct charge of the prosecution of the
Amerasia case, TT, p. 1008)
Senator TYDINGS. Now, if Service had given Jaffe his own personal
cop:i.es, vlould he have violat.ed any injunction of secrecy as to
state Department documents?
Mr. HI1.'CHCOCK. To my knowledge he would have vi olated no lavT
whatsoevel' or inj1.ln;~tion the State Depaltment may have had
with reference to Servicef~. personal copy ••.• (TT, p. 1008)
All documents fOQ~d in his desk at the State Department
were carbons of his reports ~hich he ~rvi~ was entitled
to keep. As Mr. Service suggests, it is not logical that he
should take official copies of his reports, that had become
Government property, when he had carbon copies that he could
freely lend vTithout violating any law. (Tydings Committee Report, p.93)
While not condoning it, we recognize that it wa.s an accepted
practice for State Department officials to impart some types
of classified information to writers in order to give them
background information for their articles. John S. Service
was in an tmusual position in China and, in accordance with
General Stillwell's wishes, he maintained relations with the
representatives in China of the American press in order to
brief them on political and quasi-mili te:~:,y developments in the
China theater. He appears to have been alloTtjed a greater freedom
in contacts vIith the press than would an officer in a similar
position in 'Vlashington. r-£ should also be emphasized that
both Mal'k Gayn and Philip Jaffe v;ere considered reputable newsmen
and writers by the public in the spring of 1945 when Service
first met them. (TCR, p. 93)
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Dr. Kubek, hOi-leVer, has it somE:i-lhat differell ~ly:
According to a statement by Service in 1957 to the State
Department security officer otto Otepka, he passed only
eighteen documents; and in his testimony E.S. Larsen admittecl
having shmm to Jaffe some documents written by Service. It
cannot be &tated vii th certainty, therefore, exactly how many
documents Service passed--or how many documents compdsed the
total which Jaffe received from his netvrork of sources. The
actual numbers, in both cases, are disputable and not really
important. (p. 112)
.
It is quite clear, I think, that to Dr. Kubek the actual number of
documents that I "passed" to Jaffee is not really important.

As

I shall note pre.sently, his next charge literally depends on this
uncertainty.
A few points.

I made no statement to Mr. Otepka, so far as

I can remember, in 1957. I believe my first meeting with him was
in the a.utumn of' 1958 vihen I went through a lengthy "interrogation"
(by a panel of three officer s, not two as Va'. Otepka says) as a
step to\-lard

my

eventual security clearance.

Thi s went on for more

days and sessions than I can recall. Unfortunately, though a stenog
raph'er""'Wat;"pre'S";!TIt and: busy ~ I have no trans(:ript: the l"edcral Loyalty

.

Security progranI has long since .evolved beyond the stage of allO'.<ling
the person most concerned to l'eceive transcripts in proceedings
such as this. I repeated my best recollection that the number of
personal copies of my memoranda involved was eight to ten. It was
then intimated (as it had been in even more vague terms in some of
previous heru:ings) that someone' was supposed to have been heard
to say to someone else that the number was eighteen. The implica

my

tion--never made clear--was that this was a wiretap of a phone con
versation betueen Jaffe and another person involved in the Amerasia
case. There was never any identification of persons, never a record
ing, t.ranscript, text, or even clear statement of just what was said.
I could only reply that I believed (as I still do) that the number
was eight to ten; but that since my recollection was .not"absolute,
it \-<ould be difficult for me to prove othenlise if clear and positive
evidence was presented that the. number Vias eighteen.

The panel made

no attempt to present such evidence, and I have never seen or heard
anything that cc,uld be cons:idered eviden-::e to show that

my m~mory
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is incorrect.

The panel was interroga.ting me, it might be noted,

more than thirteen years after the event--·which is nou more than
twenty-nve years a\·:ay.

I should also mention here that it is like

wise untrue that "Service told Otepka that his on].y motive in passing
the papers to Jaffe ,...as to discredit Ambassador H1.lrley" (fo'.)tnote. 252,
'p. 112).

I had no such motive; but even if I had, it is hard to

see how it would have been furthered by any such action--since none
of the memoranda mentioned Hurley or dealt with his attempts to bring
the Communists into a coalition government.
Dr. Kubek is not really interested, hOi'lever, in any such l'ela
tively modest number as eighteen.

He is ready to go far beyond it.

Because evidence to the contrary is lacking, it may be assumed
that many of Service's documents found at Amerasia were delivered
by Service himself in these few meetings with Jaffe and his
associates. (p. 111)
I. understand that Dr. Kubek is not a lavT.ver: nor am I.

Nonetheless,

I find it rather startling to be told that if I cannot present com

plete

~~d

incontrovertible proof of innocence, then I am guilty.

Innocence is not al\oiays easy to pl'ove--though I have ahl<:!.Ys thought
that there was ample direct evidence in my ovm case.

But if someone

else is found to have done wr.at you are ac.cused of, is that not to
be considered

"evidence to the contrary"?

The record, as in other

aspects of the much investigated Amerasia case, is copious.

A few

examples:
Senator TYDINGS. Let me ask you this: '-las there any evidence
gathered by the FBI that came to your knowledge that shovled
that Service was connected in any manner, shape, or form with
the taking or stealing of documents from the State Department
other than we have had described here in your memorandum?
No sir; other than the clearly identified
ei.ght State Department ozalid copies which were found in
Jaffe's brief case which I assumed, up until the time Larsen
had admitted giving them to Jaffe, might well have come from
Service.
Mr. HI'l'CHCOCK.

Senator 'l'YDINGS. Was he ever detected passing any document
to anybody connected ''lith this case or anybody on the outside?
lvIr. HITCHCOCK.
(TT, p. 1008)

No, sir, not to the best of my recollection.
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Mr. HITCHGO:::K. From rny recollect.ion--and I think it is
pretty good on that point.-··Larsen was in a position to supply
them.
Mr. HORGAN.

Any of th8 documents in the case?

Mr. HITCHCOC"'".t<. Hell, nml as I said earlier this morning, my
recollection is that virtually all of these documents, even
those that had not 0:riginat8d from State, had been routed to
state. NOl-l all of these, from anything I kno,v to the cont:rary,
had to come from IJarsen. (TT, p. 1034)
Mr. '!'ORGAN. I s it proper to say, therefore, that from your
handl:ing o:f the situation, you were adequately satisfied on
the basis of the docu~ents and other Government material you
had available to you, that the subjects who vlere being considered
for prosecutive action ivere those who had, a hand in obtaining
these documents?
.
Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes; in this sense; that there was nobody else.
Now, what I mean by that is--I am not trying to quibble. Larsen
is the only person that I could ever attribute from the evidence
submitted to us as having b~en able to do this, with the exception
of Roth. (i~, p. 1035)

Earlier in this memorandum, I mentioned a group of thirty-one
documents printed by Dr. Kubek, where he had selected a copy from
my personal papers although, in each case, the same basic ma.terial

was among the documents actually :found in Amerasia.

This sort of

thing might be regarded as an accident if it happened once or twice;
it cannot be an accident 'When, as her€ ' ,

it is done consistently.

What, then, can be the explanation for this seemingly illogical
choice?
Most of the copies of my reports that were in the possession
of Amerasia had been forwal'ded to vlashington under cover of Embassy
despatches, Army or other o:fficial reports, or were ozalid copies
prepared in--and hence clearly the property of--the State Department.
As the record makes very clear, these various types of· material
were never available to me (since I never prepared the transmitting
despatch or report).

They were generally unknown to me, and were

never in my possession.

On the other hand, if it is alleged--as

Dr. Kubek does repeatedly--that Amerasia had in j,ts possess:i.on, not

Embassy despatches, but my

Dim

file copies--,.,hich Dr. Kubek points

out I had permission to retain--then the reader will be much more

19
ready to believe Dr. Y.ubek when he says that "mfillY of Service I s
documcnts found at Amerasia were delivered by Service himself .•.. "
A..'1 ex9.tnple may ma.""e this more clear.

report No.

Document No. 275 is my

13 from Yenan, dated March 15, 1945, giving a factual

summary of "Chinese Co:nmunist Views in Regard to Sinkiang."

The

copy of this report 'Vlhieh was actually in tne possession of Amerasia
was an ozalid fac simile reprocl.uction of the signed original.

It

carrj ed on i't·.s face state Department di stribution symbols which
linked it to the office in 'Vlhich E. S. Lar sen 'Vlorked.

It was, in

fact, one of the docur.:..ents which Larsen had admitted giving to
Jaffe.

The personal copy of this report which was in my desk

a typed carbon copy.

'VIaS

It could not have been very sharp and. di stinct,

since it was the fourth copy, made on a small Hermes portable
typei'lTiter, at night in a cave in Yenan.

But it carried my hand

written initials above my typed name on the last page.

In the

Foreign Service in those days (a..'1d perhaps also today), the drafter
might sign the origirre.l but, of the duplicate s, he :i.nitialed only
the.·Silc.....capy ..
When we turn to Document No. 275 itself (page ])109), it will
be seen from a thoughtfully added footnote that: "This is a

c~.rbon

copy, but the initials JS are wrj.tten above the typed signature."
There is, therefore, no question whatever about the source of the
document that Dr. Kubek has selected to print.
that the copy actually in Amerasia

~.S

Despite the facts

clearer and more legible,

and carried markings which identified it indisputably as being
government property, he has preferred the copy from my personal
papers--i-Ihich i.-iaS never near Amerasia..

The reader, particularly

if he knows an;ything about State Department procedures, vTill naturally
assume that Amerasia, \-lher e he is erl'oneously told it was found,
could only

hav·~

gotten thi s copy from me directly.

Finally, Dr, Kubek persistently suggests that there was some
mystery about the Amerasia case, and that :t was mishandled and
covered up .
••• reads 15ke a spy thriller, but is all the more interesting
because it is true. (p. iii)
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' ••• one of the stranGest tales in recent American history.

(p. 30)

The strange case of Amerasia, like many a fictional spy
thTiller ••. (p. 31)
••• the strange circumstcUlce s ....

(p. 35)

•. •perhaps the most bizarre of all its peculiar feaJcures.

(p. 49)

••. strange arrangement .•. a final peculiar piece of business (p. 51)
• •. strange case of the purloined Government paper s. . •
••. secret sources within the Federal Govermnent.
• •• through the).r mysterious nehlork...

(p. 70)

(p. 73)

(p. 71:)

• .• Service I s role in the whole strange af.fair.

(p.

111)

In no real ~ense was the Amerasia case tried; it w<::',s mer'ely
hero.'d. (P. 51)
• .• the e'Jlnals of American jwisprudence contain few example of
misused legalism as shocking as this one.
(p. 52)
• •• the curtain "las quietly dra"m on the spectacular case of
the purloined document s. (p. 55)
Why, indeed, did the Criminal Division of the Department
of Justice handle the whole case of Amerasia in so timid and
apo~ogetic a n~ner ... ? (p. 59)

••. the hitherto all-but-forgotten "Case of the Six" vlhich had
been so tffectively buried ..• (p.62)
Had the Amerasia case been prosecuted honestly and vigorously,
as some had hoped ••• (p. 113)
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One interE.:sting aspect of this labored

filld

studied atten,pt

to suggest dark mysteries, both in the backgrowld of the case itself
and in the vTay in which it was prosecuted, js that Dr. Kubek is un
able to offer al'ly l1e.. . : facts whatsoever about the case that are not
to be found in the transcript and report of the 'Iydings Committee.
That transcript included testimony from the lirEI and Department
of Justice officiaJ.s in charge of investigating and p:cosecuting the
case.

It also contained the report of the 19116 investigation by

the Hobb s Committee or the House Committee on the ..T udiciary, the
presentment of the Nev; York grand jU't'y in 1950, testimony bY E. S.
Larsen, and the full transcript of ray o.m hes.1'ings before the state
Departm<;nt Loyalty Security B9ard as '\-Tell as my testimony in three
days of hea.1'ings before the Commi t~ee itself.
If there was ever a case which has been thro1Jghly investigated,
and of which the full record has been opened to public scrutiny,
it must be the Amerasia case.

Unfortunately, the 'l'ydings Comro.it tee

finished its wo::ck twenty years ago, and its transcript s.nd report
total some 2,850 pages.

}<'rom a record of this she (though the

Tydings transcript is not entirely taken up with the Amerasia case),
Dr. Kubek

h~s

selectlve. If

been 'l-lhat can only charitably be descl'ibed as "highJ.y
It may be helpful to the reader, therefore·, to insert

here a factual summary of the case.

Thts was prepared in 1950 by

the Department of Justice for the Tydings Committee which) after
its long

investi~ation,

concluded:

The facts set forth in the ensuing memorandum of the Department
of Justice are in all respects consistent and in accord with
the facts and evidence adduced before this subcommittee.
CrCl\ p. 122)
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'MEMon.\NDu~1 OF 'l'HE

Dl:PARnIENT

OJ,' JUSTICI} o~r THE A~!F;nASL\

CASE

t:-;T~WDUCTION

This report is It summitry or the events relating to the prosecution in the
Amernsia cnse. In addition to the salicpt facts, it sets forth the various pro~ecu
tion l)roblems enconntered and the rea:;OIlS for thf) decisions made at the various
st.ageil of the litigation. The legal conclusions expres~cd are documented by an
analysis of the pertinent SupremeComt decisions, which is attached to this
repoit as an appendtx.
THE BACKGROUND OF 'l'HE CASH

"Amerasia" wa'> a bimonthly magt.-zine owned, edited, and published by
Philip J ..Jaffe in Xew York Citro Kate tlIitchell WliS an n~sociate editor. The
publication, ill existence for some 8 years, had a small circulation, less than
2,000, and was devoted exclusively to politica.l and eC')I;omic matters in the Far
f~ast. Both its editorial pOilition and the contents of its articJe~ projected the pro
Communist vicwpoint. It" chief appeal was to persons interested ill a. spccinltzed
study of pnn-l'acific problem;!, e\'cnts, and de\·elopment~.
Since many avenues of comll1unication between the Far East and the United
States were cl05ed durillg tIle war, Iler;;on:; interested in politicill, economic, and
other developments in the I'a.cific area were cut off from the usual ~ources of pub
lic inforl11(l.tlO!'l and were hugely dependent 011 informa.tion obtained through
government!1.l sonrces, If:gctlly or illegally. Data. of the charMter required could
be obtained from censored disp!1.tches, departmental retea.ses and press relntions
offices, from on-the-record and off-the-record il!tervirn';s \dth gon)rnrnenU.. 1
officifLls, from monitorcd broac1castii, and from the Onice of War Information. It
appeared tlmt c1D.s~ified docwncnts were shown to writers and others for "bltck
ground" purpo3Ps with the understanding that the article, i'ltory, etc. subscqumitly
writwn would bE: submitted to censorship (l.uthcritics. And, of course, in this
C!lsu~dr.t(l. .of this Ch!1.fncter were 1'.150 oht/\ined by ncquiring unauthorized acceSll to
actual Government documcnts and report$.
The Amerasia case in vestigation was commenced. l'.S a re,;;ult of au instance in
the l!l.tter c:>.tcgOl'Y where the contente Or!l. Government, document, not authorized
for publication, were found in an issue of the magazine Amerasia. An article,
"The Case of Thailand," prepared by OSS, ,vas reprinted in almo3t vel'batim form
at page 23 of the January 26, l!H5, isslle of Arnern.si::t..
The Thailand article dated December 11, 1944, was part of a. classified OSS
document and in general pointed Ollt tile major differences of British and American
vie\\l)oints on Thailand, commenting upon that country's political future. The
document was a stard~nd OSS report pt}blished periodically eyery 2 weeks. These
reports were made up prilll:lrily for the USd of OSS and State Department
employees.
THE ISITIAL SEARCH .>\ND SEIZURE BY OSS

In February 1945 an official of the Office of S~rategic Sen-ices, in examining the
foregoing issue of the magazine Amerasia, noticed the Thailand article.
Since the unauthorized publication of the contents of a clas,;,ified document would
ha.ve been n. violation of sccurity regulations, the OSS official turned the docu
ment, together with the Amerasia article, over to ~Ir. Archibald Van Beuren,
security officer of OSS, who, in turn, 011 February 28, ID4.'i, took them to )01r.
Frank B. Bielaski, Director of Investigation, OSS, in New York, N. Y. Mr.
Bielaski was requested by ~Ir. Van Beuren to place under 511r\'eillll.nce every
person in Wa~hington who had access to the document in an effort to determine
who was supplying secret information to the editors of the Amerasia magazine.
When Hielaski was informed that Ilumerous person;; had access to the document,
be decid",d against surveillance of thcse individuals, and on his o\vn initiative
decided that the way to get the tacts concerning the matter would be to go directly
to the offiee of the Amerasia nngazine.
The OSS aprroacherJ the matter a3 being solei.\' One of countersecurity within
thll.t agency. It ol'erlooked or disregarded the fact that there might be involved
possible vhbtiolls of Federal crimin:\l laws and thnt they had no investigative
jurisdiction wh(!.tcvcr in r<!spcct to criminal offenses. Consequently, the OSS at
this point should hn,ve referred the entire m:J.tter to the FBI, which has primary
investigative jurisdiction of espionage cases and unlawful removal or concealment
of Government docllments.
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Acting without the kr:owl~dge or approval oC tt,e Department of Justice,
JUebs!:i proceeded to the office of the Amerr.sia magazine at 2:<'5 Fifth Avenue,
New York City, and by subterfuge and without the kuo\';ledge or consent of
Philip J. Jaffe, the sole owner and publisher of the Amerasia Ulagazine, secured
admission to the Amerasir. promise3 around midnight on Suudny, 11:m:h 11. 19'15.
}'or about 2;,f hours ther<:afte:r HidL.s~d Ilud 5 as:;istunts thO:Ollghly searched ::-JI
the papers, records, and documents on the premises and, after eX!1.l11ining ill the
neighborhood of 300 documents, mel5.s~:i d~cidcd to take 20 or more of tho docu
ments to Washington as proof. After taking these documents, IHcluski and
his Il!"sistunts then replaced all the other documents so that there would be no
evidcncc of their illegal search and seizure.
THE lo'JJl INYl:S'l·lOA'l1.0N

lmmedill.toly after this search find f>ciwrc of the documents ill the premise.;; of
Amerasia, Bielaski camc to Washington bringin~ with him the documcnts seized
and reported to General Donovan, heRd of the vSS. ThereaftJr, the documents
were shown to the Secretary of Stale. The latter immediately requ,~sted that
future investigat.ions be conducted by the Pederal Bureau of Inve;;ti~atioll and
the docutUt:nts were turned over to the Burcau at that time. ',"ith thIS informa
tion the Burea.u immediatel} ill!1ugurated all intensive and full-sc:lle investig:'..tion
beginniug in the middle of i\!arch and continuing until after the arrests on June
~1"~

.

It is, therefore, clear the illegal search of the Amerr.sia premi~es and the illegal
seizurc of the dot)umcnts by the OS8 agents constituted the basic information
'whieh started the FHI investigation in motion. Until the FBI received these
documents ill l\Iarch 19-15 it lind no knowledgc oC thc activities of thc OSS agents
and was not thcn conducting nn independent investigation of this matter.
The invt!stigation launched bY the !<'llI, cons:sting largely oC continuolls physical
8urveilltl.l)cc, established that J9.f1"e, in the spring oC l!H5, D1ttclc several trips to
Washincton on which he contHcted Emmanuel S. Lr,rsell, a China speei!'.list+
employcd by the Stntc Department. JulIe also contacted Andrew Roth, an ON!
lieutenant 'who W:1S 11 Far gr.::;t ~pecblbL !lltd a fJl;G tjwc employce of Amende,.
John S. Service, 1\ State Department Foreign Service employec on duty in China,
return cd to thc United St2.tes on al:>out April 15, 1945, and was observed in the
company of Jaffe 011 several OCCI'.SiQllS bc~wccn that time and thc time cC hi:.
arrest on June 6, 19-15. Oil some o~casiolls, the~e persons were observed studying
pape!":; together or passing papers to each other, but since both Jr.ffe and Roth
wele writing books at the time and all of the pen:ons we:e intcrested in a common
eubject, no significant or guilty connotations could be drawn Cromsnch conduct
without. some admissible evidence of identification of thc papers as official docu
ments. However, there was no evidence of the contents or natu,'o of the papers
which were passcd bctwe';lI these p c r s o n s . .
Insofar as criminal prosecution was concerned, the carefully observed actions
of the suspects in this respect were as consistcnt with innocence as with guilt.
As was later found by the House subcommittee which made a painstaking examin
ation of the cuse, "No Governrr.cnt itcms were ever seen to be passed from one
subject to another, although all oC them were under constant su;yeillance for some
time." (Report oC Subcommittee IV of the Committee on the Judiciary, House
of Representativcs, 79th Cong., 2d sess., pursuant to H. R. 430.)
While in New York City, Jaffe was, of courbe, in daily association with Kate
Mitchell, bis office Ilssociate. He was also in frequent cont:1.ct with Mark Gayn,
a correspondent and magazine writer who also specialited in Car eastcm subjects.
Once duritlg the invcstigation, Gnyn while riding on a bus was observed reading
what appeared to be a copy of an official rcport. This report, it was later ascer
tained, had to do with common go;;sip about thc marital relations between Gencral
issinlo Chiang K..i-shek and his wiCe. Generally speaking, the results of the phy~i
c,'1.lloUrveillances of the subjects while in New York were or a neutral or negative
chnrllc:t~r exc<:!pt as prooC of association.
The surveillance f'tiled to eEtablish
the actual theft or unauthorized remoy:d of a. single official document by anyone
of the subjects and no evidcnce wa;l adduced which indicated t'kl.t !lony official
documcnt or other paper W!lS ever pas)l"d or delivered by any 0f the s:Ispects to a
kuown or suspected espionn!;c agent. In this connection, the Honse subconmlittee
which later ruviewed thi~ cn::e found: "although the various perties wc:e frequent
ly observed in the company of one another by trained iuYestigators, no one of
them was ever seen to delivt:r allY Gon·rnment items to a.nother."
The investigatiou oC the FBI, in addition to establishing association between
the various subjects, elso eSl!1b1isbed tll.Rt there w(;re I!umerous cL"..Ssi.fied docu

lllants or copies of such documents on the premises of Amorasia, at IJMSCll'S
bom~ and in Gayn's home. The possession of these documents wa,s established
by menns of unnut.horb,d and megal entries upon the premises of the subjects
and the inforIIHl.tion and evidclIc,'.so obt:dncd could not, of COUl'se, be legally used
, in a criminal prosecution. In fact, in {,he onmt or a sub1'cqncnt trill! or cven pre
trial hearings, in which the ('"idcllel) was challenged, the Depll.rtment would have
been required to concede the bcts as to thc illegAl trespasses, searches, and seizures.
, The otI:ces or Amerasia were enterlld wit,hout senreh ,\'<urants on March 20,
19·15, March 26, 1945, i\Iareh 27, 1945, April 23, 1945, April 24, 1945, and
May 14, 19·1.5, and the documellts four,d thcrdn inventoried ll.lld p11otographcd.
The opnrt.nl':nt of Philip Jacob Jl'ffe was entered withl'ut sean·h warrallts
on April 2, 19,15, and April G, H),t5. No material of interest was locnted,
The apart ment of Emmanuel Sigurd V\rseu Vias entered without a search war
rant on April 6, 19'15, aud some of the documents found were photographed.
The apartment of ~Iark Julius Cayn was entered without a search w~rrant
on April 0, 1945, and April 27, 19'15. Photographs were made of the documents
found.
The apartment of Kate I,ouise Mitchell was entered without Il. search warrant
on l\Jarch 31, 19·15, Nothing material W!'l.S found.
Of course, a criminal prosecution in any case, and pnrticulnrly in this case,
'V.ould be the grentcst of det.errents. B1lt even absent the po:;sibility of a success
ful prosecution (bccnuse of the necessary methods by which the e\'idence in
this case was secured), the steps taken by the FBI were more than justified, not
only to put a stop to the loose hnndling of Governmcnt documcnts, but also to
protect tbe internal sccuri~y. of the country.
'
SUB~nSSlON

OP CASE '}'O CRUUNAL DIVISION

Untill\Iay 29, 1945, the Criminal Division of the Department had no knowledge
of the facts hereinbefore set Iorth or of the investigation conducted by the OSS
or the FBI. On that dllte the Fir,;t Assistant of the Criminal Division was
given a IlwmOrandlllH dated l\Io.y 29, 1915, which had lust been rcceived Irom
the.EBI. This mcmc:a:1dlUTl briefly summarilcd the salient fact~ developed. by
the FBI inYC;3tigation. The First Assistant was itlstructed to study this mcmo
ralldum and make an immediate decision with respect to pro~ecutioll. The FBI
mcmomndulIl itself solicited a dcci~ion within 2·1 hours f\,S to the arrc:>t of the sub
jects,
The First Assistant reviewed tbe FBI mE'IDornndum and then conferred with
the FBI ofllcials who had the case in charge. After this conference and after a
review of the memorandum of Mr.y 29, 1945, he came to two conclusions. The
first conclusion was that the Departmf'nt did not then have the neces,ary legal
evidence available to convict the individuals involved. An attachment to the
memorandum of May 29, 1945, under the heading "Evidence" pointed out the
warning thnt-"Most of the !oregoing information rcgarding the contacts made
by the various principals and ~he documents wbich were exchauged were oLtained
throu,gh highly confidential means and sourccs of information which cannot be
used In evidence." [Emphasis supplied.1
The Criminal Division, of course, recognizcd the obstacles inherent in the easc.
Nevertheless, it was concluded that, with the usual "break" which attends the
spprehension of Federal law violators, sufficient e~idence might be obtained to
e;;tablish a casc. This conclusion was based on t.wo factors: One, that more
tha.n 80 pcreent of Federal law violators confess their offcnse after their arrest.
and two, by confronting the suspects with the incriminatory documents expected
to be round on their arrest, damaging admissions might be obtained.
It was decided to authorize the issuance of B. complr.int for three reasom:
First, we were then at war and the indications were that the suspects were
engaged in what might be dangerous espionage activities. Their arrest would at
lelk't put a stop to these aetiyities and unearth their ramifications. The Bureau
"anticipated that a. considerable amount of additional evidence will, of course, be
de,'elopcd" against contacts r.nd a:'3ociates of the defendants after their arrests.
Seco;'ld, it wa~ hoped that sulilcicnt legal proof might be acquired by admissions
upon tl,eir lH1'fcSt and otherwise.
'
Third, there existed the pO~5ibi1ity that timely motions to suppress any docu
ments whic" might be seized at the time of the arreHt migl.~ not be ma~e.
The Crimin3.1 Division authorized the fiJi!!g of So comphint on J He 5, 1915,
again5t Philip J. Jaffe, Emmanud Sigurd Lar~c!1, Andrew Roth, and J hn Stewart
Service as suggested by the Bureau, In addition, the Crimin.s.l DiviSion author
ized the arrest of K.s.te Louiso twIitcboll and Mark Julius Gs:yn. The, comp1aint
,

I

.

25

charged nil six witl> 1'. CO:15pir!l.cy to violatc t.it!e 50, sect ion 3t of the Espionage
Art" k,villg to do with the lln!lul,horizcd r€'moval 811el possession of documents
rehting to th.:, ll!ltiOllal dcfclIse.
On '!t.:nc 6, 1945, sJl the defendants were arrested in New York City or in
Washington, IJ. C., lH:d in e3cll"caso where (\ defendnnt wa~ found en his prC1Jli:;<es,
the pr('ll1isc-;< ,,;ere th<}ro:1 6hly senrched nnd the documents fO!lnn rernoved by the
arresting offiCers, No "<'ol1-'>cnt to senrch" lluthorizations '\\'~re obtained froIn any
of the defendants.
The results of the :l.H;c;sts, the s6nl'ches and the interviews WDre, on the whole,
disappointing: and did DOt. p:oyidc the prosecution, except in the case of I,arsen
l'mo. Jaffc, with the evidence hoped for fIS to whel1, whtre, how, a.nd by whom the
oflici:lI p::tpers were removed ann recciyed by the defcndauts. No documents
were found on Hoth or Senice or at their premises. Jaffe, ?lIitchell, and Roth
dcc\ifl{'" to sign stat('m~nts. Only It Sm9.lI})NCcntage of the documents seized by
the }'BI related to the national defense.
.
After the arrests, the prosecution of the case "ras, on JUIlC 13, 1945, fI;:;sip;ned to
l
Rohert ?II. Hitchrock, a Speda Assistant to the Attorney General, one of the most
ahlf', expcrie,lced, and conscientious trial attorneys in tI,e Department. Des
ignated to assist him w:t.'; Donald B. Anderson, a former Federal Bllreau of Illycsti
gat.ioll speei~l agent, StaLe judge, and prosecutor.
All of the dr:fenclanU· were scp:uately represclIted by counsel and all indieations
were PUlt the ra!\o would be \'igorOllsly defeaded. Defense coull:,el requested
conferences with re[lr(;i;entative~ of the Criminal Di\·i,.,ion, and demnnded er.rly
hearings in Kew York and '\'nshington. Since preliminary hearings before a
United States Commio',,;ioner would not have been in the intere~ts of the GO\'CrIl
ment bccall"e they \\'ould pre:mnturely exposc the prosecution evidence, an imme
diate indirtr..1('nt wa~ ;;ought to mi'lke such h(~aringi\ unlleceS3:J.ry. Anindict.ment
".:QuId eliminn.te the defendants' rigl1t to 1\ preHminary hearing lit which evidence
of probahlc cause WC'Jld hl1.ve to be add\!ced. This Wh~ pnrticularly illlport1111t
for the additional re:F;:,n tha~, it would !'<!c:uire considerable time to process in the
FBI hthoratoTy hundl'c::!s of seized documents COl flI1gt'rprinting, ht\ndwriting, and
tyt'ifl'gf"ftnd, to' tra~e th.:::n to their official sources, ek.
From the very hc;6nning, coun~el for sume of the defenn:J.nts advised that
motion;; wO'lld be Jr.lldc Ilth.eking th") Mfc;stS RfJO the s('i'>;'.Iro of the doC'uments
and tll1tt ap1'2iC:ltion ",QuId bc mr,dt~ fo the court seeking to :!UpPl'tlSS the el'idence
50 obtained.
As a matter of fact, ~s ea.rly as June 11, 19{5, I,arsell had ascertained froD; the
bundin~ snperintfnde:1t that he had permitted agents to enter Lar5en's apartment
without Il. ser:n:h W!l.rtftut. This did not become known to the prosecutors until
September 28, 19·15. when Larsen filed a motioll to suppress.
In view of the fact tha.t the Government's knowl'Odge of the existence of the
seized documents WC5- obtained by prior illegal entri.!s !',nd seMches. it WilS inevi·
table th2.t a court wou:d suppress all of the e...·idence seized at the timc of the
tines!.:;; 'Il'lth the resl!!t thA.t the GO\'ermnent would be without a provable case.
For the Supreme Conrt has held that where information has been obtained by
the GOYCmrLlent through a previo1l5 unconstitutional searoh a.nd seizure "not
merely the e".·idence SI) !lcqllired shall not be used before the court but ths.t it
shall not be used at p.1I" (Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. ;$35,
389). This quoted language has been construcd by the Supreme Court as making
inadmissible not only the e\'idence illegally obtained, but c.Iso all eviddJ,ce deriVl~d
from leads or clues, because they are "fruits of the poisonous tree" (Nardone v.
United Sta/E$, 303 U. S. 338, 3'10-341).
It is appropriate to note here that, somewhat anslogous to the question of
unla.v..rul search a.nd seizure, certain information was in the possession of the
Criminal Di.. i~ion which had been furnished by the FBI with the admonition
that stich "informa.~i,)n regarding the contacts made by the various principals
and the documents ddc!! were exchanged were obt:l,ined throui?\h highly con
fidenti!!1 means and SOllrccs of information which cam",!: be usea in evidenCE."
(Emphasis S;lpplied.l Thi:; information wus obtained by the Bureau through the
merhum of technical s11rH:il11l.nCe, which included the recercling of conversations
between smne of the .:kf"nd:1.nts.
One such conyel;;~ Hoa between Jaffe: !l.nd Sen'ice, occurring in the former's
room at the Statler Hotel, Wl\~hhlgton, D. C., on :.1a;' 8, 1945, has been widely
publicized recently dlH~ to the fact that B. single sentence thereof found its way into
the record of au e:<;cclIth'e session of the Sella.te COalfl1ittee. In order that this
6ingle ser.tence might be yiewed in its setting, rather tha.n out of context, the
Department of Justice on June 26:1 ~.)O, made a\'a.i\a.ble to the comrnittee the
transcript of the con\"cr~aiioll rcisting to this particular statement.
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lnformatioll of this type of course could lIa ve lIO bearing 011 the question
prosecution. It was furnbhed by the FBI with the explic:t Il.dmcl1ition thnt it,
wa,; obtained through highly conr1dentir.1 meuns and sourc(:s o! information and
eould not bc u~cd in e\·idcllcc. :'Iorco\·er, evidence ot,lained hy wire t1\l;pinj.(
or thi'Ou~h lends or ehl~S thererrom is in>ldrni:;"ible in C0':1't (.Vardone Y. ()niled
Stal.., 30Z ti. S. 370, ,VarJol!C Y. Ulliled S{(ll~.,. 30S U. S. 33S, and Weiss v. United
Sta/n; 308 U. 8. 321), &.nd evidcIlce obtained by plan tinil; microphollc3 on a
dcfcndnnt's j)fcmises cannot be u5c:d when 0. tr(':;pll.ss accoI!lpani(~s its installation.
(S'3C nolaman v. United St{/Ie.~, 316 U, S. 129; compnre United Stflles v', Coplon,
88 'F. Supp. £121 (SnXY).) lIence, information of thi" type could not be con
sidered in weig;hing the po~sibility of 8ucccssful prosecution in this C!lSC.
'I'1m GHANI) JURY PRF;SEN'l' ..\.'rION

As previou~lJ.' indicatod, in oro.,r to forestall preliminary hcaring~ dUriB;!: which
the Government's evideIlce wou:d be needles51y di\'l!lged while the defeIldants
could remnin sill'nL an early pre~cntation to a grand jury was decided upon. This
enrly prescntn.tioll was planned even though the case was not yet ready for pn.'iI
entation and t.he analysis und tracing of the docnments had hc:cn b:lrdy !)(.'\!;UIl.
While the 1119.tter was being presented to tl;e grand jury, somo of the ddendants
requestenn conference with the Assistan t Attorney Gcr:.eI'tll in chnrge of the
Criminal Division. These requests wen: received on June 21, Hl-l5, the first day
of the grand jury presentation ann on the dR.Ys immediately fol\0wing, It was
suggested to couI1se! for the defendants that if they would agree to a postponement
of the preliminary hearing:; the Go\'ernment would a.!Tord the defendants an
opportunity to confer with the Criminal Diyisioll. Defense counsel ,\greed. to a
'postponement of the prelilllinu.ry hellrings, requesttng I'.n opportunity for a flllthel'
discussion of the case.
Thus the llocessity for an early indktment W/l.S averted, sitlee the GO\'erllllH'nt
was no !olll;or faced with revealing its evid'3I.ce in a pr()\ill1inl.ry he:;ring. The
FB! WI"'S, of COI:rse, still enl;ag(';1 in the lahorious t~,sk of pro()essing the hundreds
oLdoClIn1t'lltS that Il!ld be'em rei zed.
A conference was held 011 June 27, 1945. Coul1sd for the dufelldnnts Mitchell
and Gn.vn representeri that their clients were not gUilty of II criminal offense and
that what they did W,\S bcillf~ dene by evcry newspaper reporter, I'OIHmllilS~,
Cotr<.!spondcnt., a.nu writot in Xew York ILncI Washingtoll.
During this confcr(;ncc, it was hrought out that the current grand jury wO'Jld
go out of existence in a. few d!l.Ys and a discussion W!li> had as to wheLher the
Governmcllt would apply to the court to extend the term of the grand jury then
in session or represent the matter to the new grand jury, The Criminal Division
reprc!!entativ('s stated that they werc inclined to extend the grand jury for
another month but that they would review the whole case subsequent to the
conference.
.
..
Immedintely after the conference was concluded, Kat{; l\Iitche1\'s attoruey
otr~red to have her appear before the grand jury, ",aive immunity, and answcr
every question put to her. This offer \\a3 particularly favorable to the Govem
ment, For, in addition to enahling the Government to make out II stronger case
against d'Jfendants thnn could be otherwi:;e established, the defendallts' defensive
evidence is obtained and the witness leaves himself open to a charge of perjury
in the eyent he makes a false statement in his sworn testimony before the grand
jury,
Thereafter, the attorneys for Jaffe, Gayn, alld Service also made this same
unusual offer in writing although Jaffe later failed to appear and testify. The
Government agreed to the appearance of the defendants before the· grand jury
a.nd coupled the acceptance with a demand that such df'fendallts also submit
thums.clvcs to examination by the Government prosecutors prior to their IlP
penrall(;e befom the p:rand jury. Another condition imposed I;y the GOYcrumcnt
wa;j that the Xe\\' York defendants, in the event of their indictment, would
not contest their removal from Xc\\' York to \Yashington. These conditions
were agreed to by the defendants.
With the case in the pv,iLion outlined, it was d('cided, subject, to the grand
iurors' consent, to withdmw the ease from thn expiring grand jury whieh had
.(Jnly heard 1 day's testimoay and re-present the evidence to tl. new grand jury.
This decision was bU3ed on lb" following co!,;;idt'rations and no others:
1. The e\'idcnee and, in particular, the documents seized, hundreds in
number, wor.: not ready for presentation to the grand !ury.
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2. The ouc:r of the deCendants to be examined by Government counsel and
appear before tho grand jury wilhout immunity OT counsel neces~itated 8.
more dclibemte I;\.uti time-~om;umh:g appror.ch, preparation, !lnd grand jury
prese!ltation.
.
'rho grand jury which heard f day's te$timony on June 21, 19,15, and which was
expirillg on July 2, 1!H5, \';m! informed of the above consideratbns. They were
also informcd that if they desired to retain iurisdiction in th& mnttor it would be
nocessnry Cor the Government to get an order extending their term for a month or
6 weeks. The grand jurors ngreed without any objection to have the c!tsewith
drawn Cram their consideration.
The prepn.ration of the case was continued on an intensive scale during the
month of July 19 15. :Starting on July 23, 1945, the Government prosecutors
£tarted the pre-gra.nd-jury examination oC tho:3e deCendants who had offered to
waive immunity. They were cross-examined and confronted wiLh the docu
ments, and every elTort was made to establish thcir possible cOt~plieity. A8 the
preparation find expo;;itioll of tho case developed it became increA"ingly clear that
Jaffe and Larsen were the main culprits. Jaffe, Larsen, and Roth did not submit
to examination by the Goyernment prosecutor::! or appear before the gmnd jury.
'l'he presentation of the case to the grand jury WP.5 commenced 011 July 30,
1945, and session" were hol,1 on July 30, 31 August I, 3, 6 nnd 7, Hi45. Three
or the defendants (Sen'ice, 1\litchell, and Gayn) and 24 6o\'ernmcllt witnesses
including 16 FBI agents testified before the grand jury. It must be emphasized
that each witllcss who had testified on June 21, 1945, before tho previous grand
jury was again clllled and testified before this grand jury and all pertincllt e\-idt'nce,
documentary or otho;rwise, supplied to the Criminai Dh'ision v;as presented to or
made available to the grand jury for its cOllsidcratio!l.
.
On August 10, 1945, an indictment WI::.S returner! against Jaffe, Lnrscll, !l.lld
Roth charging them, in substance, wi~h cOllspimcy to embezzle 1).lId remove
official dOCulllent~ without pcrmi5sion. The grand jllrY refus0d to indict Service,
Gayn, and Mitchell afi~r listening to their own testimony !lone! the Covzl'lIment's
testimony and evidence '.,·ith rcspec~; to then·,.
The.. grand jury, in voting for orl:'.gdu~t luc.ictm('\!~s, ,"old a~ !oUOWG:
c
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1'welve grand jurors must, of course, concur before 8. valid indictment can be
returned. The vote of the grand jury was particularly signit1cant since the pro
ceedings were ex parte and only the Government's evidence WM presented except
for such explanations a.<; were made by the defendants who testified without the
aid of counseL
Many or the grand jurors who voted [or no bills. aCter listening to the testi
mony, adopted the position that thc loose methods of handling, filillg, contrOlling,
and releasing official papers almost im'ited the form of activity in which the
deferldants were engaged. They also took the position that mnny other news
papermen and writers, besides the defendants, were obtaining access to classified
material Cor background purposes and that the remedy lay within ·the depart
ments and agencies rather than in prosecution.
Ko~ only was the attitude of the grand jurors indicative oC what might be
expected of petit jUfors, but it should be borne in milld in con~idering the question
or the disposition of the case that the remaining defendants would be repre;)ented
by c()nn~el on their trial,and would have their own witnesses and an opportunity
to testify themselvCil. It i~ also worthy of note, in view of the grand jury vote,
tha.t after a 3- or 4-month trial, only one petit juror would be required to prevent
the con\'iction of the defendant~.
And, fi'.ally, when;as P.. grand jury may indict 1M.ely upon a showing that
there i:5 probable call~e for believing an offense hr..s beell committed, the petit
~ury ~allnot ("om'jet unless it is satisfied beyor:.d a reasonable doubt tbat a defendant
JS gUilty.
•
.
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In this type of cnse it is import~nt that the Government's C'lid',Jnce be clear
and COllvincing. To lose a case of this kind is bad not only for the prosecution,
but it could have an adverse eITect on public opinion fl.') to the real d'H)[~Cr ir,volved
in cases of ~!us nature. In other words, the country would tend to dcprcriate the
case and the seriousness of the consr,iracy. In this connection it i~ interesting
to note that the Dcpnrtment of J'.l8tice, with one exception, hils not lost!!. single
case where Communist (l,ctivity wns I.', feature of the casco It might be added there
that ill one case, now pending, the Government has been unable to date to
institute prosecution because the evidence obtained would not be admis.':iible in a.
tri~J of the case.
, As stated previously, the indictments returned charged Ja,tTc, Larsen, Ilnd
Roth ill substance with conspiracy to embezzle and remove official documents
witr.out permission. The Govemmcnt had abandoned the doubtful premise that
any considerable part of the documents related to the national defense. One
lactor to be considered in evaluating this decision then reached by the prosecutors
is that none of the documents seized by the OSS were knowll or available to
the prosecutors Ilt that time.
SpeC'iliC' documents which appeared to relate to the national deff;IlSe were made
the object of special study by D(}partmcnt attorneys and FBI representatives
with n view to making out pos:>ible substantive charges of espionage against one
or more of the defendants. However, this study revealed in each instance that
proof of some vital element was larkin,!;" In additior:, an indictmellt citarging
bribery was prepared with respect to Larsen and JatTe, but IIll nn.oJys!s of the facts
B,vailable established that such a charge could not be sllstained be~ause the mOlley
paid by JatTe to Larsen's wife was ostensibly fOf typing copies of Larsen's personal
records and not for the pnrpose of influC'ncing the official conduct or action
of I,arsen.
'1'he indictment, as drawn, did not require the Goverurn(.nt to prO'll;! that the
documents reb,ted to the national deft)n;;c--only that they were official documents.
The indictment returned was ba~()d on th~ same con"lpiracy section of the Criminal
Code as ~he compillint. Thus it is clear that the defendants were subject to the
same punis:ullent '011 either theory. The oniy result in the chnnge bet,ween what
the complaint chaq.;ed alld what th..; illciictmellt charged wail to lessen the burden
of proof for the Government.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that th~ House subcommittee which
later reviewed this case :>tated, after examining all the documente, "Few, if Il,ny, of
the identifiable classified doct!ments involved in this case hr,d any real importll.nC'3
in our 'nationa! defense or our war effort."
In addition, the subcommittee also made the foilowing observations with respect
to the nature and content.s of the documents involved:
(1) Many had already been given wide publicity.
'
(2) Many of the idtntifiable documents might have had their evid~ntlal
value destroyed by reason of the court's sustaining the defendants' motions
attacking the warrants of arrest.
(3) Most of the "classified" items in question were copies. There were
lew, if any, original documents.
(4) The bulk of the e')cuments were not of recent date. Some were
da.ted as early as 1936, were innocuous in content, and were and could have
, been generally known to anyone interested in the information they contained.
(5) Most of the items seized at Jaffe's office were type"..ritten copies.
Some of such copies were proved to ha'le been typed in one of the Govern
ment departments, It may be fairly inferred that the originals of such
copies were neyer remo ved but that copies were made a.t the department or
agency where the orig;inals reposed.
(6) Most of the items dealt with personalities or political aspects in
countries in the Far East.
(7) * * * there Wa!! no evidence that My of the documents or copies
were eyer put to any use harmful to the war efrort.
(8) Many "clD.55ified" Goyernment documents or copies were found In
the posses5ion of some of them, the greater Pllrt of the documents pertaining
to politic!>l matters in Jap:m, China, India, and Asia.
After the return of the indictment, Jaffe, Roth, and Larsen pleader! not guilty
and attorN'Y;; for Larsen aad Roth indicated, thet they would contest the case
very vigorvusly and would not plead guilty. On the other hand, Jaffe's counsel
indicated the possibility of a p!f~a in the e'-ent that no sentence of imprisonment
were jrnpo~ed.
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Since Jalic, Roth, Ilnd Lar:;en were eh'lrgcu toget.her ill 1\ single indictment I\S
codefcnd:lllts, the normal and desirable procedure woukl be II joint trial of all
three, It was for this ren~()n tbat the Government did not at first regard these
ovcrture~ (ayor.:.bly,

A'l~ACK

UPON THE

GOVER~~IE~n's PI:OO~'

While the c:',sc was in this status in the lnst week of September HH5, several
happenC'd which thre!ltened to destroy the Government's casco
It develop('d that sometime ~hol'tly after I,:lrsen was rclea"ec! on boud following
his arre:,t he contacted E. H. Sager, the manager of hi" apartment house in which
he Ih'ed, alld told him that he, Larsen, knl'\\' that someOll(' had been in his apart
ment. He inquired whether Sager had let the pcr:;OtlS into his apartment. It
appe/\fi; that Sager admitted that he had given the FBI (\gent.~ the keys to Larsen's
apartment.
Thereafter. and on September 2·~, 19~ 5, Larscn telephoned Sager and stat.ed,
"you remember you told me you let th05e mell into my apart.ment." To this
Sager replied "\ cs." Lnr~en thercllpon informed Mr. Sager that his attorney
w!:!'; dc::"irous of obtaining fin afIiel:.wit from Sager, set.tillg forth the facts of the
situation.
The fnets were tlmt the ageat~ had predo\lsly entered the apartment of tarscn
twice ,,-ithout a search warrant, onc(~ on April 6, 19.J.5, to inventory nnd photostat
the documents on the premise:> and to take typewriting speeirllens and once to
install a microphone in an apartmcnt ill the ~amc building into which Larsen was
to mO\'e on JUlle 1, H).15.
0:1 September 28, 1945, the Criminal Diyision was informed that Larsen's
attorney wa~ about to file a demurrer, motion to quash the indictment and an
application to Sllppr!)S5 the e\'idellce obtained from the sea'!'ch of Larsen's
apartment.
.
neprc~entati\'Cs of the Cri=ninal lJivision cotlferred with FlU officials on the
IUorlllng of September 28, 19-1;,), an.-I it wit!! generally agreed that the CIlSP. was in
serions jeopard;l. Annmbr:r of s\lr;~estions were made_ and rliRcard"d, The
possibility of offerir.g to SHl'prc-;.~ \·i.lnntarily all of the t1ocumt:lHs scL.cd from
Larsen at the tilile of his llaest, and then attempt to establish the case against
Larsen 011 the basis of documents found in the pos;:e.osion of Jaffe, was discussed.
However, the most seriou.~ prc1b:rlll was that J!'Jle wOllld le3.rtl of Larsen's Illotion
and tile II sim:lar moti'Jn, in which eVl;nt the entire case would be destroyed. Aud
. if Jaffc'~ motion to supprr.;;s were granted, the supprr'ssed evidence not only wOI.!ld
not b" ad:nis~ible against Jaffe, but would also be inadmis3ible ag:\in~" I.arsen
and Roth on a joint trial of all three. Sec Goldslein v. Uniled Siaies (316 U. S.
114,119-120); McDonald v. Uniled Slat~8 (335 U. S. 451, 456, ·157, 461). In view
or the imminence of I,arson's motion, Hme was of the eS3enee and immediate action
bad to be taken, if the prosecution of Jaffe W~.il to be snlvaged.
The fir3t as"ist:l.llt thereupon cl1t:ed JafTe's counsel and t1i5cu~sed his previolls
suggestions with respect. tn Il. piNt of guilty and a conference waB arranged for thp
cnrl~' afternoon, that same day, September 28, 19·15.
While waiting for Jaffe's \Ya~hington couh;;eJ to appear, Larseu's motion to
qunsh the indict ment and ~lIppress the evidence was served upon the Department.
Immediately after the motion papers 'l\'ere served, Jaffe's attorney appeared
(or the conference. Before admitting him, inquiry was made of the clerk of the
district court as to whether :\[r. Larsen's attorney had filed the motion to quash.
The clerk stated thnt the motion had just been filed and had already been reviewed
by the press.
_..The motion as filed nl1('ged briefly that the evidence obtained by the Go\'ern
Inent had been obtainE'd by illegal ~earches and sei7.Ures, by wire tapping and by
the me>;;ll detention of the defendant. Larsen supported the application by a.
detailed 13-pa!;c afTida\it ill "'hieh he swore that at the time of hi;') arrest at his
apartment the np:ents bt'tray€'d a prior knowledge and familiarity with his personal
effects which ther could not hr.v(; acquired by [C'gallllcnns. He also set forth the
building ml1nager'~ arlmbi'ioll thllt he had pernlittcd the ap:ents to have access to
his apartment in the ahsence of LarscH and prior to his arrest.
thing.~

JAFFE'S PLEA OP GUlL1'Y

It W!'i~ realized that when Jaffe's lawyer eOllcll1d,!d his conference with the
DcpMtn.cnt, he would learn of IAH5en's motion frNIl the new~parer acconnts, and
would thcr"after in all probability initiate D. ~illlilar motion on beh(!.1f of his O'\\'ll
client, It. was thout:lht impcrath'e to do wh5tenr po:;~ible to salvar,e the case
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ag~in~t Jr.!!e.
To this end an effort wn~ nl~,ue to oulnin au immediate and firm
commnment from Jaffe's attorney that Joffe would plead guilty.
During ti:<: disCUS5i;)11" the p:utieil to tlliJ con(erc,nrc spc;cul::lt,:-d Oil thc nature
of the l!'·.)n(C!1ce which the cou:,t would be likely to illlpo5e. The Criminal Division
advised Jafi",,',, !!.ttom,,}, that the jucl:'cs of the DL,trict of Cnlumub did not ordi
Ilarily n"k f.)r or req 1le5t nlly rc('ommondation and that we were not in a positicn
to Olll.kc any commit ment with respect to sentence. After some discussion, it
was finally e.grced that J:l.fIe would plead gUilty and the Governtn~'nt 'Would, if
permiLteci, recomm,)ltr! the impodition of a subst:wtial finc. Thc maximum finc
was 810,000 nnd it w:,s umlcr3tood that such a fine Y;Quld be paid by JafTe ill the
event it was imposNl. f]O\\'cvcr, Jc\ffc's COllllsel conditioned his commitment
upon the premise that the court would conscnt to he::lr a recommendation from
the Gcv,~rr.lIlent. After Jaffe's counsel was firmly committed to pleading his
client guilty, inquiry was m:ldc as to the earliest time iu which the plea of guilty
could he entrred. In,!7c's counsel staled that the plen, would be entcrcd whenever
the GO\'erumcnt could arrange for it.
This conference took pl::lce on F'riday afternoon, September 28, 1945.
'lhe Criminal Divi:"ion W,,1~ nnxious to di<iposi? of JaITe's case before hc would
reconsider (:h he had done before) or file a motion to suppress t!le e\'idence
obtained ffi.JUl his pr.:miscs. Upon inquiry it wa.s leftrneri that Judge Proctor
would be holding court on Saturd:lY morning, Scptcmb:lr 29. 1\)·15. Judbe
Proctor W:.l$ asked to take Jf\lTc's plea and agreed to do so. Judge Proctor nlso
ad\'ised tht(t he would consent to hear the recommendation of Gon:rnment and
defense counsel a~ to ;;clltencc Ilrter a plea of gllnty wus entered by Jane.
On Sn.turd.1Y morning, September 29, 1915, .JnlTe pte"ded guilt.y to the felony
dwrgc. Judge Pl'odor heard the vit'ws of Jaflu's ~oljn'l::;1 and GovcrlLment coun
sel. GO\'cr!ltncnt cOlm~c1 recommended th!l.t a substantial fine bl) imposed. After
bearing counsel for beth parti"s, Judge Proctor imposed a fine of S2,50n, ",hidl
was paid. There had !lot heell any prescntence confercncc or con;;ultl1tion of allY
kind 'with the court before the cnse came on for pica and sentence.
DISF OSnlaN AS '1'0

RE~L\l:\lNG

DE<'!;::SI>.~~rs

With the case of In!7e safely dispo~cd of ill what \n\S considered a lllRI,ller salis
("cter y un(!,:]' the cireullbtances, tlte Dvp:l.lt mrnt was still cQ;;[n)[lV:d with thl)
motion to sUl'~m:ss fi!'.d by L:.1rscn. A IIInnlx;1' QC cod"renrcs wcre held with tlJf'
. attorllcys for I.!l.rSCIl snd Roth in an effort to obtain pleCls of guiity but withollt
8uccess. Lar,en's nUe:-!:t}' at fir3L took t he po~ition he would not consider a plea
until hi$ modon to suppre5~ Wtl~ dccid"d.
The tilll(, for filing the Government'!!; rCopO!l:!e to the motion to suppres'l wus
deferred. In response to the motion, the Gon:rnmcnt would have been obliged to
admit the illegality of the search and ~dl!lrc, Howe\,er, the necessity for muking
this arlmi~sion was ayer~ed when J.ar~en's CO\lIl~e1 finally offered to plead his client
nolo contendere if he cO'Jld receive some .!l3SUmnCe that oniy a moderli.te fine would
be imposed. He poin~t:d out that I.arslJll had been imp03ed upon by JalTe, that,
he had lost W, Govt:r;,ment po;;ition which he had held for 10 years, that he was
unemployed and pcnnn~ss, and that ho had a wife and family dependent upon him,
The Government w!?,s aware of these facts and finally Ilgrecd, if consulted by
the court, to recommend a fine of S500. This p03itinn was taken largely because
of the abo\'e factors but also hecatlse we realizcd that Jaffe was the main culprit,
that he had corrnpted Lar:;clI and was r('spollsible (or his plight, and that it
would be manife5t1y unjust for LRrsen to receive a sentence greatcr or even equal
to that impost~d upon Jaffe, Larsen entered a pIca of nolo contendere on Novem
ber 2, 1'H5 and was fined S300, as recommended by the Government.
Only the case against Roth now re'l\£Iined. This case W£I$ \'ery weak and
depended on several Pt\"Cil or handwritin£; and typewriting (identified as Roth's)
of what appeared to be official docu;ncnt", • . . •
]n view of the stto.te of the e\'idence above outlined, the decision was reached
that the c!!~e egain~t Roth could not be sueec:,sful1y pro~ecuted. After several
postponement., of he.lrin.~~. on motiolls br!>ught by Rot~'s ~ttor,~eys, e.~d after
an unsucces~rul eff(lrt '\\':15 made to pl!!'ce It on the pending maC·.l',"C dOCKet, the
Go....ernment wus !orc~d to nolle pross;; the ce.~c agnbst bi:n on February 15, 1946.
This repr.·:t i3 not intl".nded to qt;a:if{' the s"riou~n.~s3 .or gravity of. this c!'~~e.
The FBL, p:ompt end vigorollil actIOn III face of a. 6ItU'.(\OIl alr<.:~.dy tainted With
Dle;;ll.lity W~~ of bestimable service to this country. This report only dell!s with
the difffcutti~s of succt)s5ful prosecution and the bases for tbe decisions Dlllde.

3.1,
t'!il~in~ Co~:~:itte~Repo::~, pp. 123-133. The memorandu1Tl 18
prj.nted in full except for one cmission--before the penultimate
paragraph--of details of the evidence against Roth, against
"Ihom charges "fere droppel1. The appendix "lhieh follm<red this
memora.l1dum is e, technical legal discussion of precedents and
Supreme Court decisions, under the fotlrth and fifth amendments,
which the Department of Justice believed to be controlling.
For reasons of space, it is not reproduced. It can be found
at ~ICR, pp. 133-136.)

Among the yarious investigations of the Amerasia case, I have
mentioned. the Federal grand jury in Nerd York.
grand jury.

FoJ~o\<ring

Sene.tor McCarthy f s

This was a "run9.1.;aytl

mu~h-publicized

charges

(similar to those made here by Dr. Kubek), this grand jury, "acting
on its ov.'l1 authol'ity" and utilizing its subpoena pOt-leI') ma.de an in
dependent investigation.

If Dr. Kubek would like to suggest bias

on the part of the Den:ocratic majority of the Tydings CommIttee
(Senators Tydings, McMahon, and Green), he can h::u'dly level such
an accusation against the grand jtu'Y.

It l.s interesting; therefore,

to note that its presentment, datE":d Jtme 15, 1950, included the
·foll01·;ing concl.usions:
The grand jury also found no evidence to indicate that the
Department of Justice vias remiss in :its prosecution of the
case.
The grand jury believes that the American people have been
poorly sex,yed by the compounding of confusion t.hrough dis
closures of half-truths, cohtradictory statements, etc., in
this and similar Cases. (TCR, pp. 136-137)
There is, then, no great mystery about the way the case "as
handled.

liThe tainted nature of the original sea1:'ch by OSS agents

infected the entire investigatory process vihich follovlcd. II

The

illegal entries having become known to one of the defendants (Larsen),
the

prosecu~ion

moved quickly to salvage what it could of the case

by accepting a guilty plea from Jaffe with a moderate fine and no
demand for a j ail sentence.

Si:nila:r:lY , it Was agreed that Lar sen

would plead nolo contendere and pay a fine of $500.

The Tydings

Corr:nittec came to the conclusion:
'l'he fact that SO:1e of the .defendants did not receive the plli'1ish
ment vhioh '·.'C teda:,-' feel they deserved. or v:hieh vie i-lOuld liY..e
to have seen them receive is the result of certain ::i.ncidents
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of the case which have been here-tofore di.scussed and not the
result of dereliction on the pari:. of the prosecuting officials.
Under all of the circumstances of the case, we are constrained
to suggest that the Department viaS fortunate in securing the
punishm.ent that was meted cut. (TCR, p. 11~0)

\:

OtIT inquiry has been thorough and designed to develop
every logical source through i-Ihich informe.tion of relevance
to the case might be obtainGcl.•
This case has nm., been considered (1) hy the Hobbs Cormnittee
of the House of Representatives in 19116; (2) by a special grand
jury in Nevl York in J950; and (3) by this subcommittee. In
each instance the conslusion is the same--indeed, the only con
clusion vthich the facts vrill support--that no agency of our
government was derelict in any way in the handling of the
Amerasia case, (TCR, p. 144)
Parenthetically, this matter of illegal entry and search did
not enter into and could not have affected the grand jury considera
tion of my case and its decision agai.nst an indictment.

In any event,

entry of my temporary residence, and I had no

there ',las no

government documents in my possession.
stnce Dr. Kubek has some 41j. footnote references to the Tydings
tnmscript, one must assume that he is familiar vlith this record.
If he is not, he certainly should be.

But in his effort to convince

his readers that my role in the" strange ll 'case i,'as "centraJ., If there
is much that he chooses to omit.

He notes, for instance, that the

grand jury voted 20-0 against my indictment (one seems to feel that
this in itself is meant to be evidence that there 'Has something
strange about the case: it has, as a matter of fact, already been
so considered. by at least one writer in Taiwan).

But he fails to

mention that I "laived immunity and appeared voluntarily before the
grand jury.

He repeats (without source) the statement (made by

Senator Joseph 1.IcCarthy) that the FBI gave assurances that the evidence
was "airtight."

But he ignores the letter in the record from J. Edgar

Hoover denying that such assurance was eVer given.

He repeats (vlith

out source) the accusation (again from Sene.tor McCe.rthy) that Under
Secretary of State Grevi v:as forced to resign as a result of my clearance.

But he fails to see the clear evidence--including a letter from Mr.
Gr(;'.·J--th9.t this vi'as not true,
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He refers to the OSS re.id on Amerasia on r·1al'ch
the finding there of "hU!ldreo.s" of

cJ_E~S sified

11, 1945,

a.'I1d

govermnent document s,

but fails to note (as mentioned in the Tydings Report, 'p.

91)

that

this clearly indicated that Jiffierasia'lS source of government documents
was

~lready

fully developed before I arrived jn the United States

on April 12, 191~5.

1,ike,,!ise, he fails to note the record that the

FBI indicated to the Departments of state and Navy on April 18-
before I had ever met Jaffe, Larsen, Mitchell, or

GaJ~--that

was ready to present the case for prosecutive action.

it

In other

words, even before I was first sought out by the Amerasia group,
the FBI was satisfied that the source of Ameras:i.a's documents was
kn01VD

and the case solved.
Dr. Kubek also chooses to ignore some very direct refuta

tions of his allegation that I had any ce!ltral role in tl:e Amerasia
'lase:

:'tr. McINJo..'RNEY. The evidence on Service was thin. They said
tbere ,\-las in Jaffe's office, as I recall j.t, copies of his
confidential report s. \'lhen ive arre sted, or made the searche s,
'we-found c()pies of his l'eport. He· irrLcrvlevled I~ars(:n, and l,a1'so11
admitted that he had given Service's copies to Jaffe, ano. Service
had. not given them.. Service was very sUl'prised that Jaffe had
that report. It we.s on that thin allegation that v.'e a'.lthol'ized
on Service ...... (Testimony of Mr. James McInerney, Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Criminal DiVision, Department
of Justice, before the Hobbs committee in 1946. TT, p. 2289)
MY. }'!ORGAIr.

You sa"l all the evidence I assume, available in
connection idth JOhi1 Service.
fil'x. McINERl'JEY. Yes, sir. You mean-
Mr. MORGAN. At that time.
Mr. McINr~NEY. I, personally?
:'tr. MORGAN. I mean, at the time of the prosecution, were you
cognizant and familiar 'Nith the evidence against l·tr. Service?
fill'. McINERNEY. Ye s, sir.
Vx. MORGAN. An1, on the basi s of your knOi.Jledgeof such evidence,
did you feel that prosecution of him i·:as '\-iarranted?
Mr. McINERNEY. No, sir. (TT, p. 998)
To sU!!Il1.:w:-ize.

After laying a fOU'ldation of assertion that a

hillldred-odd stolen government documents written by me were found
in Amerasia, Dr. Kubek goes on to "assume" that many of these docu
ments '\-fere delivered by me to Jaffe, and that I had a central role

ina. strange case \-lhicli was not p:co::,e:::uted honestly and vigorously,
but instead effectively buried.

I submit that,. by any definition,

this is ciear an(l serious defamation.
The Amerasia case, after all, involved the criminal charge of
"conspiracy to embezzle, steal, and purloin Pl'Ope:rty, records, and
valuable things of the records and property of the United states."
To this charge, one

mall.

pleaded guilty and another, nolo contendere.

Punishable crimes, agaj.nst the United states and during a time of
war, ,,'ere obviously therefore committed.

For Dr. Kubek to say the.t

I had a "central role" in such a case cannot be anything other than
saying that I also i'las guilty.
In other words, Dr. Kubek, without being able to offer the
slightest scintilla of new evidence or information, blandly denies
the validity (good faith?

honesty?) ofa whole series of decisions

conscientiously reached over the years by numbers of boards, grand
juries, committees, and individuals, who had before them the whole
record:
a)

the grand jUl'y, which voted unanimously against my indictment,

b)

the state Dcp(1.:rtml'mt, under Secretary B"jrne.s, whl ch cleared
me and returned me to duty in August, 1945,

c)

the Loyalty Security Board, under General Snow, and the
responsible security and personnel officers of the Depart
ment of state, under Secretaries

~furshall

and Acheson,

who cleared me in some seven investigations and hearings
between 1946 and 1951,
d)

the T".fdings Subcommittee, including Senator Lodge, "lhich
found Senator McCarthy's charges--similar to those here
;revived by Dr. Kubek--to be unfounded,

e)

the State Department, under Secretary Dulles, "lhich accepted
my return to duty (after the Supreme Court had ruled unan

imously that r:ly discharge was illegal) and which, under
Secretary Herter, restored my security clearance in 1959
after another full investigation.

*

*

* *
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'1'here is

lr.ilc1'1

more th'l.t might, but nee:d not, be said about

~~:E'::"~~~ Pa~~.EE'

14y chief concern here is to

poj.!~t

out the

fraudulent representation thf.t a hundred-odd reports of mine .lere
found in Amerasia, and the defamation in the statements that I
delivered r.;any o.oCU'lients to

J~.ffe

and had a

ce~lt1'al

role in the

Amerasia caSE:.
Dr~

Kubek's other errors -of fact in the Introduction and in

his editorial comments are of many categories--major, minor, and
ludicrous--and too numerous to be dealt ''lith adequately here.
Dr. Kubek js, of course, free to form hi S ovm opinion of my
reporting f'rom China.

I am content to leave to the scholars in

the field the evaluation of this reporting (and the editor I s
analysis of it).

Although I dislike the packaging provided by

Dr. Kubek, I .relcome the publication of my reports: I wish,
indeed, that it had not been so long delayed.

IV.w

OvID

personal

copies were deposited with the Offlce of Chinese Affairs in 1945
and subsequently lost.

In 1950, in

hearings befm'e the IJoyalty

IT.;}"

-Security Board and the Tydings Coromi ttee, 1: had considered that
my he st defen se again st some of. the accuse.tiol: s vlot,ld be -:he actual

texts of my reports from Yenan.

Despite strenuous efforts, it Vias

never possible to assemble anything like a complete set.

Little

did I and my couJlsel suspect that the "evidence" needed fOl' my
defense

vlaS

there all the time, locked up by the Department of

Justice in the form of retained copies of my personal papers.
Scholars will perhaps find the documentary materials useful
for research into that period.

They may find Dr. Kubek's contri

butions less useful in some other "rays.

It may be hard, for instance, to
Dr. Chang (p. 1162).

~\.now

Chinese names are one problem.

that Dr. Hsi-jo is really

Or that Dr. Hu Shih, the scholar-philosopher

and former an,bassador to the United States, is generally (but not
a.hrays) listed in the index under Shih.
uniformly

he~.I'f'nl:

The editor's notes are not

as, for instance, when h:- informs the reader that

.

flCC Clique" means "Chinese Com'l!unist
.
Clique in Kuomintang politics"
(p. 527).

And it may be a good idea to check footnote citations.

Professor Harold M. Vinacke may be surprised, for example, to find

Chiang Kai-shek's vie\-/s put into his mouth (footnote 29, p. 21).

*

*

'*

*

Vnlat', one 'Ivonders, is the purpose of this ponderous, maladroit
effort to raise the ghost of Senator McCarthy.
Soon after the

appea~~a.nce

of The Amerasia

Pap~~,

Dr. Kubek

commenced \1hat seems, from the nei.,rs repox·ts> to have been something
of a td_ulilphal tour of Tail-Ian.

The Free China vleekl;y:, of March 29,

1970, headlined a featured intervievr with him: HAHSAvl TALKS HURT

AUJIES.

'l'hi s '....ould probably not be the fir st time that the Internal

Security Committee has demonstrated an interest in external affairs.
It is al so true that the Committee has been \-laging a feud vli th
the Department of State for a number of years over the employment
of Mr. otto Otepka.

But it is nO\-l more than eight year s since I

retlred from the State Department; and, in any case, any relevance
or connection of my case to Otepka's seems obscure.
Dr. Kubek a_lso rnakes a somewhat obscure statement about my
employment since retirement .
• • . eventually fiervic!7 found a convenient cockpit for f'urthel'
poss:ible propagandizing of .the beatitudes of the Corllmunist
rct;ime. This VIas on the library staff of the Cent€::r for Chinese
Studies at the BerY.eley campus of the University of California ..•.

(p. 70)
Since I have neither writ.. . . en, spoken, nor taught any courses dealing
"d_th the government and politics 'of modern China, Dr. Kubek can hardly
knO\v my c'urrent vievis.

Presumably, then, it must be the mere fact

of my employment that he wishes to call attention to.
Finally, there is a statement in the Foreword that the Amerasia
story should be a lesson "especially for all the officials in our
Government, whether or not in the diplomatic service .rr
But none of these clues really casts much light on why I, per
sonally, should have been picked as the prime target of Dr. Kubek' s
monuncntal 'dork.
very

II

st!' 2.nge" •

To use one of hi s mm favor i te vlords, I find it
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this work several times over with considerable accuracy, and to Hr. John
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